A Micro-Economic Analysis of Farm Restructuring in the Khorezm Region, Uzbekistan by Djanibekov, Nodir
  
- Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung - 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 
 
 
 
 
A Micro-Economic Analysis of Farm Restructuring 
in the Khorezm Region, Uzbekistan 
 
 
Inaugural-Dissertation 
 
zur 
 
Erlangung des Grades 
 
Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften 
(Dr.agr.) 
 
 
der 
 
Hohen Landwirtschaftlichen Fakultät 
 
der 
 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 
 
zu Bonn 
 
 
 
vorgelegt am 25. März 2008 
 
von 
Nodir Djanibekov 
 
aus 
Taschkent (Usbekistan) 
 
  
Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde von der Hohen Landwirtschaftlichen Fakultät der Rheinischen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn als Dissertation zugelassen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referent:    Prof. Dr. Klaus Frohberg 
Korreferent:    PD Dr. Peter Wehrheim 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 15. Mai 2008 
Erscheinungsjahr:   2008 
 
 
 
Diese Dissertation ist auf dem Hochschulschriftenserver der ULB Bonn 
http://hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de/diss_online elektronisch publiziert. 
 
 
  
“The great thing about being the only species that makes a distinction between right 
and wrong is that we can make up the rules for ourselves as we go along.” 
- Douglas Adams 
 
 
 
“No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not only the 
world as it is, but the world as it will be...“ 
- Isaac Asimov 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A Micro-economic Analysis of Farm Restructuring in the Khorezm Region, Uzbekistan 
 
Ever since its independence several reforms in agriculture of Uzbekistan have been taken as 
part of a gradual transition process towards a market-based economy. These processes 
include: market liberalization, reformation of land relations, structural changes, and creation 
of supporting market infrastructure. Furthermore, there has been considerable promotion of 
input market liberalization, abolishment of state procurement system, introduction of water 
charges and improvement of the livestock sector. The understanding of the effects of these 
reforms on the agricultural producers and consumers is very important for further decision 
making. This work is part of ZEF’s project in development research on the ’Economic and 
ecological restructuring of land and water use in Khorezm, Uzbekistan’. 
In order to formalize the key aspects of sectoral decision making, the major task of this 
research is to develop a model for policy analysis which reflects the unique features of the 
agricultural sector of Khorezm. The developed model integrates linear supply and non-linear 
demand modules at the point of partial equilibrium under observed values from 2003. The 
supply module consist of the regional crop and animal production activities over three farm 
groups. The demand module is based on a Normalized Quadratic – Quadratic Expenditure 
System which specifies both an Engel curve and relative price effects consistent with 
microeconomic theory. The demand module consists of food and manufactured commodities 
including leisure time with endogenous prices over two consumer types. A large amount of 
aggregated and micro-economic data on the regional agriculture sector is used for providing 
the necessary information to understand the construction of the model and the results.  
To ensure that the base solution of the model fits the observed values of modeled activities 
and that the model simulations include the characteristics of regional demand and supply, the 
model parameters both for demand and supply modules are adjusted separately. This study 
contributes to the field of known calibration techniques for positive mathematical 
programming models. The developed method solves the overspecialization problem, 
maintains model flexibility, and allows the model exactly replicate the observed situation by 
recovering its original specification. 
The model results eventually show that, despite higher input prices and water pricing being 
introduced, positive effects of water use efficiency and market liberalization may dominate. 
Furthermore, it could be shown that the livestock sector serves as a security tool in rural 
households for maintaining their income level. Moreover, the improvement in livestock 
productivity shows the potential to decrease water consumption in the agricultural sector of 
the region. The market liberalization will not necessarily lead to an increase in the regional 
production of cotton. In general, the market liberalization has a positive effect on the regional 
rice sector which can be cultivated on land released from the procurement quotas in case the 
land is suitable for rice cultivation.  
Kurzfassung 
 
Eine Mikroökonomische Analyse des Landwirtschaftlichen Strukturwandels in der 
Region Khorezm, Usbekistan 
 
Seit der Unabhängigkeit von der ehemaligen Sowjetunion fand in Usbekistan eine Vielzahl 
von wirtschaftspolitischen Reformen statt, die auf einen schrittweisen Umbau der 
Wirtschaftsordnung, einschließlich des Agrarsektors, in Richtung Marktwirtschaft abzielten. 
Diese Reformen betrafen Gütermarktordnungen, Eigentums- und Nutzungsrechte 
landwirtschaftlicher Flächen, sowie infrastrukturelle Maßnahmen. Darüber hinaus wurden 
insbesondere die Märkte für landwirtschaftliche Vorleistungen liberalisiert, die staatliche 
Intervention weitgehend abgeschafft, Gebühren für Wassernutzung eingeführt und 
Maßnahmen zur Förderung  der Tierproduktion ergriffen. Ein tieferes Verständnis der 
Auswirkungen dieser Reformen auf die landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe wie auch auf den 
gesamten Agrarsektor ist von grundlegender Bedeutung für die Formulierung weiterführender 
politischer Strategien. Die hier vorgelegte Studie wurde im Rahmen des Projekts ’Economic 
and ecological restructuring of land and water use in Khorezm, Uzbekistan’ am Zentrum für 
Entwicklungsforschung der Universität Bonn durchgeführt. 
Im Zentrum der durchgeführten Analysen stand die Entwicklung eines quantitativen Modells, 
das die relevanten politischen Maßnahmen und die Besonderheiten des regionalen 
Agrarsektors in formalisierter Weise darstellt. Das hierzu entwickelte Modell verbindet ein 
lineares Angebotsmodul mit einem nicht-linearen Nachfragemodul mit Hilfe eines partiellen 
Gleichgewichtsmodells. Das Angebotsmodul beinhaltet landwirtschaftliche 
Produktionsverfahren dreier standardisierter Betriebstypen auf regionaler Ebene. Das 
Nachfragemodul basiert auf einem normalisiert quadratisch-quadratischem Ausgabensystem 
(NQ-QES), welches Einkommenseffekte wie auch relative Preiseffekte konsistent mit 
mikroökonomischer Theorie abbildet. Das Nachfragemodul berücksichtigt als endogene 
Variablen den Konsum von Nahrungsmitteln und weiterverarbeiteten Gütern, wie auch die 
Nachfrage nach Freizeit und damit das Angebot und den Preis für landwirtschaftliche 
Arbeitskraft. Es werden zwei Haushaltstypen unterschieden. Der enorme Datenbedarf des 
Modells wird durch offizielle Statistiken für den Agrarsektor und eigene Erhebungen gedeckt. 
Die strukturellen Parameter des Nachfrage- und Angebotsmoduls wurden in einem 
zweistufigen Verfahren so kalibriert, dass die Beobachtungen des Basisjahrs 2003 vom 
Modell repliziert werden. Diese Studie leistet mit der hierzu angewendeten Methode einen 
Beitrag im Bereich der positiv-mathematischen Programmierung und der Anwendung von 
Kalibrierungstechniken für partielle Gleichgewichtsmodelle. 
Die Modellrechnungen zeigen, dass die Einführung von Gebühren für Wassernutzung, wie 
auch die Verringerung der staatlichen Beihilfen für landwirtschaftliche Vorleistungen, durch 
Steigerung der Wassereffizienz und weitere Marktliberalisierung kompensiert werden können. 
Darüber hinaus wurde deutlich, dass Tierhaltung einen großen Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der 
ländlichen Einkommen leistet. Eine Verbesserung der Produktivität in diesem Bereich würde 
daher zu einer Verminderung der Abhängigkeit von pflanzlicher Produktion führen und 
potentiell den regionalen Bedarf nach Wasser verringern. Die regionale Produktion von 
Baumwolle würde durch eine Liberalisierung der Marktordnung eher sinken, so dass die frei 
werdenden Flächen zum Teil zum Anbau von Reis genutzt werden könnten. 
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Introduction 
 1
1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Setting 
Uzbekistan has some distinctive economic features compared to other transitional countries, 
such as high rates of population growth, a high percentage of rural population and of an 
economically active population in agriculture (Bloch 2002). Uzbekistan has a small 
percentage of arable land and very little arable land per capita of rural population (FAO 
2003). In Uzbekistan, especially in Khorezm, agricultural production is highly dependent on 
irrigation, the arable land is almost entirely irrigated and its further expansion is limited 
(Abdolniyozov 2000). Agriculture remains the most important sector of Uzbekistan’s 
economy, providing national food security and currency earnings. In Uzbekistan, around 65% 
of the population is rural, and almost 35% of total labor force is employed in agriculture 
(Spoor 2004). In 2001, the share of agriculture was about 30% of national GDP, and 
agricultural exports contributed around 35% of total national exports (Spoor 2004). 
The agricultural policy of Uzbekistan has four objectives central in line of the agricultural 
reforms (Guadagni et al 2005). First, it is stated that cotton production should allow 
stabilization of the country’s export revenues. Therefore, the agricultural sector of Uzbekistan 
is specialized in cotton production (Spoor 2004). Second, the country should be self-sufficient 
in wheat production; to this end, the area under wheat cultivation in Uzbekistan has been 
dramatically increased since 1992 (Babu and Tashmatov 2000). The third objective of the 
agricultural policy is that agricultural revenues are to be used to finance industrialization in 
Uzbekistan (Spoor 2004). In this case, a majority of state revenue from agricultural taxation in 
Uzbekistan comes from implicit taxes such as low procurement prices for the main export 
crop, cotton (Guadagni et al 2005). Finally, the agricultural policies are directed at the 
improvement of rural standards of living. For instance suitable industries have been 
established in rural areas and the private farming has been promoted (ADB 2000). 
Since independence, several reforms in agriculture have been taken as part of a gradual 
transition to a market-based economy, including market liberalization, reformation of land 
relations, structural changes, and creation of supporting market infrastructure. With respect to 
market liberalization, the consumer prices for most commodities were liberalized and the 
number of commodities under state procurement was reduced (Sirajiddinov 2004). However, 
since agriculture is the main source of the country’s export, state involvement in this sector 
remains substantial via a state procurement system and distribution of essential agricultural 
inputs (Zettelmeyer 1999). To provide incentive for agricultural producers to increase wheat 
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production, the size of procurement quotas for wheat was reduced and its procurement price 
was increased to market level (Müller 2006). Nevertheless, the production of the state target 
crops has remained substantial in land and input use in Uzbekistan (Spoor 2004). 
Farm restructuring and land reform in Uzbekistan have covered several steps including the 
conversion of state farms into collective farms and the further transformation of these 
collective farms into private farms (Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz 2002). With the completion of 
the state farm fragmentation process, a new system of agricultural producers has emerged in 
Uzbekistan, where the agricultural commodities are produced by middle scale private farms 
and traditional small scale households. All these economic features and reforms in the 
national agricultural sector of Uzbekistan are applicable for the agricultural sector of 
Khorezm (Kyle and Chabot 1997). The current farm restructuring process, namely 
transformation of large scale state farms into middle scale private farms, has increased the 
number of individual producers in Uzbekistan. Further reforms in the agricultural sector are 
geared toward an increase in producer incentives by abolishing the state procurement system 
and introducing water charges in agriculture (Bloch and Kutuzov 2001, Bloch 2002). It was 
argued by many authors that the implicit taxation of the agricultural sector, via the state 
procurement system, deprived the agricultural producers Uzbekistan of profits (Rosenberg et 
al. 1999, Guadagni et al 2005, Khan 2005, Spoor 1999, Spoor 2004). The abolishment of the 
state procurement system may raise incentives for cotton production and lead to a more 
profitable production pattern. At the same time, the role of the government in maintaining and 
operating the irrigation and drainage networks in Uzbekistan has been revised, where the 
water management has been transferred to newly established water user associations (WUA) 
and the introduction of water pricing mechanism is under discussion (McKinney 1996, 
Bucknall et al. 2003, Mott MacDonald 2003). Such agricultural reforms may result in 
unknown consequences on production patterns among different types of agricultural 
producers and in different districts in Khorezm. While the new policies may have a positive 
impact on total agricultural output, it is unclear which one will have the most significant 
impact. Furthermore, it is unclear how the different policies will affect regional production of 
specific agricultural commodities. Hence, the issue can be reduced to two main questions: 
how a policy will affect the income of different agricultural producers, and what is the effect 
of the policy on regional production. The problem, therefore, requires a tool for systematic 
policy analysis. Understanding the impacts of different policies for the agricultural sector of 
Khorezm is complex as regional agriculture includes multiple, inter-related commodities and 
inputs on the level of several groups of agricultural producers and districts. An agricultural 
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sector model is one such tool which can deal with the quantitative problems, while taking into 
account the specific settings of the regional agricultural sector. Moreover, application of the 
mathematical programming models can help to obtain a better understanding of the 
functioning of the regional agriculture sector and to provide a tool for policy analysis. A well 
defined and documented model may provide valuable information to be used in evaluating 
policy effects. 
1.2 Hypotheses 
Considering the features of the agricultural sector of Khorezm, the hypotheses to be examined 
in this study are as follows: 
1. Under the current scenario of no functioning land market, inter-farm shifts of land, i.e. 
completion of farm restructuring process, could increase economic efficiency of land and 
water use; 
2. Introduction of water prices will shift the regional crop production towards a less water-
demanding and towards livestock production; 
3. Cotton and input market liberalization will increase the area of cotton cultivation; 
4. The livestock sector may be a tool for supporting the incomes of rural households when 
input markets are liberalized and water pricing is introduced. 
1.3 Objectives 
The overall goal of this research is to analyze the consequences of different agricultural 
policies on regional production and consumption patterns. In order to formalize the major 
aspects of sectoral decision making, the major task of this study is to develop an agricultural 
sector model for policy analysis, reflecting the unique features of the regional agricultural 
sector of the Khorezm region. Whereas the empirical results may help policy makers to 
evaluate alternative policies, the model can be used to improve other empirical models being 
developed within the ZEF’s Khorezm project once more data become available. 
Methodologically, prerequisites for building a regional programming model for the study 
region are the existence of a mathematical tool to formulate and solve the problems of 
agricultural development and availability of basic regional data reflecting the problems to be 
solved. The specific objectives of this study and thus the model selection criteria included are 
as follows: 
1. to develop a mathematical programming model on the basis of empirical and economic 
information available for the Khorezm region; 
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2. to use the model as a policy information tool with which quantitative policy analysis can 
be conducted in order to better understand the factual information available for policy-
makers; 
3. to simulate alternative policy options to assess the associated income changes of 
agricultural producers; 
4. to provide information about possibilities to restructure agricultural production such that 
economic efficiency of land and water use can be improved; 
5. to establish an elegant technique for calibrating a mathematical programming model. 
1.4 Overview of Research Procedure  
The study is part of the development research project on ’Economic and ecological 
restructuring of land and water use in Khorezm region’. One of the objectives of the project is 
to develop concepts for landscape restructuring in the Khorezm region with proposals for 
legal-administrative and ecological restructuring measures using sustainable natural resource 
management concepts. The study focuses on basic commodity production in the regional 
agricultural sector under specific regional conditions. This study was conducted in three steps: 
First step related to the theoretical section, collection of the relevant publications and 
literature addressing the issues of agricultural production in Uzbekistan and the Khorezm 
region. The second step was the data collection for the empirical section from surveys and 
official statistical institutions to give an understanding on the agricultural sector in the study 
region. To determine and analyze the impacts of different policy options in regional 
production and consumption considering the local conditions, a mathematical programming 
model was then developed. In this study, a comparative static analysis of the development of 
regional production and consumption is adopted. To ensure that base solution of the model 
fits the observed values of modelled activities, and to ensure that the model simulations 
include the characteristics of regional demand and supply, the model parameters both for 
demand and supply are adjusted. First, the parameters of the supply side were adjusted via the 
technology coefficients of the model. Next, the demand side was calibrated by deriving the 
parameters for flexible demand functions. After both supply and demand sides were 
calibrated, different simulations were run for selected policies and their impacts on different 
groups of agricultural producers and districts as well as for the whole of the Khorezm region. 
The calibration of the supply side is based on a new approach which is presented here as an 
alternative to positive mathematical programming. The calibration of the demand side is 
based on an approach advocated by Frohberg and Winter (2001). 
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1.5 Thesis Organization  
The content of this dissertation is as follows: Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides 
an overview of the regional agricultural sector in Khorezm. The farm restructuring process is 
introduced and basic information on main agricultural producers, the performance of the 
agricultural sector and production technologies, and major agricultural policies are discussed. 
Chapter 2, therefore, provides the reader with the necessary information to understand the 
model construction and analysis presented in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 3, the 
general structure of the applied model is presented. Both the supply and demand sides of the 
model are described separately. Chapter 4 describes the approach used for calibrating the 
supply and demand sides of the model. First, the approach used to calibrate the supply side of 
the model is presented as an alternative for standard calibration approach knows as ‘positive 
mathematical programming’. Following this, the approach applied for calibration of the 
demand side of the model is presented. Finally, in this chapter, the results of the supply side 
calibration are discussed, highlighting the most relevant information for understanding how 
the applied approach adjusted the technology parameters of the model. Chapter 5 first 
provides motivation for and describes the selected set of policy simulations based on ones 
which are already introduced or their introduction is widely discussed in Uzbekistan. The first 
scenario simulates the increase in water efficiency via improving maintenance and 
rehabilitation of the existing irrigation and drainage system. In the second scenario, water 
pricing was introduced as a mechanism for to recover the operation and maintenance costs of 
water suppliers. The simulation included both an increase in crop yields and water efficiency. 
The simulation assumes that the collected water charges are invested into improving the 
regional irrigation and drainage system guaranteeing timely supply and better quality of 
irrigation water, decreasing soil salinity and ground water level. The next scenario was the 
market liberalization where the state procurement system for cotton is abolished and input 
subsidies are removed. The fourth scenario includes the scenario with the complete 
fragmentation of large-scale state producers into private farms. Scenario five simulates the 
improvement of livestock productivity in Khorezm. Finally, a cumulative scenario is 
simulated where all the previous five policies are introduced at once. Following the 
calibration of the model, the selected set of agricultural policies was simulated and their 
economic impact on regional production, consumption, as well as on the shadow values of the 
model constraints, was analyzed. Finally, the summary of the study, policy implications and 
outlook for future research are presented in Chapter 6. 
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2. Agricultural Land and Water Use in the Khorezm Region 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with background information on the 
agricultural sector of Khorezm. This descriptive introduction to the study region should help 
the reader place the analysis presented in later chapters of this thesis into its empirical context. 
Information on the studied region is presented in order to highlight the major features of 
agriculture in the Khorezm region, as they pertain to this study. While the study focuses on 
regional agriculture in the year 2003, it also makes reference to the major changes which have 
occurred since 1991. The analysis in this chapter is based on data received from the official 
statistical sources and collected in our own field research. Section 2.1 presents an overview of 
the process of farm restructuring in the region during the period 1991-2003. Section 2.2 
discusses essential features of Khorezm’s main agricultural producers. Section 2.3 describes 
the performance of the regional agricultural sector in the period of 1991-2003. Section 2.4 
provides some basic information regarding input endowments and production technologies 
used by agricultural producers in Khorezm. Regional food consumption and expenditure 
structures are presented in section 2.5. In section 2.6 we describe the three dominant 
agricultural policies, state procurement, taxation and subsidization of agricultural producers. 
The chapter is supplemented by a brief excursion into agricultural reforms in Khorezm; 
presented in Appendix 1 of this thesis. 
2.1 Land Reform and Farm Restructuring 
The transition process from a centrally guided economy to a market economy is comprised of 
several processes such as the abolishment of central planning, reduction of government 
interventions, and elimination of price controls. Agricultural reforms in Uzbekistan play a 
fundamental part in the transition to a market economy (Guadagni et al 2005). They are being 
implemented gradually and include: market liberalization, land reform and the creation of a 
supporting market infrastructure. Of these reform processes, land reform, explicitly the 
establishment of private property rights for agricultural land as well as the restructuring of 
traditional state and collective farms, has been considered the elementary transition process in 
all former Soviet Union countries (Lerman et al. 2004). In Uzbekistan the aforementioned 
reform policies aim to achieve four central objectives (Guadagni et al 2005). The first 
objective is for cotton production to ensure the stabilization of the country’s export revenues. 
Secondly, Uzbekistan aims for self-sufficiency in wheat production. Third, agricultural 
revenues are to be used to finance industrialization. The final objective of the agricultural 
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policies is to improve rural standards of living. At a regional scale, the farm restructuring 
process has followed three stages. The process is illustrated in Table 2.11: 
Table 2.1: Three stages of farm restructuring process in Khorezm 
  First stage Second stage Third stage 
Period 1992-1998 1998-2003 2003-present 
General objective of 
farm restructuring 
Collectivization of state 
owned farms 
Partial decollectivization Complete 
decollectivization  
Main transformations  Transformation of 
sovkhozs into kolkhozs 
Transformation of 
kolkhozs into kolkhozs; 
partial transformation of 
shirkats into private 
farms 
Complete 
transformation of 
shirkats into private 
farms 
Dominant type of 
agricultural 
producers 
Kolkhozs, sovkhozs and 
dekhqan farms 
Shirkats, private farms 
and dekhqan farms 
Private farms and 
dekhqan farms 
State procurement 
system 
Cotton, wheat and most 
agricultural products 
Cotton and wheat  Cotton and wheat  
Land ownership State ownership; 
permanent and lifetime 
inheritable possession 
Permanent and lifetime 
inheritable possession; 
land lease 
Lifetime inheritable 
possession; land lease 
Additionally created 
service agents 
No Water user associations; 
machinery and tractor 
parks 
Water user associations; 
machinery and tractor 
parks 
Dominant form of 
labor management 
Production links (zveno) 
and brigades 
Family contracting 
(pudrats2) 
Permanent and seasonal 
employment 
Source: Own compilation 
The first stage of agricultural reforms was implemented during the first eight years of 
independence. This stage was characterized by the transformation of state farms (sovkhozs) 
into collective farms (kolkhozs) via the transfer of property rights from state ownership to 
collective ownership, which required former sovkhozs to become operationally self-
supporting. During the second stage of farm restructuring which started in 1998, shirkats 
almost entirely replaced kolkhozs and became the dominant form of agricultural labor 
employment, and production of strategic crops such as export oriented cotton and import-
oriented wheat. In the first year of this second wave of farm restructuring all 132 collective 
farms in Khorezm were restructured, and 123 of them became shirkats while the remaining 
                                                 
1 A more detailed description of farm restructuring process is presented in Appendix 1. 
2 In Khorezm region in 2002, the average size of a pudrat was 6.9 hectares. An average pudrat is contracted 
from two to five years. 
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nine kolkhozs were divided into private farm unions (Kandiyoti 2002). The third stage of the 
farm restructuring process is characterized by an intensified fragmentation of shirkats into 
private farms. It has been in progress since 2003. In that year the farm restructuring process 
was shifted from partial reallocation of shirkats’ land to private farms to a complete 
disbandment of all shirkats within an administrative unit (rayon) into private farms 
(Djanibekov 2008). During the third stage of the reform in Khorezm on average 60 to 80 new 
private farms emerged in the place of one completely disbanded shirkat (OblSelVodKhoz 
2004b). The 2003 approach has somewhat adjusted to this, by supporting the creation of 
larger size private farms (PDFA 2004) than had been the case under the 1998 policies 3 
(Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1:  Dynamics in establishing private farms in Khorezm 
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If the currently held average size of private farms in Khorezm is maintained, there will be 
about 15,600 private farms with average size of 13.5 hectares by the end of the farm 
restructuring process (PDFA 2004). Assuming that one household can establish only one 
private farm, eight percent of households will become owners of a private farm business in 
Khorezm. The share of households, which will be actively involved in private farming, may 
be higher if the family relationships between households are considered; e.g. several families 
can own one private farm. 
                                                 
3 According to the regional office of association of private and dekhqan farms (PDFA) in Khorezm all shirkats in 
Yangibazar rayon in 2003 were disbanded into private farms with average size of 17 hectares. 
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2.2 Main Features of Agricultural Producers 
In 2003 the agricultural production in Khorezm mainly took place among three different types 
of agricultural producers; each distinguishable by their resource endowments, land use rights, 
production activities and individual policy environments (Djanibekov 2008). Table 2.2 lists 
the distinctive features of Khorezm’s main agricultural producers. 
Table 2.2: Main agricultural producers in Uzbekistan 
Private farm  Shirkats 
(agricultural 
cooperatives) Crop growing  Gardening and horticultural  
Livestock 
rearing  
Dekhqan farm
(households) 
Production 
specialization 
Crops Crops Vegetables, 
potatoes, 
melons; 
orchards 
Livestock, 
including 
poultry 
Subsistence 
agriculture 
State 
procurement 
Cotton and 
winter wheat 
Cotton and 
winter wheat 
No state 
procurement 
No state 
procurement 
No state 
procurement 
Additional 
production 
Maize, 
sunflower, rice, 
vegetables, etc. 
Maize, 
sunflower, rice, 
vegetables, etc. 
Winter wheat 
and fodder crops 
Fodder crops, 
maize, winter 
wheat, 
vegetables, 
potatoes, 
melons and 
rice 
Any 
agricultural 
crops and 
livestock, 
including 
poultry 
Form  
of land tenure 
Permanent 
possession; 
based on 
territory of 
former kolkhozs 
and sovkhozs 
which is about 
1.500 ha 
Long-term lease 
(10-50 years); 
minimum 10 ha 
Long-term lease 
(10-50 years); 
minimum 1ha 
Long-term 
lease (10-50 
years); 0.33 ha 
per a head of 
conventional 
cattle with a 
minimum of 
30 heads of 
conventional 
cattle (10 ha) 
Lifetime 
inheritable 
possession; 
maximum 0.35 
ha 
Input  
subsidies 
Direct input 
subsidies from 
the state and debt 
write-offs for all 
cropping 
activities 
Direct input 
subsidies from 
the state and a 
special credit at 
low interest 
rates (5% 
annual) only for 
cropping 
activities under 
state 
procurement 
None None None 
Form  
of labor 
Family contracts 
(pudrats) 
Family workers 
and hired labor 
Family workers 
and hired labor 
Family 
workers and 
hired labor 
Family workers 
Source: Own compilation 
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In 2003, agricultural production mainly took place within large-scale agricultural cooperatives 
(shirkats). As mentioned above, these agricultural cooperative enterprises were created in 
place of state and collective farms during the second stage of the farm restructuring process 
(Djanibekov 2008). As such, shirkats inherited the rights, obligations, input endowments, 
production targets and rural employment tasks of sovkhozs and kolkhozs. According to 
corresponding legislation, land was given to shirkats as permanent possession for the specific 
purpose of agricultural production (OblZem 2004). As successors of state and collective 
farms, shirkats were included into the system of state procurement quotas and input subsidies.  
At the end of the first stage of farm restructuring in 1998, shirkats cultivated 82% of total 
sown area in Khorezm (OblStat 2004a). In 2003, due to an increased rate of farm 
restructuring, area cultivated by shirkats has decreased to 50% of the regional total 
(OblSelVodKhoz 2004b). As a result of the shirkat disassembly into private farms, the 
average size of a shirkat in Khorezm decreased from 1,850 hectares to 1,445 hectares from 
1999 to 2003 (OblZem 2004).  
Figure 2.2: Cropping pattern in shirkats in Khorezm 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
C
ro
pp
in
g 
pa
tt
er
n 
(%
)
0
40
80
120
160
200
So
w
n 
ar
ea
 (1
0 3
 h
a)
CTN WWT RCE PVM
FDR OCR AREA
 
Notes: CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE –Rice; PVM - Potatoes, vegetables and melons ; 
FDR – Maize and fodder crops; OCR – Other crops; AREA – Sown area 
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It is notable that the partial fragmentation of shirkats into private farms did not decrease the 
shirkats’ area under cotton and wheat cultivation however (OblStat 2004a). The area used by 
shirkats to grow state target crops remained fairly unaffected, while reductions were seen in 
fodder production instead. Shirkats allocate the majority of their land to cotton (Figure 2.2). 
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By 2003, winter wheat became the crop with the second largest share in shirkat production; a 
result of state initiatives towards achieving national grain self-sufficiency. 
Private farms comprise the second type of agricultural producers Uzbekistan. Uzbek law 
defines the private farms as agricultural enterprises, which are managed by individual families 
or groups of families on land received under a long-term lease with a maximum period of fifty 
years. The number of private farms in Khorezm increased significantly during the second and 
third stage of the farm restructuring process (PFDA 2004). This increase was largely due to 
the mandatory disbandment of shirkats rather than improvements of infrastructure for private 
entrepreneurship in the agricultural sector. In 2003, 6,500 private farms cultivated 29% of the 
total sown area in Khorezm (PFDA 2004, OblStat 2004a). The average size of private farms 
in the Khorezm region increased from 7.5 hectares in 1998 to 13 hectares by the end of 2003 
(PFDA 2004). According to Khan (2005), there exists considerable inequality in the land 
distribution process for private farming in Uzbekistan. Khorezm replicates this finding at a 
smaller scale, as a large share of land in the region belongs to a proportionally small number 
of private farms. Figure 2.3 shows this distribution of farms in Uzbekistan and the Khorezm 
region with respect to their leased area. 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of private farms by size in Khorezm and Uzbekistan 
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In Uzbekistan, the present legislation on private farms distinguishes three different types of 
private farms, based on their specialization in agricultural production (Table 2.2). The largest 
and dominant type is comprised of private farms which specialize in crop production. This 
type of farm enterprise must lease at least 10 hectares of land, designated to it by the 
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government for the production of cotton and cereals. Within the state procurement system, 
these farms receive state subsidies for producing those two strategic crops. The second farm 
type is the horticultural private farm, which specializes in gardening and grape growing. This 
type of farm must be at least one hectare in size and is beyond the state procurement system. 
The main crops, which are produced by these enterprises, are fruits and grapes. However, this 
type of private farm may also produce crops in combination with the production of fruit and 
grapes, such as winter wheat, potato, vegetables, melons, and fodder crops. Additionally, the 
horticultural private farms are allowed to keep a small stock of animals. Since the 
horticultural farms are not included into the state procurement system, they do not receive the 
state subsidies for agricultural inputs. 
The third type of private farms specializes in rearing livestock including poultry. According to 
the legislation, the area leased to this type of private farms is directly related to their animal 
stock in the ratio of 0.33 hectare per one conventional cattle unit, meaning that there should 
be at least 30 heads of cattle equivalents corresponding to 10 hectares of land (PFDA 2004). 
In addition to animal rearing, livestock farms can produce cash crops such as vegetables, 
potato and rice. The animal rearing private farms enjoy more decision-making freedom than 
crop growing private farm, but similarly to the horticultural private farms, they do not receive 
state subsidies for agricultural inputs.  
In official statistics, crop growing and horticultural private farms are classified into one group 
of private farms, whereas animal keeping private farms are considered as a separate group. 
The share of land used by livestock keeping farms in the total area leased by private farms has 
decreased from 33% in 1999 to 10% in 2003 (OblStat 2004a). The remaining 90% of private 
farm land is leased to crop growing and horticultural farms. The average size of a private farm 
in the group of crop growing and horticultural is 14.8 hectares, and of livestock rearing 
private farms is 13.1 hectares (PFDA 2004). In the first year of the farm restructuring process, 
private farming in Khorezm had a more commercial orientation. Rice production in private 
farms amounted to one third of farms’ sown area, while cotton and wheat were grown on 25% 
and 10% of private farm fields, respectively (Figure 2.4). Since having replaced shirkats, 
private farms have received the shirkats’ share in cotton and wheat production for state 
procurement. Since 1998, the crop pattern of private farms has shifted towards cotton (40%) 
and wheat (21%) production (OblStat 2004a). As result, by the end of 2003, the private farm 
fields were mainly allocated to cotton, wheat and fodder crops (Figure 2.4). According to the 
farm survey conducted by the author in Khorezm in 2003, the state procurement for cotton 
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and wheat accounted for almost two-thirds of the area sown by crop growing private farms in 
2002. 
Figure 2.4: Cropping pattern in private farms in Khorezm 
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Notes: CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – Rice; PVM – Potatoes, vegetables and melons ; 
FDR – Maize and fodder crops; OCR – Other crops; AREA – Sown area 
Source: OblStat 2004a 
The third type of agricultural producers in Uzbekistan is rural households (dekhqan farms4). 
Their agricultural production is based on family labor and takes place on small household 
plots received on lifetime inheritable possession5. The individual household, which averages 
about 6-7 people in Khorezm, can be considered the smallest agricultural production unit 
(Djanibekov 2008). Household plot farming in rural Uzbekistan serves to complement income 
and food security (Spoor 2004), and is not a part of the state procurement system. There were 
almost 200,000 dekhqan farms in Khorezm in 2003, possessing in total 33,000 hectares of 
land (PFDA 2004). In 2003, dekhqan farms cultivated 17% of the total arable area in 
Khorezm (OblStat 2004a). According to official statistics, between 1998 and 2003, 
household’s sown area in Khorezm increased by 20% (OblZem 2004). 
In Uzbekistan, the dekhqan farm (household) operates two types of plots (Djanibekov 2008). 
The “attached plot“ (uy tomorqa) is practically a yard where household buildings and gardens 
                                                 
4 The word ‘dekhqan farm’ was often used with respect to private farms in papers on agriculture in Uzbekistan. 
The distinction of ‘dekhqan farm’ or ‘dekhqan hojalik’ from ‘private farm’ is word ‘dekhqan’ meaning a peasant 
or individuals whose livelihood is largely dependent on personal subsidiary plots and rural subsistence-type 
activities. Thus, in this study the terms ‘dekhqan farm’ and ‘dekhqan hojalik’ are referred to rural households.  
5 The study deals only with rural households. However, 50% of urban households have access to the plots similar 
to dekhqan plots (Khan 2005). 
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are located. The uy tomorqa averages about 0.1 hectare in size, with 30% of the area occupied 
by household dwelling and buildings. The second type is the “distant plot” (qushimcha 
tomorqa), which is located separately from household buildings. Two thirds of the rural 
households possess distant plots. These distant plots can be anywhere from 20 meters to 7 km 
away from the uy tomorqa, with an average distance of around 1.1 km in Khorezm 
(Djanibekov 2006a). The average size of the distant plot is 0.1 hectare. Although, according 
to legislation, dekhqan farms can have 0.35 hectare of irrigated land, a rural household in 
Khorezm with both attached and distant plots has an average size of 0.17 hectare of arable 
land, while the rest is occupied by dwellings and buildings (Djanibekov 2008). The average 
size of arable land in households which do not posses a distant plot is about 0.09 hectare. The 
attached and distant plot may constitute one piece if they border with each other, which is 
considered most favorable for rural households in terms of income. In such a case, the 
attached and distant plots are joined to each other composing a 0.25 hectare large plot of 
arable land6. Due to their cultivated area, the distant plots dominate in the use of production 
inputs such as manure, labor, machinery services and nitrogen fertilizers in rural households. 
The cropping pattern between the two plots is distinct (Djanibekov 2006a). Potato, vegetable 
and melons are grown mainly on the attached plots. Wheat and rice are mainly grown on the 
distant plot. A double cropping scheme is intensively used on both household plots 
(Djanibekov 2006a). 
Households largely allocate their plots to wheat, potato, vegetables and melons (Figure 2.5). 
However, according to a household survey conducted by the author in Khorezm in 2004, the 
small size of household plots resulted in very small marketing shares of produced food 
commodities; the largest share being used for own consumption (Djanibekov 2006a). The 
crops, which are produced by households in surplus and hence marketed, are rice, potato, 
vegetables, fruits and grapes. Moreover, despite the majority of household’s agricultural area 
in Khorezm being allocated to winter wheat, most rural households are net receivers of wheat. 
Annual wheat production of an average household can cover only one third of its annual 
consumption requirements.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 However, according to the legislation, households that have the attached and distant plots adjoined are not 
allowed to cultivate rice in their household plots. 
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Figure 2.5: Cropping pattern in households in Khorezm 
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Notes: WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – Rice; PVM – Potatoes, vegetables and melons; FDR – Maize 
and fodder crops; OCR – Other crops; AREA – Sown area 
Source: OblStat 2004a 
Since 1991, the total number of livestock kept in households doubled and accounted for 
almost 92% of the total regional animal stock. About 82% of the total regional poultry is 
raised by households (OblStat 2004a). According to the results of household survey, cows and 
calves are common in rural households: 89% and 79% of the surveyed households had 
respectively cows and calves. Poultry rearing was also widespread (84% of the surveyed 
households). Because of scarcity of pastures, sheep are not popular in Khorezm. Only 17% of 
interviewed households fed sheep; mainly for selling and own household ceremonies. On 
average, a household in Khorezm had one milking cow, one calf and 16 units of poultry. 
2.3 Agricultural Production 
2.3.1 Crop Production 
The regional GDP per capita in Khorezm in 2003 was about 255 USD (OblStat 2004b). The 
agricultural sector accounted for roughly 67% of the total regional GDP in 2003 (OblStat 
2004a). Crop production amounted to 43% and the animal sector produced almost 56% of the 
agricultural sector’s total output in 2003 (OblStat 2004a). In 2003, the output of the 
agricultural sector per hectare of sown area was about 1,044 USD. 
The reforms developed to achieve the transition to a market economy and grain self-
sufficiency changed the cropping pattern in Khorezm considerably (Table 2.3). Four major 
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observations regarding the regional cropping pattern can be made for 1993-2003. First, the 
area under cultivation of food crops, especially winter wheat increased drastically. Second, 
the cotton cultivated area has been kept unchanged. According to the state procurement 
system, the regional land allocation is determined primarily by the government and the state 
procurement quota. Remaining arable land may then be allotted to other crops at the 
discretion of agricultural producers. Consequently, with the intensification of the farm 
restructuring process, the land allocated under cash crops has not increased. Hence, the 
increase in wheat area was achieved at the expense of perennial fodder crops. Fourth, except 
for the drought period in 2000 and 2001 the total regional crop area has been increasing 
steadily. These four points will be discussed further.  
Table 2.3: Cropping pattern in Khorezm, 103 ha 
Crop 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002 2003
Share in 
national 
product
in 1992-2003, 
%
Cereals 42.2 64.5 78.7 73.0 49.2 68.9 86.0 6.1
Winter wheat 4.2 16.9 27.0 30.5 36.0 46.3 51.2 3.4
Rice 32.1 38.2 47.0 39.9 9.8 19.1 30.6 32.3
Cotton 112.6 102.1 100.3 100.3 109.6 110.7 102.3 7.4
Potato 1.9 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.9 4.1
Vegetables 8.2 9.6 6.5 5.7 7.1 7.9 8.7 5.1
Melons 4.0 3.1 2.6 2.4 4.0 4.1 3.3 8.3
Maize and fodder  70.2 62.4 52.1 42.2 30.7 31.7 26.9 8.3
Total crop area 239.1 244.8 242.8 225.8 203.3 225.9 230.1 6.0
Gardens 15.7 15.6 19.2 11.7 11.5 11.9 12.3 4.9
Total sown area 254.8 260.4 262.0 237.5 214.8 237.8 242.4 5.9
Source: MAWR 2004a; OblStat 2004b 
In 2003, 80% of the crop area in Khorezm was used for the cultivation of cotton, wheat and 
rice (OblStat 2004a). The production of other crops such as maize, potato, vegetables, melons, 
and fodder crops was less significant as they covered only 18% of the total crop area. 
Additionally, there was an attempt to introduce sugar beet cultivation in the Khorezm region 
in 1998-2001, based on an import substitution policy (OblStat 2004a). However, due to low 
yields and low sugar extraction rates the sugar cultivation in the Khorezm region was 
abandoned. 
Being the primary strategic crop because of its export value, cotton was cultivated on 45% of 
total crop area in Khorezm between 1992 and 2003 (OblStat 2004a). The total regional 
Agricultural Land and Water Use in the Khorezm Region 
 17
production of cotton in 1992 and 2003 amounted to 7.4% of total cotton production in 
Uzbekistan (MAWR 2004a). The general tendency in cotton production is that the cotton 
yield has been decreasing both at the national and the regional levels (OblStat 2004a). Since 
1998, when the farm restructuring process was accelerated, cotton production has been 
transferred from shirkats to private farms without affecting the total cotton area under 
cultivation in Khorezm (OblStat 2004a). 
Winter wheat is the main crop used in the double cropping system in Khorezm (Djanibekov 
2006a). In the double cropping system, it is grown as a first crop and is followed by rice or 
maize and sorghum for fodder in the summer period. In general, the regional production of 
wheat accounted for 3.4% of the total wheat production in Uzbekistan from 1992 to 2003 
(MAWR 2004a). Similar to cotton, wheat production has been transferred to private farms 
(OblStat 2004a), and the area of wheat cultivation in shirkats was maintained via decreasing 
the area under fodder crops. In Khorezm, wheat yield tripled during 1997-1999 and further 
dropped by almost half during the drought in 2000 and 2001 (OblStat 2004a). Major changes 
in the regional cropping pattern occurred due to the introduction of winter wheat as part of the 
state program of achieving food self-sufficiency. After the establishment of the program for 
grain independence in 1992, area allocated to wheat in Khorezm increased to 23% of total 
sown area in 2003 (OblStat 2004b). This was achieved through the decrease of fodder area, 
mainly lucerne (OblStat 2004a). At the same time, the area cultivated for cotton remained 
relatively stable. Overall, the expansion of winter wheat in the region did not affect the 
production of crops, which could still be grown in a short period after winter wheat. 
In 1992 and 2003, almost one-third of rice in Uzbekistan was produced in Khorezm (MAWR 
2004a). According to official statistics, the area under rice in Khorezm in 2003 was almost at 
the same level as in 1990 (OblStat 2004a). Rice cultivated area had remained relatively stable 
in the period of 1990-1999, but the drought years of 2000 and 2001 resulted in a drastic 80% 
decrease of rice production in the Khorezm region (OblStat 2004a). The strategic character of 
cotton in the national economy is a main reason why rice showed such drastic decreases in 
cultivated area during the drought years (Müller 2006). Depending on the sowing period, 
there are two methods of rice cultivation in Khorezm. The first method involves varieties of 
rice which are sown in spring as a first crop. The second method includes the varieties of rice 
which are planted after winter wheat in summer. Both cultivation methods allow for winter 
wheat sowing after the rice harvest. In the first years after introduction of winter wheat 
according to the state program on self-subsistence, the area of rice in Khorezm likely 
increased in part due to the increase in the use of the double cropping system. 
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The area allocated to food crops such as potatoes, vegetables and melons has been 
continuously increasing in proportion to regional population growth (OblStat 2004a, OblStat 
2004b). In the period of 1992-2003 the regional production of potato, vegetables and melons 
accounted for 5.4% of total production in Uzbekistan (MAWR 2004a). In Khorezm, almost 
two thirds of these food crops were produced on rural household plots, and mostly for own 
consumption with only a small surpluses being marketed (OblStat 2004a, Djanibekov 2006a).  
Maize is third among grains in terms of sown area in Khorezm (OblStat 2004a), and is mostly 
produced as a forage grain for livestock and poultry feeding (Djanibekov 2006b). Since 1991, 
the production of maize in Khorezm region has been decreasing; as is the case throughout 
Uzbekistan (OblStat 2004a, MAWR 2004a). In 2003 the production of maize for grain in 
Khorezm was about 28% of its production volume in 1991 (OblStat 2004a); accounting for 
2% of total national production. There are two maize cultivation methods that differ according 
to the date of sowing and time of harvest. In the first method, maize is sown early in spring 
and harvested after full ripeness of grains. Then the primary product, maize grains, and the 
byproduct, the maize stem, are used in poultry and livestock feeding. The second method 
involves a short growing season for fodder maize in summer; i.e. in-between winter wheat 
cultivation periods. In this method, fodder maize is harvested as a stem before its full 
ripeness. In Khorezm in 1991-2003, 85% of the area allocated to maize production was 
cultivated according to the second cultivation technique (OblStat 2004a). 
The increase of wheat production in Khorezm came at the cost of the area for perennial fodder 
crops. Between 1991 and 2001, the area of fodder crops in Khorezm decreased 2.8-fold and 
the ratio of forage sown area to livestock quantity diminished 3.6-fold (OblStat 2004a). 
Forage production was partially transferred from shirkats to households and later to private 
farms (OblStat 2004a). 
The distribution of products varied depending on the type of agricultural producer (Figure 
2.6). While shirkats and private farms were specialized in producing cotton and grains, 
households dominated in production of horticultural crops. According to official statistics 
(OblStat 2004a), shirkats occupied about 56% of total sown area and produced 22% of total 
output of the agricultural sector in 2003 (OblSelVodKhoz 2004b, OblStat 2004b). Private 
farms occupied 30% of sown area and produced 10% of total agricultural output. Households 
occupied 17% of total sown area and produced about 68% of total agricultural output in 2003. 
Due to its double cropping properties (Djanibekov 2006a), the wheat production in rural 
households of Khorezm region makes up a significant part of the regional wheat production 
(OblStat 2004a). 
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Figure 2.6: Area distribution among agricultural producers in Khorezm in 2003 
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Notes: HRA – Harvested area; CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – Rice; MZE – Maize; PTT – 
Potato; VGL – Vegetables; MLN – Melons; FDR – Fodder crops; OCR – Other crops; SK – 
Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households 
Source OblStat 2004a 
Table 2.4 shows the differences in crop yield and crop gross margins in 2003 with respect to 
type of the agricultural producer. According to this data, in Khorezm, cotton and fodder were 
the crops produced with losses in 2003. While cotton production was mandatory, the losses 
from fodder cultivation were offset by livestock production. 
Table 2.4: Comparison of crop yield and gross margins in Khorezm in 2003 
Crop yield, t ha-1  Gross margins, USD ha-1 Activities 
SK PF HH REG SK PF  HH  REG 
CTN 1.6 1.6 − 1.6 -86.4 -39.0 n.a. -72.8
WWT 3.0 3.2 4.9 3.6 220.3 224.6 482.2 295.7
RCE 4.1 4.5 4.9 4.4 639.3 696.8 723.6 678.0
MZE 3.2 2.6 3.5 3.2 346.2 288.4 388.4 356.8
POT 13.2 10.8 13.7 13.5 511.0 374.8 904.6 812.6
VGL 19.3 13.9 20.5 19.4 453.5 396.5 901.5 713.3
MLN 14.8 9.1 18.8 15.1 300.4 149.1 590.9 385.7
FDR 10.5 12.7 17.1 12.9 -4.5 -10.4 -8.2 -4.1
Notes: CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – Rice; MZE – Maize; PTT – Potato; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLN – Melons; FDR – Fodder crops; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural 
households; REG – Average in Khorezm 
Source: OblStat 2004a; OblSelVodKhoz 2004a; Private farm survey 2003; Household survey 2004 
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2.3.2 Animal Production 
The animal sector produced almost 60% of the agricultural sectors total output measured in 
monetary value in 2003 (OblStat 2004a). In contrast to other CIS countries the transition 
period in Uzbekistan was not accompanied by a drastic decrease in the number of livestock 
and outputs from livestock (Iñiguez et al. 2004). On the contrary, in Khorezm (Table 2.5) and 
general in Uzbekistan, the number of livestock and sheep flock increased during 1992-2003. 
In fact, the only observed decreases are found in terms of poultry and eggs per capita and are 
due to the decrease in maize production (Table 2.5). Livestock and poultry account for 8.1% 
and 8.6% respectively of the total stock of these types of animals in Uzbekistan, while the 
regional share of sheep is only 2.1% of total national flock (MAWR 2004a). Since 1991 there 
has been a slight change in the composition of Khorezm’s animal stock. The count of sheep 
and cows has increased and that of poultry and bulls has decreased (Table 2.5). Despite being 
negatively affected by the decreasing area of fodder production, and lack of pastures, animal 
production in Khorezm has proven to be less sensitive to natural conditions, such as droughts 
(e.g. in 2000-2001), than has crop production. 
Table 2.5: Livestock and poultry rearing in Khorezm 
Parameter 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002 2003
Animals, 1000 heads 
Livestock 400.4 431.3 441.5 445.1 450.0 446.9 448.7
including cows 155.1 167.3 179.4 183.5 186.3 188.2 189.7
Sheep and goats 157.6 174.9 197.2 206.5 208.9 219.1 219.4
Poultry 1,646.4 1,348.2 994.0 1,345.7 1,194.0 1,302.4 1,437.6
Production, 1000 tons 
Meat 23.8 23.2 29.1 30.6 32.3 33.3 37.5
Beef 20.6 21.2 26.2 24.6 30.9 31.9 34.7
Mutton 1 0.8 2.1 4.7 0.8 0.9 1.1
Poultry 1.7 1 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.5 1.4
Milk 323.7 340.8 350.6 377.7 383.8 388.1 419.6
Eggs, mln units 109.1 94 97.4 104.9 110.3 114.9 130.5
Source: OblStat 2004a 
In 2003, milk and meat were almost entirely produced by rural households (OblStat 2004a), 
while a quarter of eggs were produced by shirkats and private farms (Figure 2.7). As the 
figure shows, although the share of land use by private farms increased drastically by 2004, 
their share in livestock sector was still small. Despite a role of livestock in the livelihood of 
rural households (listed below), private farms find it relatively more complicated to be 
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involved into livestock rearing than crop growing activities which tacitly imply the mandatory 
land allocation under cotton and winter wheat. The government when deciding the transfer of 
land to a new private farm gives preference to ones which specialize in crop growing. 
Figure 2.7: Agricultural product distribution among producers in Khorezm in 2003 
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Notes: LVK – Livestock; COW – Cows; SHP – Sheep; PLT – Poultry; MEA – Meat; MLK – Milk; 
EGG – Eggs; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households 
Source OblStat 2004a 
In general, livestock rearing plays an important role for rural households of Khorezm and 
provides them certain benefits. First, it provides households with a daily source of food, such 
as milk, which may also be sold to markets for additional income. In rural households that 
don’t have distant plots, livestock is the primary source of food and income (Djanibekov 
2006b). Second, livestock is considered both an asset and an item of security for many 
households. In Khorezm, both households and private farms practice a short-term fattening of 
bulls for sales purposes to solve cash liquidity problems. Livestock can also represent savings, 
in that it is recognized as private property and considered a relatively stable storage resource 
(Djanibekov 2006b). Livestock can also earn interest in the form of offspring. Third, even if 
the agricultural producers in Khorezm do not use animal traction for field operations, 
livestock has an input function for crop production in the form of manure as an organic 
fertilizer. Fourth, rural households producing crops and employed in shirkats and private 
farms receive additional low-value byproducts. By feeding these crop residues to livestock, 
households convert them to high-valued animal products. Fifth, labor demands of animal 
husbandry does not feature peak periods, as does e.g. crop growing, but is fairly smoothly 
spread over the entire year. 
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2.4 Inputs and Production Technologies 
2.4.1 Land and Water 
The Khorezm region is divided into two parts by the Amu Darya river. The right bank of the 
river is approximately 230,000 hectares and only slightly used for agricultural production 
(OblZem 2004). The left bank has an area of 455,000 hectares, from which 276,000 hectares 
can be irrigated and used for agriculture. Irrigable area almost doubled between 1990 and 
2003, from 137,000 hectares to 276,000 hectares (Abdolniyozov 2000). The region consists of 
ten almost equally-sized administrative districts; six of which are located in the upstream area 
and four in the downstream area. According to the data of OblZem (2004), the basic type of 
land use in Khorezm in 2003 was sown area (31.2%), hayfields and pastures (25.3%). The 
sown area presents annual and perennial crops. The share of idle land, i.e. land which is not 
used for agricultural production, is about 26.6%. Additionally, poor reclamation lands amount 
to about 0.3%. Perennial plantations (2.0%) cover land that is occupied by fruit trees and 
vineyards. Hayfields and pastures are registered as land that may be used for animal 
husbandry. Mostly, this area is located on the right bank of the Amu Darya. Due to the low 
level of annual precipitation, land identified as pastures and hayfields has low fodder content 
and is not used for animal grazing (Abdolniyozov 2000). The area under forest (8.6%) 
presents wood plantations, which serve mainly as shelterbelts on agricultural land. Land 
allocated for household dwellings (6.1%) is registered separately since it comprises composite 
land usage such as buildings, perennial plantations and crops.  
Given the low level of precipitation, water from the Amu Darya is the only source for 
irrigation and agricultural production in Khorezm. In general, the water inflow into Khorezm 
meets the demand (Müller 2006). However, the region has experienced water shortages, e.g. 
in the period of 1982-1999. The likelihood for water-shortages in Khorezm has definitely 
increased such that the probability of attaining sufficient amounts of water fell from 82% in 
1992 to 74% in 1999; meaning that at the observed conditions of 1999, there can be three 
drought years on average in a decade (Müller 2006). The annual water used during the 
drought period of 2000-2001was 2.5 km3, compared to 3.8 km3 in 2002 and 2003 
(OblSelVodKhoz 2004g).  
Water from the Amu Darya is channeled to agricultural fields by gravity through a 
hierarchically arranged irrigation network; including main, inter-farm, and on-farm channels 
(Khamzina 2006). The main and inter-farm irrigation channels have a combined length of 
2,372 km, and on-farm irrigation channels measure 13,616 km in combined length 
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(Abdolniyozov 2000). The water arriving in Khorezm is collected in the Tuyamuyun water 
reservoir, and its volume is rationed depending on the monthly water demand in the region. 
During the droughts of 2000 and 2001 water availability in the irrigation seasons decreased 
double and threefold respectively (Figure 2.8). 
Figure 2.8: Monthly water use in Khorezm in 1994-2004 
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Source: OblSelVodKhoz 2004g 
As Figure 2.8 shows, annually, there are two distinct cycles of water use in agriculture in 
Khorezm. The first cycle covers the period from February to March, in which water is used 
for flushing salts from the top soil, i.e. the leaching period. Annually leaching is undertaken 
on 80-85% of irrigated area (Abdolniyozov 2000). The second cycle covers May-September; 
i.e. the main crop vegetation period. The water demand schedule is estimated annually 
depending on crop area, cropping structure, crop water requirement and leaching norms; all of 
which were developed in the early 1980s (OblSelVodKhoz 2004d, OblSelVodKhoz 2004g). 
The most water consuming crop cultivated in Khorezm is rice (Figure 2.9). According to the 
recommended values on irrigation, rice was grown on 12% of the total sown area in Khorezm 
and used about 44% of all irrigation water in 2003 (OblStat 2004a, OblSelVodKhoz 2004d). 
As shown in Figure 2.12 there are river bordering districts which have immediate access to 
the irrigation water and off-stream districts which have no direct access to the river. The 
districts without direct access to the river are dependant in their water supply on the water 
consumption in the districts that border the Amu Darya directly (Müller 2006). They were 
also the ones most affected during the drought years. During 1999-2001, which includes two 
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drought years, the average irrigation rate per unit of area decreased by 65% in the off-stream 
located districts, while the losses range from 48% to 57% along the river (Müller 2006). 
Figure 2.9: Water use according to irrigation norms in Khorezm in 2003 
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Source: OblSelVodKhoz 2004d 
In general, the regional irrigation system suffers from leakage and seepage due to technical 
shortcomings. Therefore the conveyance losses are high. According to Abdolniyozov (2000), 
the efficiency coefficient of the main irrigation channels in Khorezm is 0.9-0.96. The 
efficiency coefficient of intra-farm channels is 0.7. The whole irrigation network has a 
coefficient of efficiency of 0.50-0.55; meaning that 44-45% of irrigation water is lost into the 
drainage system (Abdolniyozov 2000). According to estimates, based on the recommended 
irrigation amounts as well as official statistics for planted area, water loss in 2003 was 43% of 
total water used for irrigation. The average amount of water used in the irrigation period is 
about 14,100 m3 per hectare. The water used for leaching is about 5,200 m3 per hectare 
(Abdolniyozov 2000). 
2.4.2 Labor and Machinery 
In 2003, the population size in Khorezm was over 1.4 million people, and constituted about 
5.5% of the Uzbekistan’s total population (OblStat 2004b). The average arable area per capita 
in the region was 0.2 hectare. Even if the population in Khorezm was growing steadily in the 
period between 1992 and 2003, its annual growth rate has been declining from 3.1% in 1992 
to 1.4% in 2003 (OblStat 2004b). The share of rural population increased from 74.6% in 1992 
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to 77.2% in 2003 (Table 2.6). The total regional labor force is about 738.3 thousand people; 
of which 497 thousand people are employed. Almost 40% of the employed labor force, or 
183.1 thousand people, are employed in the agricultural sector (OblStat 2004b). 
Table 2.6: Population in Khorezm in 2003 
 Regional population, 
1000 people 
Share of each category in 
total regional population, %
Size and distribution  
Total population  1,412.8 100.0 
Rural 1,091.0 77.2 
Urban 321.8 22.8 
Age structure  
Male aged below 16 260.7 18.5 
Male aged 16-65 366.9 26.0 
Male aged above 65 59.0 4.2 
Female aged below 16 270.8 19.2 
Female aged 16-65 383.1 27.1 
Female aged above 65 72.3 5.1 
Source OblStat 2004b 
In general, during the period of 1992-2003, the total labor employment in the agricultural 
sector has declined by 20% (Figure 2.10).  
Figure 2.10: Dynamics in wages and employment in Khorezm 
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Notes: INDW – Industrial sector wage; AGRW – Agricultural sector wage; TOTL – Total regional 
employment; AGRL – Employment in agricultural sector 
Source: OblStat 2004b 
First of all, the introduction of wheat, which is a less labor-intensive crop, requires fewer 
people to be employed as permanent workers in shirkats and private farms. Comparing to the 
land allocated for cotton growing pudrats, contracts for wheat growing are made for larger 
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areas with less workers (OblSelVodKhoz 2003). Second, in the framework of the agricultural 
reforms, to restructure the structure of production costs, shirkats have been shedding their 
workers since 1999 (OblStat 2004b). In comparison to the number of workers employed in 
kolkhozs in 1999, their number in shirkats has decreased by 30% in 2003 (OblStat 2004b). 
Third, private farms rely mostly on own family and seasonal hired labor and, thus, tend to 
employ less people than shirkats. Fourth, the gap between wages in the agriculture sector and 
in the industry has increased. 
The fragmentation of shirkat assets during the third stage of the farm restructuring process 
features several aspects. First is the collection of a tractor fleet, formerly used on the territory 
of the shirkat. As shown in Figure 2.11, in 2003 most tractors and harvesters belonged to 
shirkats and private farms. After the fragmentation of shirkats into private farms, the heavy 
and expensive machinery, such as grain harvester combines and heavy ploughing tractors 
were transferred to machinery and tractor fleets (OblSelVodKhoz 2004e). The established 
private farms own cheap, small and multifunctional tractors for ploughing, cultivating and 
transportation to ensure adequately timed field work. Quite remarkable, the delays in service 
provisions by MTP to private farm fields, caused by the scarcity of equipment during peak 
periods, were mentioned as main factor affecting crop yields in Khorezm. In general during 
the period of 1999-2003 the level of mechanization in agriculture has decreased by 20% for 
Khorezm (OblSelVodKhoz 2004e). 
Figure 2.11: Structure and distribution of machinery in Khorezm in 2003 
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2.4.3 Fertilizer and Diesel 
In Uzbekistan, most inputs are distributed via state-controlled agencies. They are to be used 
under the state procurement system for strategic crops. The input prices are entirely 
determined by the central government and there is no private input market. Nevertheless, most 
inputs are informally traded to input abandoned or input scarce produces. In Khorezm there 
are no fertilizer and diesel producing factories, and these inputs are imported into the region 
by state agencies from other regions of Uzbekistan via railroad (Figure 2.12). 
Figure 2.12: Map of input distribution and commodity markets in Khorezm 
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 S
ource: GIS Lab of ZEF/UNESCO project 2005 
Further, these inputs are distributed among the input selling facilities, from which agricultural 
producers can receive them only via an application procedure. Fertilizer markets are 
represented by state branches of the national chemical producing conglomerate, 
UzSelKhozKhim. The amount of fertilizer and diesel to be delivered into the region and then 
distributed further to the agricultural producers is estimated centrally and depends on the crop 
grown and area cultivated. At present, households and farms, which are beyond the state 
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procurement system, are usually not included into the demand estimation (Djanibekov 2005). 
Hence these production units have to purchase these inputs on informal markets. 
Fertilizers are used at 50% of recommended rates (Kudat et al. 2000) and they are often in 
shortage in the region. Furthermore, the current norms on fertilizer application developed by 
the state research institutes do not allow the agricultural producers achieving the economic 
optimum. For instance, under the factor availability and prices observed in 2003, the 
agricultural producers in Khorezm should apply nitrogen fertilizer at the higher rates than 
ones suggested by research institutes to achieve the maximum net return (Djanibekov 2005). 
Furthermore, the official norms are given equal among shirkats and private farms without 
considering the scales of production (Djanibekov 2005). Locally produced fertilizers in 
Uzbekistan are nitrogen, phosphorous and compound fertilizers (FAO 2003). The demand of 
potassium fertilizers in Uzbekistan and Khorezm is very low (FAO 2003). The amount of 
fertilizer imports to Khorezm has seasonal variations (OblSelKhozKhim 2004a). In general, in 
1998-2003, the total amount of nitrogen fertilizer delivered to regional producers dropped by 
27% (OblSelKhozKhim 2004a). According to the official statistics, in 1998 to 2003 the total 
volume of diesel delivered to agricultural producers in Khorezm dropped by 29% (OblNeft 
2004). In the period between 1998 and 2003, there was a decrease in diesel, nitrogen fertilizer 
and labor use per hectare of sown area in Khorezm (Figure 2.13). 
Figure 2.13: Dynamics of inputs availability in Khorezm 
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Notes: WAT – Irrigation water (m3 ha-1); DSL – Diesel (kg ha-1); NIT – Nitrogen fertilizers (kg ha-1); 
LAB – Labor employed in agriculture (h ha-1) 
Source: OblSelVodKhoz 2004f; OblSelVodKhoz 2004g; OblStat 2004b 
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2.4.4 Fodder 
The main fodder crops in Khorezm are maize, fodder maize and lucerne. Their calculated 
nutritional value, based on one kilogram of dry weight, for Khorezm is presented in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7: Nutritional value of main crops in Khorezm 
Crop Fodder Ratio to main 
crop product
Fodder 
Units
Digestible 
Protein, g
Calcium,  
g 
Phosphorus, 
g
Cotton Seed cake 0.24 1.0 230 5.0 6.5
  Husk 0.15 0.2 20 3.0 3.6
Winter wheat Bran 0.18 0.7 106 3.0 6.2
 Grain 0.02 1.2 122 1.8 2.7
  Straw 1.30 0.2 12 4.7 1.3
Paddy rice Bran 0.36 0.7 106 3.0 6.2
 Grain 0.01 1.1 77 2.0 2.4
  Straw 1.50 0.3 6 4.4 1.0
Maize Grain 1.00 1.2 91 2.5 2.4
  Stem 3.00 0.2 21 1.9 0.6
Fodder maize Stem 1.00 0.3 30 1.7 0.8
Lucerne Stem 1.00 0.2 50 6.0 0.9
Source: Dalakyan and Rakhmanova 1986 
Since there is only little area available for use as pasture, animal feeding follows an intensive 
regime, where most fodder is created as a byproduct from regional sources such as cotton and 
cereal (Djanibekov 2006b). Seeds extracted from cotton ginning are processed into two fodder 
products: cotton-seed husk and cotton-seed cake. Among the fodders produced in Khorezm, 
cotton-seed cake has the highest content of feed nutrients (Figure 2.14). Winter wheat and rice 
production also make a significant contribution to animal feeding in Khorezm through their 
byproducts bran, grain residuals and straw (Djanibekov 2006b). Total metabolizable energy7 
production in Khorezm between 1991 and 2003 remained stable due to an increase in the 
production of grains (Figure 2.14). 
Nevertheless, there was a significant change in the composition of metabolizable energy 
production. In 1991, the largest share of metabolizable energy in Khorezm was produced via 
fodder crops such as annual grass and lucerne, but in 2003 the grain byproducts became 
dominant in the structure of metabolizable energy produced (Djanibekov 2006a). A 
significant decrease in the availability of metabolizable energy occurred after 1999, largely 
due to decreases in the production of maize, fodder maize and lucerne, and constant increases 
                                                 
7 Metabolizable energy production is calculated using the metabolizable energy content in each fodder as 
presented by Dalakyan and Rakhmanova (1986), according to OblStat data on cropping pattern. 
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of animal stock in Khorezm. For instance, in 2003, the metabolizable energy available for a 
unit of conventional cattle decreased by a factor of 1.7 in comparison to its value in 1991. 
Figure 2.14: Composition of metabolizable energy production in Khorezm 
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Notes: CBP – Metabolizable energy via cotton byproducts; WRB – Metabolizable energy via 
byproducts of wheat and paddy rice; FOD – Metabolizable energy via fodder crops; MEC – 
Metabolizable energy per cattle 
Source: OblStat 2004b; Dalakyan and Rakhmanova 1986; Own calculations 
2.5 Food Consumption 
The official statistics regarding expenditures presented in Table 2.8 were obtained from the 
Regional Department of Statistics (OblStat). According to primary estimations provided by 
the official statistical bulletin, regional income was about 224 million USD in 2003 (OblStat 
2004b), or 159 USD per capita. In 2003, the total expenditures of population in Khorezm was 
about 192 million USD (OblStat 2004b), or 136 USD per capita, from which expenditures for 
purchases and services were about 171 million USD, and payments for credits were estimated 
at about 21 million USD (OblStat 2004b). The total expenditures for food and non-food in 
Khorezm in 2003 were about 76.6 million USD, from which 87.8% were spent for food 
consumption purposes (OblStat 2004b). Between 1992 and 2003 the actual share of total 
value of food expenditures in total expenditures for Khorezm was on average 81.6% (OblStat 
2004b). However, the official estimates of 18.4% of non-food (manufactured) commodities in 
total expenditures in Khorezm seem very low. For example, FAO (1998) reports that in 
Agricultural Land and Water Use in the Khorezm Region 
 31
Uzbekistan the share of food expenditures in total population expenditures was 34.7%8. 
Therefore, the total nonfood consumption value presented above is lower than the one used in 
our calculation which relies on the data from FAO/SUA on the average daily food 
consumption per capita in Uzbekistan. According to the author’s calculations, meat and other 
food commodities had the largest share in total food expenditures for Khorezm in 2003 (Table 
2.8). Wheat and grains (except rice and maize) are the main food commodities and contribute 
strongest to energy intake per capita in Khorezm. Meanwhile, these food commodities are 
produced in deficit in Khorezm. The annual consumption per capita of wheat and grains, 
potato and vegetables, milk and eggs in Uzbekistan increased from 1995 to 20039. However, 
the daily intake of energy per capita in kilocalories declined from 2,659 in 1995 to 2,310 in 
2003 (FAO 2007). 
Table 2.8: Agricultural food commodity balance in Khorezm in 2003 
Commodity Units Consumed 
quantity 
Produced 
quantity
Difference 
(+ export, – import)
Share in food 
expenditure, % 
Calorie 
share, %
WWT 103 ton 247.3 184.0 -63.4 10.6 57.5
RCE 103 ton 19.5 119.0 99.4 2.3 3.8
POT 103 ton 63.8 39.2 -24.6 3.1 2.4
FRT 103 ton 74.4 38.1 -36.3 13.9 2.5
VGL 103 ton 132.4 164.0 31.7 10.7 2.3
MLK 103 ton 198.5 427.3 228.8 13.2 10.2
EGG 106 pieces 80.5 131.6 51.0 1.9 0.5
MEA 103 ton 34.4 64.2 29.7 25.4 6.1
OTH 103 ton 48.3 0.0 -48.3 18.9 14.8
Notes: WWT – Wheat and grain products; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; FRT – Fruits and 
melons; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Poultry eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH 
– Other food commodities 
Source: FAO Statistics Division 2007; Own calculation 
Foreign trade turnover of the region in 2003 was about 48 million USD, from which export 
accounted for 74%; creating a trade surplus of 23.3 million USD (OblStat 2004b). Despite 
this, in 2003 the region was still a net importer of food commodities (Table 2.9). Cotton was 
the dominant item of regional export (81.4%) and the overall regional trade balance (61%) in 
2003 (OblStat 2004b). In 2003 the region was still a net importer of food commodities (35% 
of total import). Rice, vegetables, milk, meat and eggs were the food commodities produced 
                                                 
8 The official statistical data on population expenditures and consumed quantities is based on quantities sold in 
local shops and markets. According to the author’s own observation the major part of commodities is sold at 
small rural markets, and therefore those quantities are not presented in the official statistical datasets, e.g. rice 
and milk consumption are not reported in the official statistics. 
9 Aggregation of commodities is presented in Sections 3.2.2. 
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in surplus in Khorezm. Wheat and grains, potato, fruits and melons, are the food commodities 
imported in Khorezm in 2003 (Table 2.9). 
Table 2.9: Export and import structure in Khorezm 
Shares of 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Export in Trade balance, % 83.7 69.8 53.8 60.9 71.5 73.6 64.8 49.7 74.3
Share in Export, %   
Cotton 93.8 95.9 85.6 77.7 69.6 81.4 83.8 83.5 81.4
Food commodities 4.2 1.1 2.6 2.9 4.5 5.1 4.8 4.9 1.0
Services 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.9 2.1 1.5 2.2
Others 1.8 2.3 11.5 19.1 25.8 12.6 9.3 10.1 15.4
Import in Trade balance, % 16.3 30.2 46.2 39.1 28.5 26.4 35.2 50.3 25.7
Share in Import, %   
Food commodities 4.8 52.4 17.8 29.9 41.0 54.6 48.3 5.9 34.9
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Others 95.2 47.6 82.2 70.1 56.2 45.4 51.7 94.1 65.1
Source: OblStat 2004b 
2.6 State Regulation 
2.6.1 State Procurement System 
In Uzbekistan, the market reforms initiated since 1991 were aimed at gradually liberalizing 
agricultural commodity markets, and raising producer-level prices. In addition to these 
reforms, the farm restructuring process was also to aid the transition to a market economy. 
The procurement system in form of production plans and cultivated area allotments for 
specified crops has remained the main component of the pursued economic development 
strategy. Cotton procurement is mostly export-oriented, and is practiced as part of an income 
redistribution policy (Guadagni et al. 2005). The procurement policy for cereals is designed to 
strengthen food security by stabilizing cereal production, and is integrated into the import 
substitution policy. Land allocation to cotton and cereals according to the procurement 
tasks dominates agricultural production (in terms of total cultivated area) (Figure 2.15). 
The regulations on cotton and cereal procurement differ from one another. On papers, to 
encourage the sale of cotton directly at local markets, as well as through trade agents for 
export, the government established a regulation that left 70% of the produced raw cotton at 
the producer’s disposal. However, unlike the situation for cereals, there exist no local cotton 
markets, and therefore, no alternative marketing channels for cotton in Uzbekistan. The state 
procurement is only subject to assigned procurement, meaning that only a certain share (50%) 
Agricultural Land and Water Use in the Khorezm Region 
 33
of the production must be sold to the state at procurement prices. Upon fulfilling their 
obligations for the procurement contract, agricultural producers can sell any remaining 
surplus of cereals at the market. Rice is also considered part of the state procurement system, 
but agricultural producers are not given the mandatory production quotas for rice in the same 
fashion as for cotton and wheat. Instead, every year agricultural producers need to receive 
official permission in form of a license to produce paddy rice. Producers without a license are 
prohibited to produce rice. The farms which receive a license for rice production are obliged 
to sell a part of their harvest to the state agency at the state procurement price, which is below 
the local market price. 
Figure 2.15: Land allocation for cotton and cereals in Khorezm 
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Notes: PRC – Area sown for procurement task; FAL – Area sown without procurement task; 
SRP – Share of land sown for procurement task 
Source: OblStat 2004b 
Following independence, two major changes in the state procurement system occurred (Khan 
2005). First, a new cotton pricing system was introduced to increase producer incentives. 
According to the new price formation method, the procurement price for cotton is established 
on the basis of the net world price minus ginning, transportation, custom and certification 
costs, and taxes paid by intermediate participants. As a result, the cotton procurement price 
has increased drastically, although it is still lower than the world price (Guadagni et al. 2005). 
Moreover, followed by the state policy on achieving grain self-sufficiency, the procurement 
prices for cereals have increased about 25% compared to their level in 1995. However, the 
state procurement prices are set with consideration of changes in the official exchange rate of 
the local currency to the US dollar (Figure 2.16). 
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Figure 2.16: Correlation between procurement prices and exchange rate in Khorezm 
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In years when official exchange rates diverge highly from the black-market exchange rates, 
the procurement prices tend to be much lower than the export prices. The second change in 
the state procurement pricing of cotton and cereals has been the introduction of the 
“double pricing system” according to which half of the procurement quota of cotton and 
cereals must be sold at the state procurement price. The other half of the cotton harvest is 
sold at the contract, i.e. negotiated, price, which is 20% higher than the state procurement 
price, but only applied in cases where producers fulfill the procurement quota. In the case that 
a farmer fails to reach the procurement task, the state procurement price is applied for the total 
harvest. After these changes in the procurement system the cotton prices continue to be lower 
than international prices and procurement prices for cereals continue to be lower than the 
local market prices (Figure 2.17)10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 In order to better reflect the real situation, the ratio of the cotton procurement price to the world market price 
was calculated using black-market exchange rates for relevant years in Uzbekistan. 
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Figure 2.17: Comparison of market and procurement prices in Khorezm 
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Notes: CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – Rice 
Source: OblStat 2004c; Müller 2006 
Before the exchange rate unification in 2003, the official exchange rate was overvalued and 
the gap between official and black-market exchange rates was threefold. Before the 
unification of the currency exchange rate in Uzbekistan the average procurement price for 
wheat was equal to 40% of the local market price (MAWR 2004a, OblStat 2004c). 
Figure 2.18: Dynamics in real prices of output and inputs in Khorezm 
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Notes: CTN – Cotton; WWT – Wheat and grains; RCE – Rice; AMN – Ammonium nitrate fertilizer; AMP – 
Ammophos fertilizer; DSL – Diesel fuel 
Source: OblStat 2004c; OblSelKhozKhim 2004b; OblNeft 2004; Own calculation 
Since the exchange rate unification in 2002, the procurement price for wheat has increased to 
60% of the local market level. If the official procurement prices are adjusted to 1995 price 
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levels, there is a substantial drop in real procurement prices for cotton, and for 2003 it is only 
around five percent less than its level in 1995 (Figure 2.18). The decline in the real 
agricultural product price for cotton shows that its nominal price increase has remained lower 
than the inflation rate. Along with changes in the procurement policy, which were to give 
incentives for producers to specifically increase yields for cotton and grins, the input prices 
have also been increased to provide more economic incentives to agricultural producers to 
increase factor productivity in general. However, the state control over input distribution and 
input endowment in farms for machinery, fertilizer, diesel and seeds remains virtually 
unchanged. Consequently, the procurement price increase has only marginally improved 
incentives to agricultural producers, since the commodity price increases have been partially 
offset by increases in state prices for inputs. 
2.6.2 Agricultural Taxes and Subsidies 
The transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy included the 
transformation of the old agricultural tax policy into one featuring new producer incentives. 
The system of agricultural subsidies for and taxation of agriculture in Uzbekistan can be 
distinguished by the type of agricultural producer and the crops which are included into the 
state procurement system. The simplified scheme of the budget inflows (in the form of 
implicit and explicit taxes) and budget outflows (in form of subsidies) is presented in Figure 
2.19. 
Figure 2.19: Taxes from and subsidies into agriculture in Uzbekistan 
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Source: Own compilation 
The largest share of state revenues from agricultural taxation come from implicit taxes such as 
low procurement prices for the main export crop, cotton. According to the study of Guadagni 
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et al. (2005), in 2003 the producer price control presented the main form of agricultural 
taxation, and was followed by direct taxes such as income and land taxes. The implicit 
taxation of the agricultural sector in form of procurement prices has been particularly 
discussed by many authors (Rosenberg et al. 1999, Guadagni et al. 2005, Khan 2005, Spoor 
1999). In order to offset the negative effects of the taxation regime, the state provides 
significant subsidies for irrigation, financing and other inputs to agricultural producers 
(Guadagni et al. 2005). However, these are not direct subsidies but rather involve indirect 
measures, such as price differentials for inputs and cotton byproducts, arbitrary allocation and 
reallocation of financial resources, maintenance and operating costs of irrigation system as 
well as credit postponements, debt write-offs, tax remissions and lax crediting. Most of these 
subsidies are not directly allocated to producers, but rather allocated to the agricultural sector 
as a whole. Table 2.10 shows the difference between official and informal market prices for 
the main nitrogen fertilizer and diesel in 2002-200311. Those input price differentials are 
producer-oriented and crop-oriented; meaning that only those agricultural producers who have 
a state procurement task have access to subsidized inputs. As a result of the input price 
differential, which is a state controlled discrimination scheme, regarding input availability, 
agricultural producers select either to apply inputs under a state procurement crop, or crops 
with higher market values, or transfer them for activities with higher incomes (Guardani et al 
2005). 
Table 2.10: State and market prices for fertilizer and diesel 
 Units Ammonium nitrate Diesel fueld 
    2002  2003  2002  2003  
State price  USD ton-1 35 73  79 116  
Market price USD ton-1 49 100 91 140 
Difference % 38 37 16 21 
Source: OblSelKhozKhim 2004b; OblNeft 2004; Household survey 2004 
Moreover, due to the absence of formal supplementary input markets, the extra amount of 
inputs necessary for production is available only via black markets. The demand for this 
informal input market is primarily sustained by agricultural producers beyond the state 
procurement system, who are not given access to subsidized inputs from the government. 
Further liberalization of agricultural markets, particularly the cotton market, is needed to 
increase production incentives as well as to raise agricultural productivity and producer 
incomes. As such, cotton production under the state procurement policy has less relevance for 
                                                 
11 Converted using average market exchange rates for 2002 of 1,300 USZ/USD and for 2003 of 1,052 USZ/USD 
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the economy of Uzbekistan than often stated (Müller 2006). On the other hand, since other 
sources of state revenues have been made available, there is currently less need for 
agricultural taxation (Khan 2005). Since the procurement system accumulates only a little 
share of the state revenues, but ensures a desirable composition of output; one may argue that 
this may also be achieved by more market oriented policies. 
After this chapter, the reader should receive a general understanding of main features of the 
agricultural sector in Khorezm to follow the model development and policy simulations in the 
next chapters. 
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3. Structure of the Agricultural Sector Model for the Khorezm Region 
In this chapter we present a modeling framework for the agricultural sector of Khorezm. The 
objective of the chapter is to build on a model and to show how it can be adopted and used in 
a regional context. Particularly data limitations constitute a constraint and have to be 
circumvented in an intelligent way. In fact, the novelty of this study lies in adapting standard 
versions of this model to the complex reality an individual region in such a transition 
economy as Uzbekistan. 
The layout of this chapter is as follows: First, in section 3.1, the selected approach is justified 
via a description of features of mathematical programming models. Then, arguments for 
favoring the price-endogenous sector model approach are presented and supported. Section 
3.2 demonstrates the structure of the price-endogenous regional model for the agricultural 
sector in Khorezm. The process for aggregating administrative districts, producers and 
consumers, production activities and commodities requirements is presented in section 3.2.2. 
Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 include a step-by-step presentation of our agricultural sector model. 
Section 3.3 describes the structure of the model’s supply module. Section 3.4 describes the 
structure of the model’s demand module. The choice of the functional form for the assumed 
demand system is justified in section 3.4.1. Since the construction of an agricultural sector 
model has large data requirements, we list these separately for the demand and supply 
modules in sections 3.3.4 and 3.4.4. The equations and definitions which link the demand and 
supply modules in the general agricultural sector model are presented in section 3.5. Finally, 
section 3.6 discusses scope and limitations of the model. 
In general, the application procedure of agricultural sector model for Khorezm (KhoRASM) 
consists of several steps (Figure 3.1). These are: database collection and arrangement; 
building the full model based on demand and supply modules; calibration of the demand and 
production modules; analysis of the calibration results; policy simulations and comparative 
static analysis and policy implications and conclusions. The KhoRASM model is programmed 
in GAMS modeling language. It is calibrated and solved as a non-linear optimization, using 
the numerical solver CONOPT3. 
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Figure 3.1: Stages of the model building 
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3.1 Selection of the Modeling Approach 
In chapter 2, we paid special attention to the empirical environment of Khorezm’s agricultural 
sector in Khorezm, so as to provide a framework within which to locate the assumptions for 
the sector model we present now. The approach used for modelling the agricultural sector of 
Khorezm should capture the basic features of the regional agriculture: First, the model should 
capture the interrelations of production activities most prevalent to the region (see chapter 2). 
Second, the model should replicates the nature of the sector in terms of allowing for various 
changes in the fixed production factors and input-output relationships; e.g. changes in prices, 
animal feeding practices, yields, irrigation water availability, consumption structure and 
relevant state. Third, the model should feature regionally specified input-output parameters 
and restrictions on resource availability in order to capture comparative advantages between 
modelled districts and producers. 
Moreover, the approach should be applicable through available datasets and for simulations. 
First, there are problem of data availability, e.g. long time-series information, especially, 
when working on developing countries or transition economies such as Uzbekistan this factor 
often comes into play. This problem is related to the limited degrees of freedom which make 
infeasible the estimation of all kind of interrelations between different production variables 
due to a short period historical observations data (Hazell and Norton 1986). Next, the 
approach should be applicable for the analysis of new policy changes which involve 
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significant deviations from the observed past trends (Hazell and Norton 1986). This study 
includes a set of policy simulations never observed in the agricultural sector of Khorezm, such 
as the introduction of water pricing and the abolishment of state procurement quotas, so that 
this point becomes valid. For instance, in case of lack of data and for unprecedented scenarios 
the econometric approach is rarely applicable. 
The generally used tool for modelling agricultural sector for quantitative policy analysis is 
mathematical programming approach. This modelling approach imposes behavioural 
assumptions over a mixture of historically observed and synthetic data to arrive at a 
representation of the sector in a multi-output and multi-input framework that is consistent 
with economic theory (McCarl and Spreen 1980). For several reasons, this approach is the 
most appropriate for modelling the agricultural sector of Khorezm. First, mathematical 
programming model incorporates relationships between different production variables, 
regional cross-effects (Apland, Öhlmér and Jonasson 1994). Second, it does not depend upon 
long-term historical data, and can be applied as a quantitative tool for assessing development 
and policy alternatives; especially potential effects of previously unprecedented policy 
scenarios (Norton and Solis 1983, McCarl and Spreen 1980). Third, this approach seems most 
suitable given constraints such as limited data availability and lack of historical observations 
(Buysse, Van Huylenbroeck and Lauwers 2007). Forth, providing a framework to systematize 
and categorize available information, it allows for a detailed description of the dependencies 
of production variables on exogenous changes in the regional agriculture and more detailed 
analysis of problems with spatially competing dimensions (Hazell and Norton 1986). 
One important feature of the mathematical programming model is that its structure allows 
specification of changes in the economic environment. Using such a model, a modeler can 
introduce specific policy changes into the model and observe the simulated response (McCarl 
and Spreen 1997). The agricultural sector model based on mathematical programming allows 
incorporating exogenous changes for policy simulations in appropriate attributes of the model 
(Hazell and Norton 1986), which renewed recently an interest in programming models. For 
instance, the effect of introduced water pricing can be evaluated by exogenously increasing 
the variable costs for crop production per unit of irrigation water required in the model. The 
liberalization of cotton and input markets can be examined by removing the minimum 
production level constraints for cotton and using new input prices. 
On the other hand, the fact that mathematical programs are usually based on behavioral norms 
instead of observed actions is one of the weaknesses of the programming models (Buysse, 
Van Huylenbroeck and Lauwers 2007). As a result, the mathematical programming approach 
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can neither describe nor predict exact outcomes for specific years suggesting the possible best 
solution according to the economic environment (Hazell and Norton 1986) in a way that its 
solutions demonstrate what “should” happen rather than what will happen. One approach to 
bridge this gap between observed data and theoretical properties of the model in question is 
the positive-mathematical programming approach (PMP), mainly introduced by Howitt 
(1995) in the context of agricultural sector modeling. Nevertheless, even if the approach is 
called mathematical programming, it combines both econometric and mathematical 
programming approaches. For instance, the price and income responsive commodity demand 
functions are estimated using econometric methods and then introduced into the mathematical 
programming model (Takayama and Judge 1971). All the above stated motivates using a 
mathematical programming approach for our analysis of assessing the impacts of policy 
changes on agricultural 
Furthermore, for the regional sector model the prices should be defined endogenously to 
recognize the price-quantity interrelationships (McCarl and Spreen 1980). Therefore, in order 
to reflect this premise, the demand functions needs to be introduced in the optimization 
model. This requires a specification of the functional form of demand system. Lau (1986) 
summarized a set of criteria for the specification of a complete demand system which can deal 
with important theoretical issues. Those criteria were further classified into eight categories 
by Frohberg and Winter (2001) into i) theoretical consistency, ii) domain of applicability, iii) 
flexibility, iv) maintained hypotheses, v) computational facility, vi) factual conformity, vii) 
extrapolative robustness, and viii) the interdependence of these characteristics, e.g. 
introduction of cross-effects between consumption levels of different commodities to fulfill 
theoretic consistency. However, the simultaneous fulfillment of all these requirements by a 
functional form of a demand system is generally impossible (Frohberg and Winter 2001). 
Therefore, the ones which satisfy the most relevant criteria for transition country should be 
applied. Moreover, the selected functional form for a demand curve should sufficiently 
describe the consumer behavior to allow for analysis of the relevant welfare components. This 
requires specification of both an Engel curve and relative price effects consistent with utility 
maximization (Banks, Blundell and Lewbel 1997). The inclusion of income effects are very 
important for modeling commodity demand in Khorezm, since the influence of pronounced 
variations of income on demand is one of essential to the analysis of transition country 
demand structures (Frohberg and Winter 2001). According to this criterion, the selected 
functional form of demand should reflect the driving influence of income changes on demand. 
Functional forms involving non-linear Engel curves on disproportional modifications in 
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consumption patterns and expenditure shares by growing income are more in line with 
empirical evidence and more suitable for empirical analysis (Frohberg and Winter 2001). 
A well known candidate for demand analysis which fulfills the mentioned requirements is the 
Normalized Quadratic – Quadratic Expenditure System (NQ-QES) (Ryan and Wales 1999). 
This demand system developed by Ryan and Wales (1996, 1999) encompasses the 
Normalized Quadratic Reciprocal Indirect Utility Function (NQRIUF) and the Normalized 
Quadratic Expenditure Function (NQEF), both proposed by Diewert and Wales (1988), as 
special cases of demand analysis. The Normalized Quadratic – Quadratic Expenditure System 
fulfils three requirements of building a mathematical model for demand analysis. First, in the 
system Engel curves are quadratic in income, i.e. the quantities demanded are quadratic 
functions of total expenditure or income. Linear Engel curves assume a proportional increase 
in demand for each commodity. Second, the system is flexible in a Diewert-sense meaning all 
first derivatives of demands with respect to prices and income are arbitrary at a reference 
point (Pollak and Wales 1992). In other words, the demand system can replicate the 
demanded quantities, income derivatives and own- and cross-price derivatives at a specified 
price-expenditure situation (Ryan and Wales 1999). Thirdly, the curvature condition, which is 
required by micro-economic theory, may be easily imposed locally during the estimation, if 
not satisfied at the reference point, without destroying flexibility (Ryan and Wales 1999). The 
properties of NQ-QES are discussed in the following sections. Following this, the model 
consists of three components: (1) agricultural sector model; (2) linear supply module; (3) non-
linear demand module, which are discussed in the following sections. The developed model 
integrates both linear supply module and non-linear demand module at point of partial 
equilibrium under observed values from 2003. 
3.2 Structure of KhoRASM 
3.2.1 Main Features 
The first prerequisite for building a mathematical programming model is a proper definition 
of the model which comprises the choice of the functional form of the objective function and 
constraints and the definition of endogenous variables, exogenous variables and parameters to 
be calibrated (see Section 4). KhoRASM is designed according to the framework presented by 
Hazel and Norton (1986) for evaluating the impact of external shocks on production and 
consumption patterns and commodity prices. KhoRASM is a static model, and assumes that 
the adaptation of the agricultural sector on the intervention occurs simultaneous without a 
time lag. KhoRASM is a partial equilibrium model, which means that explicit connections to 
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other sectors of the general economy are not included into the model. In the base run solution, 
KhoRASM replicates the agricultural production activities of Khorezm in 2003. Results 
obtained after implementing an exogenous shock in the model are compared with the base run 
results. Like the model, the comparisons of scenario simulations are static. The obtained 
solution describes the agricultural sector as it were under assumptions of perfect competition 
in regional commodity markets (Hazell and Norton 1986). Despite the possible existence of 
transaction costs in commodity production and marketing as well as information gaps 
regarding regional prices for producers and consumers, two characteristics make the 
assumption of a perfectly competitive market reasonable for the agricultural sector of 
Khorezm. First of all, the regional agricultural sector consists of a large number of consumers 
and agricultural producers which interact with a single regional commodity market, except 
cotton market where production quantities and prices are controlled by state. Commodity 
prices (except for cotton, maize and fodder) are determined by aggregate market behavior of 
producers and consumers, and no price influencing power exists with single producers 
/consumers, i.e. they are price takers. Second, there exist no strong preferences for 
differentiations in commodities. That is producers and consumers appear to regard 
commodities groups as being fairly homogenous. Third, agricultural producers purchase 
inputs before information on crop price changes become available, which is only during the 
crop harvesting period. With respect the factor markets, it is assumed that the agricultural 
producers in Khorezm cannot influence the factor prices, except for labor. The definition of 
labor prices is described in the Section 3.2.2 and 3.5. Given these realities, the behavioral 
implications of the KhoRASM model seem to be suitable with the theoretical economic 
behavior of the modeled agricultural producers and it can be used to simulate the regional 
sector response to a specific exogenous shocks. 
KhoRASM is structured as presented in Hazel and Norton (1986). The model endogenously 
determines production activities and commodity prices based on producer and consumer 
preferences, which in turn are shaped by production technologies and commodity demand 
functions. KhoRASM consists of supply and demand modules. Consequently, the model 
optimizes via simultaneous adjustments in supply and demand sides which will be presented 
separately in the following sections of this chapter. The supply module includes all the input 
and output items of crop, animal sector and fodder sector. The demand module consists of 
commodity consumption by the regional population (Figure 3.2). Each of supply and demand 
modules is divided respectively into several production and consumption blocks with regard 
to producer, consumer and district aggregates. The behavior of producers in the supply 
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module is depicted at an aggregate level and restricted in terms of initial resource 
endowments, while the behavior of consumers in the demand module is depicted via 
commodity demand functions. Agricultural producers maximize their profits within a set of 
crop growing and animal keeping activities (see section 3.3.). Each production activity is 
depicted via specific technology coefficients, and subject to input as well as output constraints 
(e.g. policy instruments). Consumers spend their entire income on consumption. They 
maximize utility from consumption (see section 3.4). Each produced commodities can be 
consumed, exported, imported or traded between districts.  
Figure 3.2: Structure of KhoRASM 
District 1 District n
Farm 1 Farm n
Crop Feed Animal Animal Feed Crop
Sector Sector Sector Sector
Input Commodity Commodity Input
Factors Balance Balance Factors
District 1 District n
Food
Consumption
Food 
Consumption
Demand
Production
Internal Trade
Outside
Export/ Import
 
Source: Own compilation 
Compared to the depiction of the agricultural sector model presented in Hazel and Norton 
(1986), KhoRASM has a number of simplifications: First, it does not feature resource 
exporting and importing activities. Secondly, the model omits commodity processing 
activities. We do this mainly because of data scarcity, but one may argue that the relatively 
underdevelopment state of the regions processing sector 2003 further justifies this omission. 
To simplify the features of the regional agricultural sector of Khorezm several assumptions 
for the model were formulated as follow: 
• The model is a partial equilibrium model, maximizing consumer’s and producer’s 
surpluses; 
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• The region is too small to affect national commodity prices; 
• Products within each commodity type are homogeneous; 
• Commodity consumption is determined by commodity prices and income; 
• Relationships between inputs and outputs are linear in form of single Leontieff 
technologies. 
3.2.2 Aggregation of Districts, Producers, Consumers and Commodities 
For reasons of computational necessity and data needs, the model’ demand and supply sides 
are aggregated over districts, producers, consumers and commodities. As a spatial model, in 
order to more explicitly analyze the effects of exogenous changes on the production structure 
in different areas of Khorezm and to account for differences in available technology, resource 
supplies and product demand, the model is spatially disaggregated over districts (rayons). In 
the model, the region is separated into five district aggregates according to their location to 
the Amu Darya river (Figure 3.3). Each district is described by its resource endowments and 
technology coefficients. 
Figure 3.3: District aggregation in KhoRASM 
 
Source: GIS Lab of ZEF/UNESCO project 2005 
Following (Hazell and Norton 1986) the production module includes three different 
submodels to represent the agricultural producer groups defined by Uzbek legislation; i.e. 
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rural households (dekhqans), private farms, and large agricultural enterprises (shirkats). Other 
farm types, such as remaining collective farms (kolkhozs), state animal keeping enterprises, 
and subsidiary farms, are considered in the model in the producer aggregate of shirkats. These 
three producer aggregates define the total crop and animal production in Khorezm in 2003. 
Aggregation at the producer level is based on the assumption of technological homogeneity 
(Hazell and Norton 1986) according to which producer groups are defined by a different set of 
input/output coefficients and constraints. This type of aggregation makes procedural sense, 
especially since official statistical data for production patterns and input endowments are 
available only at this level of aggregation. In KhoRASM, producer aggregates of shirkats and 
private farms are only producers of commodities. Analogous to the agricultural producers, the 
consumers are also aggregated into separate groups. The rural household aggregate is 
included into the group of consumers of food and non-food commodities and leisure. In 
addition to the rural households, the urban households are introduced as consumers of food 
and non-food commodities. These two groups of consumers define the total consumption in 
Khorezm in 2003. 
Consequently, there are four separate groups in the model. The first two groups are producer 
aggregates and include shirkats and private farms. Their behaviour is limited to production 
decisions (Table 3.1). Since the behavior of rural households is based on supply and demand 
responses on the markets (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet 1991), in KhoRASM, the rural 
households are aggregated into a group of consuming as well as producing. The fourth group, 
urban households, only engages in consumption decision.  
Table 3.1: List of producer and consumer aggregates in KhoRASM 
  Producers Consumers 
State enterprises (shirkats) 1  
Private farms 1  
Rural households (dekhqan farms) 1 1
Urban households   1
Source: Own compilation 
KhoRASM consists of produced and consumed commodities which are observed for the study 
region. The model includes 14 commodity aggregates which can be produced, consumed, 
traded or used for animal feeding (Table 3.2). First of all, in KhoRASM, commodities are 
differentiated into ones with endogenous and exogenous prices. Commodities which are 
consumed by rural and urban households have endogenous prices. All other products have 
fixed prices; i.e. cotton, maize and fodder maize. 
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Table 3.2: List of commodities in KhoRASM 
Commodity Produced Human 
consumption 
Used as fodder 
for animal 
feeding 
Tradable 
Cotton 1   1 
Wheat 1 1 1 1 
Rice 1 1 1 1 
Potato 1 1  1 
Vegetables 1 1  1 
Fruits and melons 1 1  1 
Maize for grains 1  1 1 
Fodder maize 1  1 1 
Milk by cows 1 1  1 
Eggs by poultry 1 1  1 
Meat by bulls 1 1  1 
Other food commodities  1  1 
Non-food commodities  1  1 
Leisure  1     
Source: Own compilation 
The consumed commodities include food commodities produced in Khorezm, other food 
commodities imported from outside of the region, manufactured (non-food) commodities and 
leisure. According to labor economics, the allocation of time of households to either 
production activities or leisure is a decision problem (Barnett 1979). Therefore, leisure is 
defined as a separate consumption commodity only for rural households. In this way the total 
income of two consumer aggregates is allocated over leisure and aggregated food and non-
food consumption. All commodities, except leisure, can be marketed, in as much as they 
participate in inter-district flows, exporting and importing activities. Further information on 
consumed commodities is given in section 3.4. 
3.3.3 Model Activities 
A price-endogenous mathematical programming sector model typically contains several 
groups of activities which represent commodity production, demand and commodity flows 
(McCarl and Spreen 1980). There are several groups of activities in the model.  
1. A first group consists of production activities which are entirely constructed using single 
production activities both for crops and livestock. This group consists of eight crop 
growing and three animal keeping activities. Similar to crop production, animal 
production has a single activity with a single feeding regime for each producer and district 
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aggregates. According to inter-relationships among cropping and animal keeping 
activities, some crops are intermediate products which can be used for animal feeding. 
Therefore, the fodder producing activities are limited by the levels of animal keeping 
activities and animal feeding regimes of each producer type through the modeled districts; 
2. The second group of activities includes those related to the demand. Demand activities are 
limited to commodity aggregates which feature in human consumption. Available demand 
activities are specific to consumer type and districts. The demand activities include 
consumption of eight agricultural food commodities produced in the region, one 
agricultural food commodity and one manufactured commodity produced outside of the 
region, and leisure time; 
3. The third group of activities consists of commodity flows between different districts and 
exporting and importing activities for commodities. All produced and consumed 
commodities are assumed to be tradable, except for leisure. This means that they can be 
traded between the districts, imported to and exported from outside of the region. 
4. The fourth group of activities consists of labor flows from rural households to shirkats and 
to private farms and districts. In Khorezm, the rural households are suppliers of labor, and 
the production in shirkats and private farms is mostly or completely dependent on hired 
labor from households; 
5. The endogenous prices for commodities are introduced as separate activities defined only 
for food commodities, manufactured commodities and leisure time. The commodity prices 
in demand and supply model are identical. Separate prices are formed for the five district 
aggregates considering the arbitrage conditions; 
6. The final group of model activities includes activities related to definition of the demand 
components, such as the endogenous commodity prices and the definition of variables for 
household income. These demand forming equations are presented in section 3.4. 
3.3.4 Objective Function of KhoRASM 
The price-endogenous programming model is used for the agricultural sector analysis of 
Khorezm. The optimization problem consists of a system of equations reciprocally relating 
changes in commodity quantities to equilibrium commodity prices. (McCarl and Spreen 1997)  
The objective function of such price-endogenous model transforms price-dependent product-
demand schedules into a measure of summed consumer and producer surplus; i.e. net social 
benefit (Hazell and Norton 1986). In other words, it maximizes the area under the demand 
curve above the price curve, i.e. consumer’s surplus, and the area above the supply curve and 
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below the price curve, i.e. producer’s surplus (Hazell and Norton 1986). In case of 
KhoRASM, which models a competitive market with export and import activities, the 
objective function is the maximization of consumer and producer surpluses plus the net trade 
surplus less production and transportation costs. 
To attach a welfare measurement to the areas under the ordinary demand function, the 
demand function should be integrable. The general problem of incorporating demand 
functions of complex form directly into the objective functions of the mathematical 
programming models, is that these functions are difficult to integrate. Moreover, the model 
consists of a demand module which is measured in units of indirect utility and a supply 
module which is measured in money units. Consequently, the welfare effects of price changes 
can be measured via specification of a money metric utility function (Mas-Colell, Whinston 
and Green 1995). 
To join the demand and supply modules in KhoRASM, the cross-effects of consumption, 
prices and income, established by the demand module, are included into KhoRASM via the 
rescaling of the indirect utility function into a money metric utility function. The resulting 
equilibrium prices enter the objective function via demand functions (Hazell and Norton 
1986). Price responsiveness is introduced into the demand functions in form of a nonlinear 
objective function. In the following upper case letters denote variables. Lower case letters 
denotes parameters and indices. The complete listing of individual items belonging to the 
various sets is given in the Appendix 2. 
The indices in the model are as follows: 
Code  Description 
x  Production activities; 
i,j,k,l  Commodities; 
r,r1  Districts aggregates; 
z  Production factors; 
f,f1  Agricultural producer and consumer groups. 
The variables of the model are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
Welf    Regional welfare; 
MoneyM   Money metric indirect utility function; 
NTSurp   Definition of net trade surplus of producers; 
PrCost    Definition of production costs; 
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Wage  r  Agricultural wage paid by shirkats and private farms; 
Xlevl  r,f,x  Production activity levels; 
Xflows  r,i  Export flows of commodities (not allowed for leisure); 
Mflows r,i  Import flows of commodities (not allowed for leisure); 
LabrF  r,r1,f,f1 Inter-district and inter-farm labor flow between producers; 
Incm  r,f  Total income of consumers (consumption expenditure); 
g  r,f  Component of demand system (described in section 3.4.2). 
The parameters of the model are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
pex  i  Border price of commodity; 
dist  r,r1  Distance between districts; 
edist  r  Distance from districts to the border; 
trc  r,i  Transportation costs of commodity; 
varc  r,f,x  Production costs; 
g0  r,f  Demand system element (see section 3.4) at reference point. 
Following a standard welfare analysis (Just, Hueth and Schmitz 2004), total welfare of the 
study region consists of money metric indirect utility function, i.e. consumer surplus, and 
agricultural income, i.e. producer surplus. Thus, the objective function of the model is defined 
as following: 
max  Welf    = MoneyM + NTSurp PrCost−  (3.1) 
Consumer surplus is calculated by using the money metric indirect utility function (Varian 
1992), which behaves as a utility function, but measured in money terms. Since utility is 
unobservable, the selection of its measuring unit is up to the researcher’s discretion (Diewert 
and Wales 1988a). The only requirement is that the transformed utility function should be an 
increasing function of one variable (Diewert and Wales 1988a). The proposed definition of 
the money metric indirect utility function is close to an example of money metric utility 
scaling suggested by Samuelson (1974). In KhoRASM, it is assumed that at the base period 
indirect utility function is measured in units of total income of consumers, i.e. rural and urban 
households. The money metric utility function is shaped according to the indirect utility 
function given in equation 3.11. 
ogr, fMoneyM  =  Incmr, fgr f r, f
∑∑  (3.2) 
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where r refers only for rural and urban households. 
Agricultural income is calculated as the sum of net trade of agricultural commodities less the 
costs of commodity transportation and agricultural production. Evoking the small-country 
assumption (Burniaux et al 1990; Jonasson and Apland 1997), in KhoRASM, the export and 
import prices for commodities are exogenously fixed. Thus, the net trade surplus is the 
difference between net trade earnings as export revenues minus import costs and the 
transportation costs: 
                
               
NTSurp   = (XFlows  -MFlows ) pex   r,i r,i i
r i
(XFlows  +MFlows ) edist  trc  r,i r,i r r,i
r i
Flows   dist  trc  r,r1,i r,r1 r,,i
r r1 f i
∑∑
−∑∑
−∑∑∑∑
 (3.3) 
The second cost component of the agricultural income refers to the agricultural production 
costs. In 2003, the state agencies defined centrally the maximum amount of physical inputs 
such as diesel and fertilizer which agricultural producers could purchase and apply. Moreover, 
the inputs were purchased during the first months of the year. Consequently, it is assumed that 
the agricultural producers made their production decisions without considering the prices of 
these inputs, but rather based on their current endowment in these inputs. Thus, the various 
cost component (varc) contains only the costs of inputs which affect the producer decisions 
such as costs of seeds and pesticides without imposing an endowment constraint. Full 
payments for hired labor and fodder costs are included into total production costs as follows: 
               
PrCost   = varc  Xlevlr, f,x r, f,x
r f x
+ Xlevl feed Pricer, f,x r, f,i,x r,i
r f x i
               + LabrF   Wager1,r, f1, f r
r r1 f f1
∑∑∑
∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑ ∑
 (3.4) 
where i depicts only maize and fodder crops. 
The model solves for the optimal values of production, consumption, input use and 
commodity trade by consumer/producer groups and districts, while generating equilibrium 
commodity prices. 
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3.3 Supply Module 
The supply module includes the production components of the general model (KhoRASM) 
such as production activities, commodity flows and constraints. The individual elements of 
the money metric utility function, such as commodity demand and prices, and the components 
of the flexible demand system are set to zero and removed from the equations. Consequently, 
the objective function of the supply module can be reduced to the maximization of revenues 
from trading activities and becomes: 
max  Revn   = NTSurp PrCost−  (3.5) 
The transportation constraints included into the objective function consider the linear cost of 
inter-district flows, as well as export and import flows for food and non food commodities as 
defined in equation (3.3). The linear transport costs are defined as per km transportation fees 
multiplied by the transported quantity of commodities and distance. The distance values for 
modeled districts are calculated as average distances between central markets in two 
administrative districts (Table 3.3). It is assumed that only one district, i.e. Khazarasp-Bagat 
aggregate, has access to the external commodity markets. 
Table 3.3: Distances between modeled district aggregates, km 
  KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT OUTSID
KSPBGT 45.2 86.0 40.0 78.7 200.0
KKAURG  40.8 30.1 47.7  
YZRGLN   54.4 31.0  
KVAYRK       37.5   
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and 
Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – 
Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat 
districts; OUTSID – A market point outside of the region 
Source: GIS Lab of ZEF/UNESCO project 2005; Own calculation 
The undeclared variables of the supply module are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
λ  r,f,z  Shadow price of input constraints; 
ν  r,f  Shadow price of labor constraint; 
μ  r,f,x  Shadow price of state procurement constraint for cotton; 
π  r,i  Shadow price of commodity market balance; 
Demand r,f,i  Consumption level (see Section 3.4.1). 
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The undeclared parameters of the supply module are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
labr  r,f,x  Labor application norms; 
labrav  r,f,x  Labor availability for agricultural work and leisure; 
inpt  r,f,z,x  Input application for production activity; 
inptav  r,f,z  Input endowments; 
feed  r,f,i,x  Animal feeding regime; 
yild  r,f,i,x  Production yield per activity; 
sord  r,f,x  State procurement constraint for cotton. 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
3.3.1 Production Constraints 
Within the supply module, the optimality conditions imply that activities are selected and 
their values remain within the feasible set or within the boundaries of the constraint set (Hazel 
and Norton 1986). The constraints are imposed due to limited supplies of resources, food 
consumption needs and state policy instruments. In the model, the constraints are classified 
into two groups such as resource constraints and state policy instrument constraints.  
Resource availability constraints belong to the technical constraints and depict the limited 
resources in Khorezm. In the model the production a single set of technology is initially 
specified for each crop production activity in fixed proportions of land, labor, nitrogen 
fertilizer, diesel fuel and grain harvester combines and vary between farm aggregates. It is 
assumed that the resources cannot be traded between district aggregates. There are no 
importing and exporting activities of resources. Additionally, since the model is not dynamic, 
the monthly projected inputs cannot be stored over month periods. Animal rearing activities 
are restricted by available fodder from crop growing activities and imported from other 
modeled districts or from outside of the region. Due to the computational limitations each 
animal production activity has a single feeding regime which varies between farm aggregates 
across the modeled districts. Other inputs were excluded from the model, since they are of 
less interest methodologically, although they may be indispensable in real-life production, 
such as changes in soil parameters. In order to capture the peak periods of resource use, the 
endowments of specific inputs such as land and water, have seasonal dimensions. 
In the model, the policies are decided exogenously and they are static and deterministic. Since 
the annual land allocation targets for cotton are determined centrally, the main state policy 
implied in the model is the state production target for cotton. 
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Using all given features, the resource constraints in the model are expressed as: 
XLevl    inpt   inptavr, f,x r, f,z,x r, f,z
x
≤∑  , ,r f zλ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (3.6) 
1. Total labor availability. Although labor does not constrain agricultural production in 
Khorezm, and there is relatively high rural underemployment in the agricultural sector, the 
significance of including labor as a restraint in this study is to analyze the potential 
employment creation by agricultural production activities. This constraint is also used a 
balance equation for agricultural time of rural households used for on-farm and off-farm 
activities and leisure. Labor is provided by rural households only, while shirkats and 
private farms can only hire labor. The labor endowment data was formed by summing the 
total annual hours worked in agriculture, and the leisure hours of the rural population in 
Khorezm for 2003. The total annual hours worked in agriculture are inferred from 
information on the share of the rural population employed in the regional agricultural 
sector plus the working hours spent on individually owned rural household plots. The total 
leisure hours in rural households is set as a fixed proportion of the time spent for non-
working activities in rural households. To define the total working and leisure hours, the 
rural population is transformed into adult equivalents, according to official 
recommendations for calculating adult manpower by MAWR. The units are in terms of 
adult working hours with weights of 1 for males and females between 15 and 65 years old, 
0.8 for males and females over 65, and 0.5 for children aged less than 15. Labor 
endowment is specified by type of agricultural producer and by district. The labor 
constraint includes labor flow variables which represent the labor hiring-in activities in 
shirkats and private farms and hiring-out activities in rural households. 
                  
labrav + LabrF   r1,r, f1, fr, f r1 f1
XLevl  labr + LabrFr, f,x r, f,x r,r1, f, f1
x r1 f1
≥∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑  ,r fν
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (3.7) 
2. Total land availability. In the model, land is required for annual crop growing and animal 
keeping. The land constraint consists of a single soil type and is specified at the aggregate 
farm for each district according to the official statistical reports on sown area in 2003. The 
cropping calendar is introduced into the land constraint in order to cover a feature of 
regional agriculture within a double cropping schedule. It allows two crops being grown 
and harvested from the same field during one agricultural year. In the land constraint, the 
number of time periods is kept at a minimum to cover the basic cropping schedule 
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options. The land occupation in rural household is divided into two seasons, i.e. seasons 
when land is occupied by winter wheat and a season when rice or fodder crops can be 
sown. Due to the production of cotton in shirkats and private farms, their cropping 
calendars have more periods in the year. 
3. Total water availability. The demand for water is generated by the cropping activities. The 
water endowments are fixed at monthly volumes of surface water used for crop cultivation 
in each district aggregate according to data obtained from regional statistical reports for 
2003. The irrigation technology, i.e. the surface crop water requirement, is specified 
according to the values developed by the research institutes for different soil types in 
Khorezm (OblSelVodKhoz 2004c; OblSelVodKhoz 2004d). The average water 
requirements vary among district aggregates in relation to the soil structure prevalent in 
each district aggregate. In the model, irrigation water, which is not applied for crop 
cultivating, cannot be stored over periods. 
4. Total nitrogen fertilizer availability. In the model, the fertilizer constraint is presented as 
the total annual real elementary nitrogen content in each fertilizer applied by farm 
aggregates in modeled districts according to the observed cropping pattern in 2003. The 
nitrogen fertilization schedule for crop cultivation differs among agricultural producer and 
district aggregates. Unused amount of nitrogen fertilizer can not be stored, traded and used 
in the next period. Although rural households and farms, which are beyond the state 
procurement system are left beyond the central distribution of fertilizer, it is assumed that 
they each have nitrogen fertilizer constraint and at the observed situation in 2003 they 
could not purchase additional amount of fertilizers in the markets. 
5. Total diesel availability. In the model, the diesel constraint is presented as the total annual 
diesel fuel used by farm aggregates in modeled districts according to the observed 
cropping pattern in 2003. Diesel is required for crop production in terms of fuel costs for 
field operations using machines. Additionally the diesel requirements for crop production 
include the diesel costs for transportation between local markets, as well as the diesel 
costs of irrigation. The diesel application technology varies between agricultural producer 
aggregates and district aggregates. Similar to the nitrogen fertilizer, unused amount of 
diesel can not be stored, traded and used in the next period. It is assumed that all 
agricultural producers have diesel constraints and at the observed situation in 2003 they 
could not purchase additional diesel in the markets. 
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6. Grain harvester combines and transporting vehicles constraint. According to farm and 
household surveys conducted in Khorezm, scarce supply of grain harvester combines is 
considered to be a significant constraint in crop production. This grain harvester combine 
constraint is specified according to monthly use at the district level, which depends on the 
total grain combining machinery hours available within farm aggregates and in district 
tractor fleets. The transporting vehicle constraint is measured in total working hours of 
transporting vehicles in district aggregates. 
7. Policy instrument constraints relate to government policy objectives for regional and 
national development and are similar to target variables. The state policy instrument 
constraint of the model requires that activity levels for cotton production in shirkat and 
private farm aggregates are not less than the assigned area in 2003: 
XLevl   sordr, f,x r, f,x≥  r, f,xμ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (3.8) 
There are no additional constraints on crop rotation, except for state policy instruments 
which require a certain amount of land be allocated for cotton production, ad adherence to 
a cropping calendar. 
3.3.2 Market Balance Constraint for Commodities 
KhoRASM features commodity market balance equations for each model district, which 
guarantee that demand equals supply in each district. This means that production, imports and 
purchases from other districts must be balanced with human consumption, animal feeding, 
export and sales to other districts. The commodity balance of KhoRASM can be expressed as 
follows: 
Xlevl yild + MFlows + Flows                   r, f,x r, f,i,x r1,r,ir,if x r1
Demand + Xlevl feed +XFlows + Flowsr, f,i r, f,x r, f,i,x r,i r,r1,i
f f x r1
≥∑∑ ∑
∑ ∑∑ ∑
 ,r iπ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (3.9) 
The maize grains and fodder crops can be traded between producers within and across 
districts and additional amount can be imported into the region. In the supply model human 
demand is given exogenously as the volumes consumed in 2003. 
3.3.3 Data Components of Supply Module 
A large amount of data is required for sector models (McCarl and Spreen 1980). For the 
supply module we use data from our own field research, e.g. private farm survey in 2003 and 
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household survey in 2004, as well as secondary data acquired from official governmental 
agencies, e.g. OblSelVodKhoz, OblStat, MAWR and PDFA. The model consists of three 
agricultural producer aggregates, each of which should be described by the relevant database. 
While there is an official record on large state-owned agricultural enterprises available in 
official statistical reports, the data on households and newly emerged private farms is poor. 
Therefore, a private farm survey and a household survey were conducted separately in most 
production districts. 
Private farm and household surveys were administered in 2003 and 2004. The surveys used a 
standardized questionnaire and informal interviews. The questionnaire was designed to 
provide a suitable database for a quantitative and qualitative analysis of private farming and 
household production in Khorezm. Both questionnaires consisted of open-ended and closed-
answer questions. Altogether 356 private farms and 400 households were interviewed.  
First of all, both surveys provided data for structuring relevant activities and constraints of 
each farm aggregate within an agricultural sector model of Khorezm. The main objective of 
the surveys was to provide data concerning production technologies for private farms and 
households, such as nitrogen fertilizer and manure application, labor use, seeding, and animal 
feeding regimes. Additionally, the budgets and the schedules of crop growing and animal 
keeping in private farms and households were estimated from the survey results. Moreover, 
the field research supplemented the existing information about input and commodity prices 
obtained from local official statistic departments. The collected data was generalized for all 
households and private farms in the different district aggregates of Khorezm. 
More aggregated data was obtained from official agencies. However, much of the required 
data was not available from secondary sources and had to be collected by means of farm and 
household surveys. The dataset is compiled from values for 2003 and consists of several 
categories such as social and political conditions of the region, regional prices, production 
pattern, household information, input-output coefficients, economic and natural resource 
endowments. Due to the absence of information on total export and import values of crops 
and animal production, their values were generated within the base run solution of the 
transportation model. 
Annual reports from 2003 by the regional department of statistics of Khorezm (OblStat) 
provide the main source of data on crop and animal production, cropping area and animal 
stock, crop and animal product yields, on-farm input availability and policy constraints. The 
official statistical report of OblStat also serves as a dataset for land use and animal stock in 
Khorezm by farm sizes. The cropping calendar of the modeled crops is based on private farm 
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and household survey data. In addition, the information on market prices in 2003 was 
obtained from OblStat. Since only a small portion of the surveyed households sell their 
products at local markets, price information for most crops could not generated from our 
survey data. Instead, state procurement and market prices for crops and animal products were 
obtained from the annual report on 2003 by the OblStat. The prices for fodder crops such as 
maize and fodder were taken from the household survey. Input prices in the model are 
exogenous and there is a distinction made between state and market prices. The state input 
prices for fertilizers, diesel fuel, machinery services, seed, and average salary used in 
production of strategic crops in 2003 were obtained from OblStat. In line with state policy, the 
state prices for inputs are uniform for all districts of Khorezm. The market prices for those 
inputs were obtained from the household survey. 
Resource endowments such as total labor supply, and available real elementary nitrogen, total 
working hours of grain harvester combines and transporting vehicles in 2003 were obtained 
from the official reports of OblStat. The total values of water use for crop production in 
districts in 2003 were obtained from the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources of 
Khorezm Region (OblSelVodKhoz). The total diesel use over districts and the diesel prices in 
2003 were collected from the official reports of the regional fuel distributing agency 
(OblNeft). 
Obtaining microeconomic data, such as production cost calculations and domestic production 
technologies presented the greatest challenge of this study. Data relevant for crop budgets and 
costs of animal keeping had to be calculated according to the type of agricultural producer and 
district as well as according to cross-sectional data and subjective sources, such as interviews 
with local veterinarians and experts in livestock breeding (Djanibekov 2005). The survey data 
and officially recommended norms of input application are combined into input-output tables 
for each cropping and animal keeping activity in the model. The production cost calculations 
for shirkats are based on the official microeconomic datasets obtained from shirkats’ annual 
accounting reports to OblSelVodKhoz. 
Data on animal feeding requirements and recommendations, as well as nutrient content of 
crops was obtained from literature on animal keeping in Khorezm region and Uzbekistan from 
Abdolniyozov (2000) and Dalakyan and Rakhmanova (1986). Annual feeding costs per 
livestock and poultry unit were derived from household survey results. Additionally, in order 
to successfully set up the model’s nutrient based constraints, parameters are needed to explain 
the amount of each nutrient that is present in each feedstuff as well as the dietary minimum 
and maximum requirements of animals for that nutrient. The content of fodder elements in 
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crops and crop byproducts were specified, using the feeding recommendations adopted from 
Dalakyan and Rakhmanova (1986). 
While the application quantities for most physical inputs are available from the surveys, the 
data on leaching and irrigation volumes and periods, on diesel costs for crop cultivation, as 
well as those on hours for grain combining and transportation services, were not covered in 
the survey questionnaires. The monthly irrigation requirements of specific crops were 
obtained from studies conducted in Khorezm by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
Resources (MAWR 2004c, OblSelVodKhoz 2002). In the model the actual crop water 
requirements are the crop water norms corrected by the coefficient of efficiency of the 
irrigation system including distribution and conveyance losses from on-farm and field canals, 
and field application efficiency. The data on diesel use, working hours of grain harvester 
combines and commodity transportation costs is based on norms developed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources of Uzbekistan (MAWR) in 1997. 
3.4 Demand Module 
3.4.1 Description of Normalized Quadratic – Quadratic Expenditure System 
Following Howe et al. (1979) and van Daal and Merkies (1989), Ryan and Wales (1999) 
show that for a quadratic system to be theoretically plausible, the demand functions must have 
a form expressed in terms of some auxiliary functions fm, g, h and their first partial 
derivatives with respect to prices such as follows: 
h gr, f,i r, f,i2Demand = (Incm fm ) + (Incm fm )+ fmr, f,i r, f r, f r, f r, f r, f,ig gr, f r, f
− −  (3.10) 
where index f refers only to the modeled consumers such as rural and urban households; fm 
and g are functions restricted to be homogenous of degree one in prices and h is homogeneous 
of degree zero in prices. These demand functions are generated by the indirect utility function 
(Ryan and Wales 1999) for each consumer group in different districts: 
,
gr, f(P,Y)= hr, fIncm fmr, f r f
ψ − −−  (3.11) 
In order to derive NQ-QES as member of this family of functions, fm, g and h and their first 
derivatives are the following: 
fm = Price dr, f r,k r, f,k
k
∑  and 
fmr, ffm = =dr, f,i r, f,iPricer,i
∂
∂  (3.12) 
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B Price Pricer, f,k,l r,k r,l
k l1g = Price b +r, f r,k r, f,k 2 α Pricek r,,k r,k
k
⎛ ⎞∑∑⎜ ⎟∑ ⎜ ⎟∑⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
and 
B Price α B Price Pricer, f,i,k r,k r,,i r, f,k,l r,k r,lgr, f k k l1g = =b +r, f,i r, f,i 2 2Price α Pricer,i r,,k r,k
k α Pricer,,k r,k
k
∑ ∑∑∂
−∂ ∑ ⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.13) 
h = a log(Price )r, f r, f,k r,k
k
∑  and 
h ar, f r, f,ih = =r, f,i Price Pricer,i r,i
∂
∂ , (3.14) 
with condition that NQ-QES functions are homogenous of degree zero in prices: 
a =0r, f,k
k
∑  (3.15) 
Using equations (3.10), and from (3.12) to (3.15), the full version of the demand function is 
the following: 
2ar, f,iDemand = Incm Price dr, f r,k r, f,kr, f,i Price g kr,i r, f
B Price B Price Pricer, f,i,k k r, f,k,l r,k r,l
k k l1b + αr, f,i r,i2 2α Pricer,k k
k α Pricer,k r,k
k +
B Price Pricer, f,k,l r,k r,
1Price b +r,k r, f,k 2k
⎛ ⎞−∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑∑
−∑ ⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
   Incm Price d +dr, f r,k r, f,k r, f,i
kl
k l
α Pricer,k r,k
k
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ −∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞∑∑ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.16) 
where the total income (expenditure) is defined as following: 
Incm = Demand Pricer, f r, f,i r,i
i
∑  (3.17) 
According to equation (3.17), total income of each consumer is equal to total expenditures for 
food and non-food commodities in case of rural and urban households (and plus leisure only 
in case of rural households). 
where undeclared variables of the demand module are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
Price  r,i  Endogenous commodity prices. 
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The undeclared parameters of the demand module are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
a  r,f,i  Independent parameter of NQ-QES; 
b  r,f,i  Independent parameter of NQ-QES; 
d  r,f,i  Independent parameter of NQ-QES; 
B  r,f,i,j  Independent parameter of NQ-QES; 
α  r,i  Positive predetermined parameter. 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
The Engel relationship presented in equation (3.16) suggests that marginal budget shares 
depend on the present level of expenditure, i.e. at different income levels consumers spend 
different fractions of their income on different commodities (Pollak and Wales 1992). 
3.4.2 Regularity Conditions and Flexibility 
At the reference vector of commodity prices the following conditions are assumed for the 
demand parameters: 
,
oB Price =0r, f,i,k r k
k
∑  and B =Br, f,i, j r, f, j,i  (3.18) 
Since the demand system is homogeneous of degree zero in a’s, b’s and B’s, normalization is 
imposed via setting the follows restriction on b’s and d’s: 
b =1r, f,k
k
∑  (3.19) 
od Price =0k r,k
k
∑  (3.20) 
Finally, it is assumed that the predetermined α parameters satisfy the restriction: 
oPrice =1r,k r,k
k
α∑  (3.21) 
Using these restrictions, the shorter version of demand functions can be written for the 
reference prices and incomes as follows: 
, , , ,2
, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
a br f i r f io o oDemand Incm Incm dr f i r f r f r f io o oPrice Price b Price br i r k r f k r k r k
k k
= + +
∑ ∑
 (3.22) 
The derivatives of the shorter version of demand function with respect to total income and 
prices are as follows: 
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o oDemand 2a Incm br, f,i r, f,i r, f r, f,i= +o o o oIncm Price Price b Price br, f r,i r,k r, f,k r,k r, f,k
k k
∂
∂ ∑ ∑
 (3.23) 
o 2 o oa Incm δ Price b +Price bo i r, f i, j r,k r, f,k r,i r, f, jDemandr, f,i k=o 2Pricer, j o oPrice Price br,i r,k r, f,k
k
o o2a d Incm Incmr, f,i r, f, j r, f r, f+ Br, f,i, jo o oPrice Price b Price br,i r,k r, f,k r,k r, f,k
k k
⎛ ⎞− ∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∂ ⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
−
−
∑ ∑
−
oIncm b b b dr, f r, f,i r, f, j i r, f, j
2 oPrice br,k r, f,koPrice b kr,k r, f,k
k
−
∑⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.24) 
where the undeclared parameters of the demand module are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
Incm0  r,f  Observed consumer’s income (expenditure) level; 
Price0  r,i  Observed commodity prices; 
Demand0 r,f,i  Observed level of consumption; 
δ  i,j  Kronecker’s delta. 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
The microeconomic theory requirements are satisfied only when the conditions given in 
equations (3.15) and from (3.18) to (3.20) are fulfilled. The adding-up condition given in 
equation (3.17) depends on the fulfilment of conditions (3.15) and from (3.18) to (3.20). Then 
inserting equations (3.15) into equation (3.23) it can be seen that the adding-up condition 
holds only if the mentioned above conditions of the functional parameters are fulfilled. 
, , 2
, ,
, ,
                                   , ,
, ,
ar f io o oiDemand Price Incmr, f,i r,i r, foPrice bi r,k r f k
k
ob Pricer f i r,i o o oi Incm d Price Incmr, f r f i r,i r, foPrice b ir,k r f k
k
∑
=∑
∑
∑
+ + =∑
∑
 (3.25) 
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Frohberg and Winter (2001) demonstrate that homogeneity is a functional property of the 
restricted NQ-QES, which can be computed by inserting equation (3.23) and equation (3.24) 
such as: 
, , ,
22 , , , ,                 
, , , ,
                
o oDemand Pricer, f,i r, j
r f i j o oPrice Demandj j r, j r, f,i
o oa Incm Incm br f i r, f r, f r f i
o o o o oDemand Price Price b Demand Price br, f,i r,i r,k r f k r, f,i r,k r f k
k k
Demandr,
ε ∂=∑ ∑
∂
−
= −
∑ ∑
∂
= , ,
o oIncmf,i r, f y
r f io oIncm Demandr, f r, f,i
ε= −
∂
 (3.26) 
where undeclared variables of the demand module are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
ε   r,f,i,j   Calibrated price elasticities of demand (see Section 4.2.1); 
ε y  r,f,i,  Calibrated income elasticities of demand (see Section 4.2.1); 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
The economic theory requires the substitution matrix of compensated price responses, i.e. the 
Slutsky matrix, to be concave as a consequence of consistent preferences and the concavity of 
the expenditure function (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). In other words, the Slutsky matrix, 
i.e. the sum of the uncompensated price effect and the income effect, should be symmetric 
and negative semi-definite. Ryan and Wales (1996) prove that in case of a flexible demand 
function with quadratic Engel curves the curvature property can be imposed only locally 
following a Cholesky-decomposition procedure. According to this procedure the curvature 
constraints are imposed at a reference point by forcing the Slutsky matrix to be negative 
semidefinite at that point. The Slutsky matrix is defined as follows: 
, ,
, , ,
2 2
, , , , , , , ,             2
, , , ,
o oDemand Demandr f i r, f,i r, f,i oS Demandr f i j r, f, jo o oPrice Price Incmr, j r, j r, f
o oa b Incm a b Incmr f i r f j r, f r f j r f i r, f
o o o oPrice Price b Price Price br,i r,k r f k r, j r,k r f
k
χ∂ ∂ ∂
= = +
∂ ∂ ∂
= +
⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
2
3 22 , , , , , , ,
, , ,2 2
, , , ,
, ,
k
k
o o oa a Incm a Incm Incmr f i r f j r, f r f i r, f i j r, f Br f i jo o oPrice Price b Price br,i r,k r f k r,k r f ko o oPrice Price Price b k kr,i r, j r,k r f k
k
δ
⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ − +
∑ ∑⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.27) 
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where undeclared variables of the demand module are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
S   r,f,i,j  Slutsky substitution matrix. 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
3.4.3 Data Components of Demand Module 
In order to trace the cross-effects between commodities, this study uses a system of eleven 
commodities including nine food commodity aggregates, one manufactured commodity 
aggregate and leisure. The demand system is derived for each of the five modeled sub-regions 
(districts) and both types of households (i.e. rural and urban). The values used in calibration 
of the parameters that steer the adjustment reaction on the demand side of the model are not 
estimated endogenously within the model, but predominantly obtained from the international 
literature and official statistics. 
First of all, consumed quantities and income (expenditure) are given by household type and 
district. Due to the lack of data on regional consumption patterns, the information on 
consumption in Uzbekistan for 2003 was taken from the Supply Utilization Accounts (SUA) 
and Food Balance Sheets (FBS) in FAO Statistics Division12. First, items presented in the 
FAO database were aggregated into nine main food categories according to the author’s own 
discretion. In order to incorporate the demand for non-modeled food commodities, non-food 
(manufactured) commodities in the calibration procedure, the extra commodity aggregate, is 
included into the model which represents ‘all other food commodities’ left outside of the 
model and equal to the consumed quantities of all other food commodities presented in SUA 
database for Uzbekistan in 2003. Consumption per capita was inferred based on this 
aggregation rule for Uzbekistan (see Table A6 in Appendix 3). 
Next, consumed food quantities for Khorezm in the base period of 2003 were assigned based 
on the national average and proportionally assigned to the regional level based on population 
shares. (see Table A7 in Appendix 3). An aggregate for non-food (manufactured) 
commodities includes all products and services produced in the non-agricultural sector and 
valued in monetary terms of other non-food commodities consumed by the population in 
Khorezm. The total value of manufactured commodities was proportionally inferred using 
their share in total expenditures for Uzbekistan as reported by FAO (1998). Leisure is 
included into the calibration process as a separate commodity. It is equal to a determined part 
                                                 
12 No commodity price information for Uzbekistan was available in the database of FAO Statistical Division by 
02.02.2007. 
Structure of the Agricultural Sector Model for the Khorezm Region 
 66
of total hours which rural households in Khorezm assumedly spent for non-working activities 
in 2003. The total available time in rural households in Khorezm is calculated proportionally 
to the total population of these households based on data obtained from OblStat. It is assumed 
that urban households consume more expensive commodities at higher rates than rural 
households. Additionally, urban households do not have leisure consumption (see Table A7 in 
Appendix 3).  
The initial price vectors for food commodities were obtained from the official statistical 
reports of OblStat as average annual market prices observed in Khorezm in 2003. Initial 
prices for food aggregates such as melons and vegetables are values derived by dividing the 
total value of commodities in these groups by their total metric weight. Initial prices for non-
food commodities are assumed to be equal to their unit values, i.e. 1000 USD. The initial 
price for leisure is the average labor price derived from monthly wages paid by private farms 
to hired seasonal workers as observed in Khorezm in 2003.  
Following the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the commodity prices in the modeled district 
aggregates will differ exactly by the unit transportation costs between these districts (Apland, 
Öhlmér and Jonasson 1994). Therefore, the new price system for modeled commodity 
aggregates can be derived as the equivalents of the shadow prices of the relevant commodity 
market balances (equation (3.9)) in the supply module for each district aggregate (see Table 
A6 in Appendix 3). The total income (expenditure) value is a sumproduct of total consumed 
quantities for each food and non-food aggregates and leisure and their respective prices (see 
Table A7 in Appendix 3). 
Available records do not cover a sufficient time period to allow the estimation of price and 
income elasticities. Therefore, the primary values for demand elasticities were obtained from 
literature. The primary (uncalibrated) values used for the demand elasticities are the values 
obtained from the WATSIM13 model’s base-run dataset on the rest of the world and then 
adjusted according to the author’s own knowledge on food consumption reaction to the price 
changes in Khorezm such as sign and approximate value of the elasticities. The initial 
(uncalibrated) values of income elasticities were generated at the author’s discretion (see 
Table A8 in Appendix 3). The uncalibrated price and income elasticities are provided as a 
uniform value for each district and consumer type. 
                                                 
13 The WATSIM is a recursive-dynamic spatial world trade model for agricultural commodities. It is mainly 
applied for the medium-term analysis of trade policy changes (Kuhn 2003). 
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3.5 Links between Supply and Demand Modules 
The demand and supply modules in the general KhoRASM model are linked via concept of 
nonseparability such as the rural households’ decisions regarding their production are affected 
by their consumer characteristics. First, the objective function of KhoRASM model includes 
the consumer’s and producer’s surpluses in terms of the money metric utility function. 
Second, in the full version of KhoRASM, the commodity consumption is a function of 
income and commodity prices, which changes in accordance to the commodity market 
balance reached between the demand and supply modules. Consequently, changes in 
commodity demand caused by different levels of consumer incomes and commodity prices, 
and the production activities defined by the producer technologies and input endowments 
reciprocally affect each other. Third, the agricultural time available to rural households can be 
used for on-farm, i.e. production activities in the rural household plots, and off-farm activities, 
i.e. employment of rural household members for production activities in shirkats and private 
farms, and for leisure time consumption. Next, in the optimum solutions, the marginal 
revenue product of labor, i.e. shadow price of labor in the supply module, is equal to the 
marginal utility of leisure time consumption, i.e. price of leisure in the demand module 
(Benjamin 1992). Furthermore, the shadow prices of labor are equal to the agricultural wages 
which rural households receive for being hired by shirkats and private farms. Therefore, the 
following condition is introduced: 
Wage  = Pricer r,'lsr' ,  where lsr is a leisure time.      (3.28) 
Fourth, in KhoRASM, profits from agricultural activities, as defined in the supply module add 
up with the constant amounts of nonagricultural income to be equal to total expenditure for 
commodity consumption defined in the demand module.  
oIncm =AgrIncm +nagrIncmr, f r, f r, f  (3.29) 
The agricultural profit of rural households is defined as total output from agricultural 
production activities in household plots less production and animal feeding costs, plus the 
earnings from being hired in shirkats and private farms, i.e. off-farm activities, at the 
agricultural wage equal to the price of leisure time: 
( ), , ,AgrIncm = Price Yild varc Xlevlr,i r f i x r, f,x r, f,xr, f i x
Xlevl feed Price  r, f,x r, f,i,x r,i
i x
+ LabrF Wage LabrF dist lcr,r1, f, f1 r, f r,r1, f, f1 r,r1 r
r1 f1 r1 f1
−∑∑
−∑∑
−∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 (3.30)
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where f is defined only for rural households. 
In the model, the total income (expenditure) of urban households equals the consumption 
expenditures presented in equation (3.17) and fixed over all scenarios. 
The non-agricultural income of rural households equals to the difference between observed 
consumption expenditures of rural households less the observed value of agricultural profits 
as follows: 
( )
,
, , , ,
o o onagrIncm = Demand Pricer, f,i r ir, f i
o o o oPrice Yild varc Xlevl Xlevl feed Pricer i r f i x r, f,x r, f,x r, f,x r, f,i,x r,i
i x i x
o o oLabrF Wage LabrF dist lcr,r1, f, f1 r r,r1, f, f1 r,r1 r
r1 f1 r1 f1
∑
− − +∑∑ ∑∑
− +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 (3.31) 
where f is defined only for rural households. 
The undeclared variables of the model are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
AgrIncm r,f  Agricultural profit in rural households. 
The undeclared parameters of the model are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
Xlevl0  r,f,x  Observed levels of production activities; 
nagrIncm0 r,f  Observed level of non-agricultural income in rural households; 
wage0  r  Observed level of agricultural wages. 
lc  r  Labor flow costs 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
3.6 Model Limitations 
Although KhoRASM has advantages inherited by the nature of the price-endogenous 
programming model, it also has some limitations. These relate to some of the model 
specifications and aggregation assumptions. First of all, since the model is static and based 
only on a single reference year, it does not cover the simulation behavior of the regional 
agricultural sector to exogenous shocks over several periods. A second limitation is related to 
the objective function of KhoRASM, which is the maximization of producer and consumer 
surpluses. In reality, the regional agricultural sector does not behave exactly as an 
optimization model. In contrast to the optimization algorithm, the real world agricultural 
producers may not be able to maximize their profits because of frictions, uncertainty and 
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imperfect information in the market (Hazell and Norton 1986). Also, producers may have 
other considerations in their decision-making which are impossible to include into the model. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that all of the modeled producer aggregates pursue the same 
objective, namely maximization of their income, though, in fact, the objectives of each 
producer aggregate may vary. The producer aggregation in KhoRASM is based on current 
legislations regarding agricultural producers in Uzbekistan. Here, the aggregation problem 
may occur since natural and economic conditions vary considerably from one producer to 
another within each farm aggregate. In a more precise study, the private farm aggregate 
should be disaggregated into several groups according to land size, production technology, 
and input endowments. Moreover, the model does not include the labor flow to other sectors 
of regional economy. Thus, any labor discharge by the agricultural sector is treated as 
increase in leisure consumption. 
The assumption of product homogeneity is another problem related to the aggregation. The 
difference with respect to quality of crops and animal products may affect their price and 
demand levels in the region (Hazel and Norton 1986). The next problem of KhoRASM is 
related to the aggregation of the administrative districts which was done due to limits in 
computing facilities, e.g. further disaggregation of modeled increases enormously the time of 
calibration, validation and simulation runs of the model. It is necessary to bear in mind that 
any disaggregation of the model components is time consuming and data intensive (McCarl 
1982) and therefore, could not be done in the confines of this study. However, future 
development of computing facilities will allow such modifications in KhoRASM, for instance 
changing the model’s regional structure via replacing the aggregated districts by 
administrative ones. 
Furthermore, the environmental issues such as salinization and water logging are also central 
to the region, but could not be included into this analysis. Finally, KhoRASM is based on an 
input/output framework with fixes technical coefficients in a Leontieff sense (1941). This of 
itself may limit the simulation output such as the yield response and factor substitution in such 
model specification are considered through including a set of alternative activities or 
piecewise linear approximations (Hazell and Norton 1986). The introduction of a non-linear 
yield function and, thus, incorporating the input substitutability, might improve the model 
specification. Finally, the model does not adequately depict the informal input markets since 
the input trading activities between producers are not incorporated. 
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4. Calibration of Supply and Demand Modules of KhoRASM 
This chapter covers step two of the model application presented in Figure 3.1. In order to 
incorporate the regional characteristics of production module, the supply side of the model 
needs to be calibrated to replicate the production levels of the observation period. The 
selection process and additional features of our calibration approach for the supply side are 
described in section 4.1. It should be noted that literature on the applied approach is still very 
scarce. In order to incorporate the regional demand characteristics, the demand module 
likewise needs to be calibrated. The approach used in calibration of the demand module is 
presented in section 4.2. The demand module calibration consists of two separate calibration 
procedures. First, price and income elasticities of demand are calibrated to fulfill the 
theoretical consistency as presented in section 4.2.1. Secondly, the functional parameters of 
the selected demand system are derived from the calibrated elasticities of demand as 
presented in section 4.2.2. During the study, several drawbacks of the calibrations of supply 
and demand modules were observed which are discussed in sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.3 
respectively. 
4.1 Calibration of Supply Module 
The validity of the model is evaluated by comparing its base run solution to the actual 
observed situation (McCarl and Spreen 1980). In the mathematical programming models, it is 
usually assumed that basic knowledge of the system is sufficient and, thus, parameters of the 
objective function and constraints are not calibrated to historical data. The main drawback of 
this assumption is that such model does not guarantee that the observed or reference data will 
be reproduced at its base run (McCarl and Spreen 1980). An often observed trend is that 
results are close for activities with large production values, while calculations for activities 
with very small production values tend to deviate stronger from the true observations. It is 
claimed that if a good fit to the observation is not achieved than the quality of the model is 
poor. There are several reasons for the differences between the base run optimal solution and 
the observed activity levels. First of all, models by definition are simplified abstraction of a 
real system and as a result will drop information. This is why they require verification against 
actual behavior (Howitt 2002). The differences between modeled and observed values may be 
a result of an omission of factors influencing production activities. However, it is possible, 
that even if the base run solution results deviate from the observed situation, the model is still 
specified correctly. 
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A lack of data availability and reliability can be another reason that the activity levels in the 
base run optimal solution do not correspond to their observed values. Normally, a sector 
model is based on two types of information; i.e. aggregated and micro-level data. The 
aggregated data in the sector models consists of information on regional production activities, 
total production, yields, and inputs endowments, and is usually collected from the official 
statistical reports. The micro-level data consists of information on the production technologies 
applied by agricultural producers. This information is often obtained from microeconomic 
studies and surveys. In most cases, modelers introduce the averages of their surveyed data 
into their models; e.g. as linear input-output parameters suggested by Leontief (1941). A third 
reason is that regional sector models are normally validated via the comparison of the model’s 
base run results to the aggregated data on the observed values for the model’s variables 
obtained from official statistical departments. However, in transition economies, official 
statistics may provide inadequate measures of the actual production activities (Poganietz et al. 
2000). Such combination of aggregated and micro-level data in one model may produce the 
base run solution where the model’s activities deviate from their observed values. 
Policy analysis based on programming models that show a wide deviation between the 
model’s base period outcomes and the actual production patterns is generally unacceptable 
(Howitt 2005). Only after being calibrated in order to exactly reproduce the base period data, 
may programming models be used for policy simulation (McCarl and Spreen 1980). 
Consequently, the objective of our calibration should be the proper adjustment of 
KhoRASM’s supply side, in the sense that its base run optimal solution exactly replicates the 
observed activity levels without limiting the model’s flexibility. This means that that the 
calibrated version of the model should solve the optimization problem without requiring 
additional constraints. This can be achieved via a calibration procedure which explicitly 
incorporates the information on the actual observed activity levels for the base year in an 
attempt to adjust certain model parameters while keeping the number of the model constraints 
unchanged (Howitt 2002).  
Therefore, some parameters of the mathematical programming model needs to be adjusted for 
reproducing exactly a given reference point without restraining the model’s flexible and 
realistic simulation behavior. An elegant approach to do so is ‘Positive Mathematical 
Programming’ (PMP) calibration (Heckelei 2002). The standard PMP calibration solves the 
overspecialization problem, maintains flexibility of the model, and produces the exact fit of 
the activities in the base run solution to their observed values (Howitt 1995). Such calibrated 
mathematical models may require less data than the standard approaches of calibrating linear 
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programming models (Umstätter 1999). Nevertheless, the standard PMP approach has a set of 
drawbacks. One of the main shortcomings of the standard PMP calibration approach is that 
the introduction of unreasonably high cost terms into the original model is not easily intuited 
or interpreted (Umstätter 1999). Also according to the general idea of the PMP approach, the 
incorporation of a nonlinear cost function into the specification of the programming problem 
may affect the shadow prices of resource constraints and marginal cost values in the original 
version of the model (Heckelei 2002). As a result, the shadow prices and marginal values of 
the PMP-calibrated model may be incompatible with those of a dual version of the original 
model. The next critique regarding PMP calibration is that this approach involves an arbitrary 
specification of the objective function and may lead to implausible response behavior of the 
calibrated model (Heckelei and Britz 2000, Heckelei 2002). 
Heckelei (2002) reviews several methods to avoid the problems occurred by standard PMP 
calibration based on extending it via the application of consistent econometric tools and the 
incorporation of additional information on system behavior. However, these methods 
complicate the calibration process and it may be difficult for the modeler to implement them 
if the required external data is expensive or not available for the studied area and period. 
Consequently, alternative theoretically consistent econometric approaches must employ other 
estimating equations than the ones used in PMP; thus allowing for recovery of the original 
model specification with increasing data information (Heckelei 2002).  
Since the optimal solution of sector models is usually validated by comparing the activity 
levels with the observed output values available at aggregated level from the statistical 
offices, it is assumed that these aggregated values are accurate. On the other hand, the 
technology coefficients of the sector models obtained from micro-level studies such as farm 
and household surveys are used by the modelers only at average values. This neglects the 
information on technology coefficients contained in the sample data, such as standard 
deviation of the sample, which may be useful for calibrating the aggregated sector models. 
Additionally, the micro-level data relies on subjective responses of the respondents. In 
surveys, for several reasons the respondents, i.e. farmers and rural households, may give 
unreliable answers regarding the application of production inputs. As a result, the input 
applications per hectare, obtained from surveys, may have stretched distribution which is 
presented in Figure 4.1, where the micro-level dataset has a high standard deviation and a 
wide range of observed application rates. 
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Figure 4.1: Nitrogen fertilizer application in rural households in Khorezm, kg ha -1 
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Note: MEAN – Sample mean; STDEV – Standard deviation of the sample; N – Number of respondents 
Source: Household survey 2004 
As result, micro-level data such as technology coefficients may be considered the least 
reliable information in the sector model, and the main reason for the model’s deviations in the 
base run solution. Hence, the model can be calibrated via adjustments in the technology 
coefficients obtained from surveys and literature and without altering its original structure. If 
the technology coefficients are adjusted correctly, the original model will exactly reproduce 
the base year values of production activities without requiring an additional set of constraints.  
The general idea of model calibration via PMP and the selected alternative approach are 
visually presented in Figure 4.2. The presented model is a nonlinear model with maximization 
of objective function (Z) via production activities (Xj) over activity gross-margins (ηj) and 
technologies (aij). In its base run, the model solves at point A, while the actual values of the 
base year were observed to be at point Ao. Case 1 demonstrates the general idea of the 
standard PMP calibration. In order to obtain the exact fit of the model’s results to the 
observed values, PMP calibrates the model without altering the shape of the feasible solution 
space. However the specification of the objective function is altered through the incorporation 
of the non-linear production cost term (ρj). Case 2 demonstrates the calibration approach for 
positive mathematical programming models via adjustment of technology coefficients. Since 
information on technology coefficients is included explicitly both in the feasible solution 
space and the objective function of the model, their modification will alter both, the feasible 
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solution space and the location of the objective function. However, in contrast to standard 
calibration of PMP, the original specification of the objective function is not changed. 
The selected approach calibrates via an explicit use of the implicit information about the 
observed activity levels, as well as on the dual values of the original model constraints. 
Hence, the calibration process involves two consecutive steps. Step one, consists of the 
estimating the dual values of the original model constraints. Step two consists of the 
incorporation of the actually observed activity levels and the derived dual values into the 
model calibration. 
Figure 4.2: Comparison of standard PMP and alternative calibration approaches 
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Source: Own compilation 
The original version of the supply module of KhoRASM consists of the equations (3.5) to 
(3.9) with their corresponding shadow prices. In this section, the calibration of the KhoRASM 
model is described in detail. The presented calibrating process is based on the following 
assumptions: 
1) The observed levels of activities represent an equilibrium in the agricultural sector of 
Khorezm for the base year of 2003, i.e. the producers achieved maximum surplus for their 
constraint sets; 
2) The actual observed values of production activities, input and output prices, input 
endowments, and quantitative policy constraints obtained from the official statistical 
reports are correctly specified; 
3) The micro-level data on technology coefficients obtained from the farm and household 
surveys are of least reliability among all information fed into the model.  
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The adjustment of the technology coefficients included into the model specification will steer 
the model to exactly reproduce in its base run optimal solution the observed activity levels of 
the base year of 2003. The main advantage of this calibration approach is that similar to PMP, 
it avoids overspecialization, retains the model’s flexibility, and calibrates exactly. Moreover, 
this calibration approach allows the modeler to incorporate more information obtained via 
surveys. In general, as a starting point, the selected calibration approach allows the modeler to 
use minimum amounts of data for policy simulations. The next section will address how these 
parameters can be adjusted while relying only on minimum data amounts. The calibration 
procedure presented in this study is consistent with the modeler’s observations on the actual 
practice of agriculture producers in Khorezm. 
4.4.1 Stage 1: Estimation of Shadow Prices 
The first step of the supply module calibration is related to the first assumption of the selected 
approach; i.e. that the observed situation was in fact the optimal equilibrium for the modeled 
system in the base year. Consequently, in order to incorporate the information on the observed 
activity levels into the calibration process, in the second step of the calibration process the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions will be imposed providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
a constrained maximum at the observed activity levels (Takayama and Judge 1986 and 
McCarl and Spreen 1980). In case the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satisfied in the second 
stage of the calibration process, the supply module’s optimal solution will exactly reproduce 
the observed equilibrium outcome in the base run.  
Incorporation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions requires a set of shadow prices from the original 
model constraints; e.g. dual values (shadow prices as presented in equations 3.6 to 3.9) of 
resource and policy instrument constraints and commodity market balances. The expected 
values of the shadow prices for some production inputs were inferred by the author from the 
household and private farm survey components, such as unofficial land rents, black-market 
prices for diesel and fertilizers, and total value of agricultural wage which includes also the 
value of payments in kind. Expected values of shadow prices which could not be inferred 
from the surveys, such as shadow prices of water and of nutrient elements in fodder, were 
derived from the dual version of the supply module. The intervals around the expected values 
were determined by either using the standard deviation of the sample (if available) or by 
qualitative assumptions in the case of the shadow prices obtained from the dual solution, such 
as the assumption that the shadow price of the water constraint cannot be negative as a 
relaxation of this constraint can under rationality assumption never result in lower farm 
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income. The dual specification of the original version of the supply module produces 
information, that is useful for calibration in cases where production costs are correctly 
specified in the model, but the production technologies are unreliable (Howitt 2005). 
Therefore, the dual specification of the model fulfills the second assumption of the selected 
calibration approach on the incomplete information regarding production technology 
coefficients. In summary, the objective of the first step of the supply module calibration is to 
derive the shadow prices associated with binding input (λ) and labor (ν) constraints, policy 
instrument constraints (μ), and commodity balances (π) using the dual model.  
The specification of a programming model’s dual version is presented in Hazell and Norton 
(1986). The objective function of the dual problem of the supply module is a minimization of 
the total imputed value or opportunity cost of the resources constraints less the total shadow 
value of policy instrument constraints: 
          
min W = inptav λ + labrav νr, f,z r, f,z r, f r, f
r f z r f
osord μ Demand πr, f,x r, f,x r, f,i r,i
r f x r f i
∑∑∑ ∑∑
− −∑∑∑ ∑∑∑
 (4.1) 
The constraints of the dual model are derived using the first order conditions of the original 
model’s Lagrangian function with respect to the original model activities; e.g. production 
activities and commodity and labor flows. Equations (4.2. to (2.6) show the constraints which 
have been derived from the dual model. First derivative of Lagrangian over production 
activities associated with the constrained maximization of the supply module: 
( )
     
L     = π yild feed varc        r,i r, f,i,x r, f,i,x r, f,xXLevl ir, f,x
           ν  labr  λ inpt μ 0r, f r, f,x r, f,z r, f,z,x r, f,x
z
∂ − −∑∂
− − + ≤∑
 (4.2) 
First derivative of Lagrangian of the supply module over commodity inter-district flows: 
 L     =  dist trc  + π  π 0r,r1 r,i r,i r1,iFlows  r,r1,i
∂ − − ≤∂  (4.3) 
First derivative of Lagrangian of the supply module over labor flows: 
L     =  dist lc  ν  ν  0r,r1 r r, f r1, f1LabrF  r,r1, f, f1
∂ − + − ≤∂  (4.4) 
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First derivative of Lagrangian of the supply module over commodity export: 
L     =  pex  edist trc   π 0i r r,i r,iXFlowsr,i
∂ − − ≤∂  (4.5) 
First derivative of Lagrangian of the supply module over commodity import: 
  L     =  pex edist trc  π 0i r r,i r,iMFlowsr,i
∂ − − + ≤∂  (4.6) 
where all indices, variables and parameters have been declared above. 
The dual variables, i.e. shadow prices of the original model constraints, measure the 
sensitivity of the optimal solution values to changes in the original constraints. In this sense 
they have the same role as the as Lagrangian multipliers in classical optimization problems. 
(Chiang 1984). The opportunity cost of producing a unit of commodity cannot be less than the 
commodity price. Consequently, the marginal opportunity costs of constraints in equation 
(4.2) states that the total sum of the shadow prices per unit of activity level must be greater or 
equal to the total revenue per unit of production activity. At the observed levels of activities, 
the commodity prices are the shadow prices of commodity balances (π) and reflect the 
relative scarcity of the commodities supplied in the region (Hazell and Norton 1986). 
4.4.2 Stage 2: Adjusting Technology Coefficients 
In the second stage of the supply module calibration, the shadow prices of the original 
constraints and the observed activity values are used to adjust the technology coefficients.  
After developing the KhoRASM model, the optimality conditions are derived for calibrating 
the model. Both the necessary and the sufficient conditions for an optimum must be satisfied. 
For the mathematical programming model with a nonlinear objective function and linear 
constraints, the so-called Kuhn–Tucker conditions form the necessary conditions. Thus, 
imposing the Kuhn–Tucker conditions forms the set of additional calibration equations. Once 
the calibration has satisfied the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the technology coefficients are 
adjusted to values which will steer the original model to replicate the observed situation in the 
system in the base period. Therefore, following the assumption that the observed production 
in Khorezm in 2003 was in equilibrium, i.e. regional producers maximized their surplus, the 
constraints of the dual model given in equations (4.2) and (4.6) are set to the equalities. The 
next set of equations associated with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions comprises the 
complementary slackness equalities, which stipulate that the optimally binding constraints 
will have non-zero-valued shadow prices. 
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Because the shadow prices of the original model constraints and the technology coefficients 
are expressed in a single data point, the problem of calibrating the supply module can be 
considered as ill-posed. Shadow prices are provided as estimates of the dual model and 
technology coefficients are represented by the average values of the actual observations taken 
from household survey. Therefore, technology coefficients are adjusted via the sample mean 
and standard deviation. The presented calibration approach is based on finding a unique 
solution to the ill posed problem via the incorporation of additional sample information. 
Maximum Entropy (ME) estimation allows one to solve such ill-posed problems of parameter 
modification, via the incorporation of the additional information. According to Golan et al. 
(1996), in the ME estimation is generally motivated by two incidents. The first being 
insufficient information for proceeding in a traditional manner. The second being prudence. 
An attractive feature of the ME approach is that has a functional form with a unique solution 
at its maximum (Howitt 2002). Generally, the ME estimation has been applied by modelers as 
a tool for solving the problems posed by false model specifications, data errors, and 
aggregation bias (Howitt 2002).  
The calibration model is as a nonlinear problem with an objective function that maximizes the 
probability (entropies) of adjusted technology coefficients and shadow prices falling within 
the original model’s constraints. The ME estimation process is to select for each coefficient 
the ones with the lowest deviation from the original value among the infinite number of the 
modified parameters. In other words, the ME problem seeks a set of probabilities which adds 
the least amount of information to the modified parameters (Heckelei and Britz 2000): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
             
             
maxH = inpt ln inpt λ ln λt,r, f,z,x t,r, f,z,x t,r, f,z t,r, f,z
t r f z x t r f z
labr ln labr ν ln νt,r, f,x t,r, f,x t,r, f t,r, f
t r f x t r f
π ln π μ ln μt,r,i t,r,i t,r, f,x t,r, f,x
t r i t r f x
− −∑∑∑∑∑ ∑∑∑∑
− −∑∑∑∑ ∑∑∑
− −∑∑∑ ∑∑∑∑
 (4.7) 
The ME optimization is constrained by the following requirements, presented by Golan et al. 
(1996), and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions related to equations (4.2) to (4.6) according to which 
the model adjusts the values of technology coefficients and shadow prices: 
1) Definition of a support space for modifying technology coefficients and shadow 
prices. To solve the ill-posed calibration problem of KhoRASM’s supply module, the ME 
estimation requires additional information on the range within which technology parameters 
and shadow prices should be adjusted, i.e. a priori information that forms a support space 
Calibration of Supply and Demand Modules of KhoRASM 
 79
which consists of lower and upper support points. While the technology coefficients for 
fertilizer, diesel and labor are modified within based on the data range presented in the survey, 
the crop water use parameters are calibrated within a range of ±50% of their recommended 
leaching and irrigation volumes. The support space for shadow prices of the original model 
constraints equals their absolute values as observed in the surveys and as derived during the 
first stage of the calibration. Therefore the supporting interval ranges from zero to twice the 
shadow price. The selected range of the support space for shadow prices will move the 
feasible solution space such that in the base run solution the binding constraints can be 
relaxed in order to achieve the observed activity levels. 
The support space for the shadow prices is linked with the price of leisure used in the demand 
module of KhoRASM (see section 3.4): According to the demand system used in KhoRASM 
and due to the way the labor constraints are formulated, the shadow price of labor in the 
supply module equals the price of leisure in the demand module. 
2) Data moment-consistency requirements, where parameter modification is specified 
within a feasible range defined by sets of support points. Each support value is multiplied by 
its associated probability. 
3) Normalization-additivity requirements in which the sum of probabilities of modified 
parameters is equal to unit. 
4) For ensuring the fulfillment of the optimal solution at the observed activity values, the 
marginal commodity value and marginal opportunity cost equalities of the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions must be held (equations (4.2) to (4.6) defined as equalities) such as to: 
To achieve the observed production activity levels: 
( )
   
e eπ yild feed varc     =   r,i r, f,i,x r, f,i,x r, f,xi
e e e e e           ν  labr λ inpt μr, f r, f,x r, f,z r, f,z,x r, f,x
z
− −∑
+ −∑
 (4.8) 
To achieve the observed commodity flow levels: 
e e π =π dist trc  r1,i r,i r,r1 r,i−  (4.9) 
To achieve the observed labor flow levels: 
e eν  =ν dist lcr1, f1 r, f r,r1 r−  (4.10) 
To achieve the observed export flow levels: 
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eπ  =  pex  edist trcr,i i r r,i−  (4.11) 
To achieve the observed import flow levels: 
 +eπ =  pex edist trc  r,i i r r,i  (4.12) 
5) Additionally, the complementary slackness equalities imposed by the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions must be held for every constraint and shadow price: 
o e eXlevl  inpt   inptav λ  =0r, f,x r, f,z,x r, f,z r, f,z
x
⎛ ⎞−∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (4.13) 
  
o  labrb + LabrFr, f r1,r, f1, f
r1r1
o e o eXlevl  labr LabrF  = 0r, f,x r, f,x r,r1, f, f1 r, fx r1r1
ν
⎛ ∑ ∑⎜⎜⎝
⎞− −∑ ∑ ∑ ⎟⎟⎠
 (4.14) 
6) The original model’s input endowment and policy instrument constraints, and 
commodity balances are imposed to ensure that parameters are calibrated under the original 
structure of the model constraints: 
o eXlevl  inpt   inptav  r, f,x r, f,z,x r, f,z
x
≤∑  (4.15) 
                   
o labrb + LabrFr1,r, f1, fr, f r1r1
o e oXlevl  labr LabrFr, f,x r, f,x r,r1, f, f1
x r1r1
≥∑ ∑
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 (4.16) 
where the undeclared indices of the supply module calibration are as follows: 
t  Support space such as maximum and minimum points. 
The undeclared variables of the supply module calibration are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
inpt   t,r,f,z,x  Probabilities of technology coefficients; 
labr   t,r,f,x  Probabilities of labor use coefficients; 
λ   t,r,f,z  Probabilities of shadow prices of input constraints; 
ν   t,r,f  Probabilities of shadow prices of labor constraints; 
π   t,r,i  Probabilities of shadow prices of market balance; 
Calibration of Supply and Demand Modules of KhoRASM 
 81
μ   t,r,f,x  Probabilities of shadow prices of state procurement constraints; 
evarc   r,f,x  Modified production costs; 
einpt   r,f,z,x  Modified technology coefficients; 
elabr   r,f, x  Modified labor use coefficients; 
eπ   r,i  Modified shadow prices of commodity market balance; 
eλ   r,f,z  Modified shadow prices of input constraints 
eν   r,f  Modified shadow prices of labor constraints; 
eμ   r,f,x  Modified shadow prices of state procurement constraints. 
The parameters of the supply module calibration are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
LabrF0 r,r1,f,f1 Observed values of labor flows between producers and districts; 
Flows0  r,r1,i  Observed values of commodity flows between districts; 
XFlows0 r,i  Observed values of commodity export; 
MFlows0 r,i  Observed values of commodity import. 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
At the optimum solution of the calibration model (in which the probabilities of modified 
parameters are maximized satisfying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions) the technology parameters 
are adjusted to new levels so as to steer the model’s optimal solution to reproduce the 
observed activity values in the base year. 
4.4.3 Drawbacks of the Supply Module Calibration Approach 
The selected calibration approach has shortcomings which are similar to the standard PMP 
calibration. It is important for this approach to have reliable information to which the 
technology coefficients are adjusted. Next, although the unique solution for the ill-posed 
problem of the technology coefficient modification has been found, the problem of arbitrary 
simulation behavior of the calibrated model remains unsolved, since the ME estimation is 
heavily dominated by support points (Heckelei and Britz 2000). This means that the 
modification of technology coefficients is done arbitrarily; meaning that there exist an infinite 
number of technology coefficient values which may be selected within the calibration process. 
Consequently, the simple specification of the calibration model can generate unreasonable 
responses to policy simulations (Heckelei 2002). In further studies additional information on 
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the system behavior should be incorporated into the calibration process. Finally, the 
calibration approach is ad hoc. Since the applicability of this approach for other models has 
not been tested yet, the author does not claim that this approach can be used as a general 
method for calibrating programming models. This should be the subject of further studies to 
check the applicability of this calibration approach for other models. 
4.2 Calibration of Demand Module 
The objective of the calibration process for the demand module of KhoRASM is to adjust 
demand parameters for the NQ-QES to the observed levels of prices, income and demanded 
quantities at the point of optimum utility for consumers in each district. The derivation of 
parameters for a demand system is a two-step process. First, before deriving the functional 
parameters of NQ-QES, the implicit components of the demand module, i.e. demand 
elasticities, are calibrated. Given the set of uncalibrated income and price elasticities of 
demand obtained from other sources, observed commodity price and consumed quantity 
levels for Khorezm in 2003, the demand elasticities are modified as little as necessary to their 
final values consistent with the requirements of microeconomic theory (or in other words with 
assumed behavior of the regional consumers and with characteristics of domestic 
consumption in Khorezm). According to Frohberg and Winter (2001), the functional form of 
NQ-QES will not be flexible in the Diewert-sense without this preliminary procedure in the 
first step of calibration. Generally, the price and income elasticities at their initial 
(uncalibrated) values do not meet the requirements of demand theory (Frohberg and Winter 
2001). Moreover, the initial information on demand elasticities is not available for Uzbekistan 
and, therefore, the information from other countries should be adapted to the features of 
domestic consumption. This requires that, in the first stage, both income and price elasticities 
are subject to modification, which forces them to fulfil the requirements of micro-economic 
theory and considerations regarding the domestic consumed quantities and commodity prices 
observed in Khorezm in the base period of 2003. 
In the second stage, after the initial uncalibrated elasticities of demand are modified to a point 
where the theoretical conditions are met, the NQ-QES parameters can be derived. This two 
step approach, first suggested by Frohberg and Winter (2001), ensures that NQ-QES is 
calibrated and all regularity conditions are met; i.e. it exhibits adding up, homogeneity, 
curvature, and symmetry properties.  
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4.2.1 Stage 1: Calibration of Income and Price Elasticities of Demand 
In this study, the objective function of the original calibration model presented by Frohberg 
and Winter (2001) was modified in order to solve the problem of finding appropriate values 
for weighting factors of modified elasticities. In their paper Frohberg and Winter (2001) 
minimize the square of weighted deviation of calibrated elasticities, i.e. General Least Squares 
on the elasticities. The scale applied by Frohberg and Winter (2001) to weigh the elasticities 
is a matrix and vector of the inverse of the corresponding initial elasticity raised to the power 
2. However, the introduction of weighting factors does not guarantee that the calibrated values 
will be treated without considering the magnitude of their original values. In this study, the 
objective function of this calibration model is a maximization of probabilities (entropies) in 
which the demand elasticities with the highest probabilities (or which are closest to 1) are 
selected without considering the magnitude of the original value (Preckel 2001) and the 
weights (probabilities) are also introduced as variables. 
The following set of equations and inequalities describe the calibration model for the demand 
elasticities: The objective function of the calibration model (Z0) is the maximization of the 
probabilities of the estimated demand elasticities: 
y y0= ε ln(ε ) ε ln(ε )maxZ t,r, f,i, j t,r, f,i, j t,r, f,i t,r, f,it r f i j t r f i
− −∑ ∑∑∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑  (4.18) 
The non-linear optimization model should generate income and price elasticities in a way that: 
1) it takes into account the properties of demand functions, which are derived from 
neoclassical demand theory of consumer behavior in case of multiple commodities, such as 
adding-up, homogeneity, symmetry, and negativity with full curvature of all elements of the 
Slutsky matrix; 
2) it allows for a plausible reaction of consumption activities in the model to changes in 
own- and cross prices and the level of total regional income. This is especially important for 
countries or aggregates where the starting elasticities look quite dubious (Britz and Tritten 
2003) or are simply unavailable and replaced by the other country’s elasticity data. 
Using the first requirement to the calibration model, a set of restrictions for calibrating the 
income and price elasticities of demand are imposed according to Frohberg and Winter 
(2001). The calibration model adjusts the demand elasticities to microeconomic conditions 
under minimal deviation from their initial values. The following constraints are imposed: 
1) Adding-up: This property results from the assumption that the rational consumer spends 
his entire budget in order to maximize his utility. At their uncalibrated values the demand 
elasticities do not meet the adding-up and budget restriction (Frohberg and Winter 2001). 
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Therefore, the adding-up condition is imposed into the calibration model. This also means 
that the sum of quantities demanded multiplied by their price will be equal to the total 
available budget of consumers. 
o oDemand Pricer, f,i r,iyε =1r, f,i oIncmi r, f
∑  (4.19) 
2) Homogeneity: The Hicksian demand function is homogeneous of degree zero in terms of 
prices and income. Then, due to the linear specification of the budget constraint, a 
proportional change in all prices and of expenditures does not lead to a variation of 
quantities demanded or of the level of utility. Therefore, the price and income elasticities 
must be homogenous and satisfy the following equation: 
, , , , ,
y
r f i j r f ij
ε ε=−∑  (4.20) 
3) Symmetry: The Hicksian, or “compensated”, demand function curve is equal to the first 
derivative of the expenditure function (Varian 1992). Therefore the substitution effect or 
compensated demand change between two products is symmetric. The Slutsky 
decomposition reveals that for the demand functions, the cross price derivatives consist of 
a symmetric substitution effect and an income effect. Essentially, the Slutsky equation 
decomposes the demand change induced by a price change into the substitution effect and 
the income effect. Knowing this, the Slutsky equation is used for translating the 
substitution effects to price and income elasticities: 
, , ,, , ,
,
,
, , , ,
,
oDemandr, f, j
r f j ir f i j oPricer i
o o oDemand Demand Pricer, f,i r, f, j r jy y
r f j r f i o oIncm Demandr f r, f,i
ε ε
ε ε
⎛⎜= ⎜⎜⎝
⎞⎟⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎟⎠
 (4.21) 
4) Negative semidefiniteness: Given a convex utility function and a concave cost function, 
the matrix of substitution effects must be negative semi-definite. In the calibration of food 
demand elasticities presented by von Lampe (1999) this requirement is imposed by a 
necessary condition (although not sufficient) that all own-price substitution effects have to 
be non-positive. However, the entire matrix of substitution effects (the Slutsky matrix) 
must be negative semi-definite, rather than only the matrix of price elasticities (Diewert 
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and Wales 1987). This means that income effects must also express the negative 
semidefiniteness properties that the substitution effects display. While the calibration 
method presented by von Lampe (1999) considers the income effects only implicitly, 
Frohberg and Winter (2001) presented a more elegant way of calibrating the demand 
elasticities which guaranties the concavity of the Slutsky matrix. This is done via 
imposing the existence of the Cholesky–decomposition of the Slutsky matrix as suggested 
by Diewert and Wales (1987): 
, , , , , , , ,
, ,
o o oDemand Demand Demandr, f,i r, f,i r, f, jySr f i j r f i j r f io oPrice Incmr j r f
ε ε= +  (4.22) 
and  TS LL= −  (4.23) 
5) The second requirement of the calibration model was to not allow implausible values of 
the calculated elasticities. This was done via defining support spaces within which to 
adjust income and price elasticities. In cases where the cross-price effects of demand are 
known to be insignificant for Khorezm, the cross-price elasticities are allowed to have 
values close to zero. This also allows retaining the sign of the initial elasticities. 
6) Data moment-consistency requirements, of defining parameter modifications within a 
feasible range using sets of support points (Golan et al 1996). Each support value is 
multiplied by its associated probability. 
7) Normalization-additivity requirements in which the sum of probabilities of modified 
parameters is equal to unit (Golan et al 1996). 
Where the undeclared variables of the demand module calibration are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
ε    t,r,f,i,j   Probabilities of calibrated price elasticities of demand; 
yε   t,r,f,i  Probabilities of calibrated income elasticities of demand; 
L  r,f,i,j  a lower triangular matrix wheres LT is its transpose. 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
The calibration process was programmed and solved as a NLP problem using the CONOPT3 
solver in GAMS. After calibration, the concavity of the Slutsky matrix was checked via 
setting the vector of principal minors of the matrix. For this the ‘=mdeterm’ functional 
command in MS Excel (English version) was used. The Slutsky matrix that is derived from 
the calibrated final elasticities has a negative first principal minor (upper left own substitution 
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effect), while all other values alternate in signs according to the (-D)n, where n is an order of 
principal minor; i.e. the Slutsky matrix is strictly concave. After this securing the above 
properties the functional parameters of NQ-QES can be calibrated in the second step using the 
now established demand elasticities. The calibrated income elasticities for modeled districts 
and consumers are presented in Table A9 in Appendix 3. The calibrated price elasticities of 
rural and urban households are given in Tables A10 and A11 respectively in Appendix 3.  
4.2.2 Stage 2: Calibration of Functional Parameters of NQ-QES 
When calibrating, conservation of a model’s flexibility is a major concern (Britz and Tritten 
2003). In the second stage of our calibration of the demand module, equation (4.24) is solved 
subject to the constraints of equations (4.25) to (4.27) and the conditions of the functional 
parameters presented in equations (3.15) as well as equations (3.18) to (3.20). Solving (4.24) 
under these constraints produces an estimate of NQ-QES parameters (Frohberg and Winter 
2001). In this stage, the elasticities obtained in the first calibration stage are perfectly matched 
by the final calibrated elasticities (Frohberg and Winter 2001). Therefore, the objective of the 
second stage is to solve for the demand parameters via minimizing the squared difference 
between elasticities obtained in the first stage and the final calibrated elasticities without using 
scaling weights. Thus, the value of the objective function in the optimal solution must be zero: 
y yFF 2 2F = (ε -ε ) + (ε - ε )minZ r, f,i, j r, f,i, j r, f,i r, f,ir f i j r f i
∑∑∑∑ ∑ ∑∑  (4.24) 
The final calibrated elasticities are defined as follows: 
            
o 2 o oa Incm δ Price b +Price b or, f,i r, f i, j r,k r, f,k r,i r, f, j 2a d Incmr, f,i r, f, j r, fkF =εr, f,i, j 2 o oPrice Price br,i r,k r, f,ko oPrice Price b kr,i r,k r, f,k
k
oIncmr, f+ oPrice br,k r, f,k
k
⎛ ⎛ ⎞⎜ − ∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠⎜ −⎜ ∑⎛ ⎞⎜ ∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎝
o oIncm b b b d Pricer, f r, f,i r, f, j r, f,i r, f, j r, jBr, f,i, j 2 o oPrice b Demandr,k r, f,k r, f,ioPrice b kr,k r, f,k
k
⎞⎟⎟⎟− − ⎟∑ ∑⎛ ⎞ ⎟∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎠
 (4.25) 
o o2a Incm b Incmr, f,i r, f r, f,i r, fyFε = +r, f,i o o o oPrice Price b Price b Demandr,i r,k r, f,k r,k r, f,k r, f,i
k k
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∑ ∑⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (4.26) 
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Additionally, a constraint is imposed which requires that the quantities demanded meet 
observed values: 
a br, f,i r, f,io o 2 oDemand = Incm + Incm +dr, f,i r, f r, f r, f,io o oPrice Price b Price br,i r,k r, f,k r,k r, f,k
k k
∑ ∑
 (4.27) 
where the undeclared variables of the demand module calibration are as follows: 
Code  Indices Description 
εF   r,f,i,j  Final (calibrated) price elasticities of demand; 
εyF  r,f,i  Final (calibrated) income elasticities of demand. 
All other indices, variables and parameters as declared above. 
To be consistent with the reality, the values of parameter d, which expresses a minimal 
(committed) consumption level when the consumer’s income is zero, should be non-negative. 
However, the condition presented by equation (3.20) requires that at least one commodity 
should have negative value of committed consumption. This problem can be solved via 
setting the parameter d equal to zero, keeping the quadratic income terms. This will transform 
NQ-QES into a slightly modified version of the Normalized Quadratic Reciprocal Indirect 
Utility Function (NQRIUF) with quadratic Engel curves (Frohberg and Winter 2001). Diewert 
and Wales (1988) showed that the NQRIUF is a flexible functional form. 
4.2.3 Drawbacks of the Chosen Demand Module Calibration Approach 
In addition to the general limitations of flexible functional forms of demand presented by 
Pollak and Wales (1992), several post-calibration limitations were detected with regard to the 
functional form of NQ-QES. The short version of NQ-QES presented in equation (3.22) is 
used to demonstrate the drawbacks related to the parameter conditions presented in equations 
(3.15) and (3.18) to (3.20). The first two drawbacks are defined by the condition of parameter 
a. The parameter a specifies the Engel curve of a quadratic income response in the system and 
empirically plausible signs of this parameter for all modelled commodities should be 
guaranteed Therefore, the parameters a should have negative signs for all normal goods. 
However, according to equation (3.15) at least one modelled commodity must have a positive 
value. Consequently, this commodity will have followed a U shaped path in response to 
income increases. According to empirical evidence, in developing countries, leisure as a 
commodity does at times exhibit a positively increasing effect on income increases. However, 
the flexible formulation of NQ-QES does not guarantee this. This problem can be solved 
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through imposing additional constraints during the calibration of the functional parameters, 
which would guarantee that a parameters for all modelled normal commodities are negative, 
and the one for leisure is positive. However, the introduction of additional constraints on a 
demand parameter may reduce the flexibility of the system. 
A second drawback of NQ-QES caused by the signs of parameter a is related to price effects. 
As equation (3.22) shows, the demand function has a rectangular-hyperbolic shape with a 
negative quadratic term. It is increasing in the dependent parameters in response to the 
increases in the independent parameters. In this case, given the positive values of prices and 
income, the demand function may have a theoretically inconsistent effect on price increases at 
a specific range of prices. Given estimated demand parameters which satisfy the conditions in 
equations (3.15) and from (3.18) to (3.20), a very low positive price will produce a negative 
demand. Moreover, up to some level of price, the demand effect will be positive to changes in 
prices, i.e. demand function will be increasing. After this breakeven point of price, the 
demand will have a decreasing effect to price increases. Therefore, only the range of prices, in 
which demand is positive and decreasing in response to price increases, is suitable for demand 
analysis, wherefore upper and lower bounds must be applied to the price and demand 
variables in KhoRASM. 
Finally, the curvature of NQ-QES is not global. Britz and Tritten (2003) argue that a system 
featuring a non-linear Engel curve which is simultaneously flexible and globally well behaved 
does not exist, and the curvature is imposed only locally, if at all. Moreover, the imposition of 
global curvature into a flexible demand function with non-linear Engel curves destroys its 
flexibility (Barnett and Usui 2006). This means that the values and signs of the substitution, 
full and income effects will vary with respect to price changes. At very low price levels 
compared to the referenced (observed) level, the demand system will even produce positive 
effects of demand to increases in price. 
4.3 Post Calibration Results 
After supply and demand modules were calibrated, the full version of KhoRASM is solved 
using the modified technology coefficients and derived demand parameters and in the optimal 
solution it exactly reflects real production situation in Khorezm in the reference year of 2003 
such as the production and transportation activities, commodity prices and consumption are 
perfectly in line with their observed values. On this basis the calibration of KhoRASM can be 
considered successful and the calibrated version of the model can be used for further policy 
simulations and analysis. 
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4.3.1 Adjustments in Technology Coefficients 
In section 4.1, the technology coefficients of KhoRASM were adjusted within the theoretical 
consistency framework, such as model in its base run will exactly replicate the observed 
situation without any structural changes. In order to motivate the results of supply module 
calibration, the adjusted technology coefficients should be compared with their original 
values. If the adjusted technology coefficients are inconsistent with empirical observations, 
the supply module is recalibrated imposing different support space until it produces plausible 
results. In order to validate the results of supply model calibration, the percentage deviation of 
adjusted values of technology coefficients was calculated such as absolute difference between 
the adjusted and observed values divided by the observed value. 
Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of percentage deviations (from the observed values) for 
fertilizers, diesel, water, labor and area for livestock and poultry keeping. The distribution of 
percentage deviation for water application coefficient is left-skewed. This means that the 
supply model was calibrated in a way that in order to achieve the reference point at the 
model’s base run, the most of water application coefficients should be higher than their initial 
(observed) values. Such adjustment of water application coefficients can be accepted due to 
the high water losses in irrigation system (see section 2.4.1). 
The largest negative deviations in case of adjusted water application coefficient are observed 
in case of water use for fruits and melons in March which is a pre-sowing month when soil is 
leached. The largest positive deviations of water use coefficient are also observed in case of 
leaching in March and irrigation in July for vegetables, potato and maize for grains. In fact, in 
the model, the initial (observed) values for water application for leaching are of less reliability 
since the data was obtained from literature as equal over crops and time. Hence, the high 
deviations in adjusted water application coefficients during the leaching were accepted. 
Similar kind of skewness in distribution of percentage deviations is observed for nitrogen 
fertilizer application rates. This means that agricultural producers, especially households and 
private farms are used to apply the fertilizers at higher amounts than they reported during the 
surveys. In fact, the agricultural producers in Khorezm used to underreport the fertilizer 
application rates for some crops since the fertilizers are distributed by the state agencies 
mostly for cotton and winter wheat production purposes. In the meantime, the fertilizer 
markets do not exist in Khorezm (see section 2.4.3). The distribution of percentage deviations 
for diesel and labor use coefficients has the right-skewed pattern. This can be explained by the 
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fact, that the original values used for these inputs were obtained from the outdated data bases 
which were developed in 1980s. 
Figure 4.3: Deviation in modified coefficients from observed ones 
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In the last stage of farm restructuring process, newly established private farms tend to deliver 
irrigation water to their fields using electric-water pumps which reduces the diesel costs per 
hectare of crop production. Moreover, in comparison to kolkhozs and shirkats, private farms 
tend to employ less people for field operations and mostly rely on hiring seasonal workers 
(see section 2.4.2). All other inputs, e.g. seeds, pesticides, animal feeding doses, 
transportation and harvesting costs, were adjusted within range between -20% and 0% from 
their observed values. This means, that under the given input endowments, optimum solution 
can be achieved exactly at the reference point when the agricultural producers underutilize 
seeds and pesticide, transport and grain harvester combines for crop production and animal 
feeding nutrients at levels lower than the observed and recommended values. 
Compared to a standard PMP approach, which implies quadratic costs functions for each 
production activity (Heckelei 2002), calibration approach applied in this study results the 
modification in the production costs via adjustments in technology parameters. Thus, after 
calibrating the supply module of KhoRASM, the largest deviations in production costs are 
observed ion the range of ± 10% from the observed values, while in case of the standards 
PMP calibration technique14 these deviations are in the range from +40 to more than +200% 
(Figure 4.4). 
                                                 
14 Lacking necessary information, this study tested only the standards PMP approach. 
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Figure 4.4: Deviation in production costs from observed values 
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4.3.2 Functional Parameters of Demand System 
The calibration of the demand module of KhoRASM ensures that the demand system is 
theoretically consistent. At the base run solution the demand module will exactly reproduce 
the observed levels of commodity prices and consumption. The calibrated price and income 
elasticities are empirically plausible. Nevertheless, several modifications were done to the 
standard formulation of NQ-QES. First, since it is theoretically inconsistent to fulfill the 
condition presented by equation (3.20), the parameter d of NQ-QES is set to zero which 
transforms the NQ-QES model into NQRIUF (Frohberg and Winter 2001). NQRIUF remains 
characteristics of flexible demand functions (Diewert and Wales 1988). Next, in order to 
fulfill the micro-economic theory requirements, the parameter a for food commodities has an 
upper bound to keep its values to be negative, while non-food commodities and leisure are 
lower bounded for having positive values. Consequently, the derived functional parameter a 
of the demand system has positive values for manufactured (non-food) commodities and 
leisure (see Table A12 in Appendix 3). The calibrated functional parameter β is positive for 
all commodities (see Table A13 in Appendix 3). The derived functional parameter B for rural 
and urban households is negative and semidefinite with the elements being symmetric inside 
the matrix (see Tables A14 and A15 respectively in Appendix 3). 
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5. Policy Simulations with KhoRASM 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the analysis for policy effects on agricultural 
production activities, resource use, commodity prices, income and consumption in Khorezm. 
While the model itself cannot address each effect with absolute precision, it is useful to look 
at potential short-term shifts in production and consumption patterns in Khorezm. The 
selected set of agricultural policies includes the most discussed policies which have been 
implemented or are most likely to be implemented in the future. The different scenarios are 
formulated when considering the problems under review of the ZEF/UNESCO Khorezm 
project. First scenario simulates the increasing efficiency of the entire irrigation system. 
Secondly, a policy simulation is run where a water pricing mechanism is introduced. Thirdly, 
the abolishment of state quotas for cotton and the simultaneous liberalization of input markets 
are simulated. The forth policy simulation includes a scenario with full fragmentation of 
shirkat producers into private farms. The fifth experiment simulates an improvement of 
livestock feeding technologies in Khorezm. Finally, a cumulative scenario which combines 
five variations is simulated. Each scenario is introduced by exogenously adjusting the values 
of the technical parameters, fixed prices and input constraints. No changes in model 
specification, e.g. incorporation of additional activities, are introduced in the six scenarios. In 
addition, it is assumed that the other sectors of the regional economy are fixed, i.e. not 
effected, and, thus allowing ceteris paribus setting for simulations. The chapter is structured 
as follows: to begin, the motivation behind each scenario is presented; next, the technical 
specifications of each scenario of each policy simulation run using KhoRASM are explained. 
Furthermore, each scenario is analyzed by comparing the values of specified variables to their 
observed levels in 2003. The comparative static analysis is used where the base-run of the 
model, i.e. the observed activity values of supply and demand modules for 2003, serves as a 
reference point against which the consequences of alternative scenarios can be assessed. The 
results of the simulations are reported by showing changes in gross margins of production 
activities, levels of production activities, commodity prices and regional demand, land and 
water use. The model consists of 11 modeled production activities in 3 producer groups and 
11 consumption activities in 2 consumer groups in five modeled district aggregates. A 
detailed presentation of them would create an enormous amount of figures and tables, making 
their analysis extremely long and difficult to read and interpret. Therefore, the full reports on 
the simulation outcomes are given in Appendix 4 to this thesis and only the most interesting 
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sets of results, mostly one district with a direct access to the river and one district without a 
direct access to the river are presented. 
5.1 Scenario 1: Improvement of Irrigation and Drainage Systems 
The central problems within agriculture of the Khorezm region are those related to the 
extensive irrigation and drainage network (Kyle and Chabot 1997), and include a poor or 
insufficient irrigation system efficiency, drainage efficiency, field canal efficiency and field 
application efficiency (Purcell and Currey 2003). The total length of irrigation canals in 
Khorezm is about 15,987.5 kilometers, of which 2,371.5 kilometers are inter-farm canals and 
13,616 kilometers are intra-farm canals (Abdolniyozov 2000). The total length of drainage 
canals in the region is about 10,500 kilometers, of which 3,700 kilometers are inter-farm and 
6,800 kilometers are intra-farm drainage canals (OblSelVodKhoz 2002). These canals have 
been in operation without any modernization for the last three decades (Abdullaev 2003) and 
require maintenance such as removal of sedimentation and weeds from their bed and sides 
(Forkutsa 2006). However, given the size of the irrigation system, and the annual budget of 
the responsible structures, which has been declining the between 1995 -2001 (Table 5.1), 
these maintenance activities have been ignored. 
Table 5.1: Operating and maintaining costs in Uzbekistan 
O&M Costs  95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
O&M costs per irrigated area 
(USD ha-1) 
81      131 104 127 122      87 75 54     56
O&M costs per canal system 
(USD km-1) 
979    1,613 1,258 1,540 1,475  1,017 829 603   641
O&M costs per irrigation water 
(USD 10-3 m-3) 
6.1       9.6 7.1 8.6 7.7     6.8 7.4 3.5    3.8
Source: MAWR 2004c; Müller 2006 
Due to the poor condition of irrigation canals, about 63% of the diverted river water for 
irrigation in Khorezm is lost before it reaches the fields (FAO 1997). According to local 
authorities, field application efficiency varies between 55-60%, and the values of 62-73% are 
quoted in country reports (WARMAP 1996). According to WARMAP (1996), the field 
application efficiency can be lower up to 40%15. Additionally, adequate drainage is not 
ensured due to the average length of drainage canals which is only 37 meter per hectare, while 
it should be 50 meters per hectare (Kyle and Chabot 1997). All these have been causing the 
problems of soil salinity and a shallow groundwater table in Khorezm (Kyle and Chabot 1997, 
                                                 
15 The annual water application in Khorezm can be greater than 50,000 cubic meters per hectare in case of 
irrigation of rice fields (Kyle and Chabot 1997). 
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Forkutsa 2006). Because of the high salinity of soil and ground water, water losses in 
irrigation canals in Khorezm can become ‘real’ unusable loss (WARMAP 1996). Given the 
canal installation costs, it seems clear that the best approach at present is improving 
maintenance and rehabilitation of the existing system (Kyle and Chabot 1997). 
In this simulation, it is assumed that the improvement in the existing irrigation and drainage 
system16 affects both the water application rates and crop yields. First, the system and field 
efficiency will be improved by cleaning and lining the irrigation canals. The local norms on 
water application for crops exceed the values calculated by CROPWAT17. For instance, the 
irrigation norms for winter wheat and potatoes are about 40-60% higher than the CROPWAT 
estimates (WARMAP 1996). The water requirements for other crops, except cotton and early 
maize for fodder, are 9-28% higher than the CROPWAT estimates. Furthermore, the 
improvement in irrigation and drainage system will increase the crop yields by achieving a 
more timely supply and better quality of irrigation water, decreasing soil salinity and ground 
water levels. The model adaptation is implemented as follows: firstly, it was assumed that the 
improvement of water efficiency is achieved through investment by the state and does not 
pose any direct cost to farmers. Secondly, water efficiency for each crop was improved by 
10% over each water application month, i.e. water application rates decreased by 10%. Next, 
yields were increased by 10% for all crops; all other parameters remained fixed. Thus, the 
productivity of all other modeled factors, which are kept fixed in this scenario, e.g. nitrogen 
fertilizers, diesel and labor, will also improve. 
5.2 Scenario 2: Introduction of Water Charges 
The introduction of water charges for agricultural producers is currently being discussed as 
part of the agricultural reforms in Uzbekistan (McKinney 1996, Bucknall et al. 2003, Mott 
MacDonald 2003). Due to the features of Khorezm, The implementation of this reform will 
have a significant impact on the regional agriculture which depends entirely on irrigation 
water. First, irrigation water scarcity may constrain the regional agricultural production which 
is substantiated by recent findings showing that since the 1980s, the probability of drought 
occurring in Khorezm has been increasing (Müller 2006). Secondly, the water distribution 
system in Khorezm currently results in low water productivity via high distribution and 
conveyance losses and its improvement requires large investments (Abdolniyozov 2000). 
                                                 
16 Irrigation system efficiency reviews the volumetric efficiency of components of irrigation and drainage system 
and can be considered in isolation from crop production (Purcell and Currey 2003). 
17 CROPWAT is a decision support system developed by the Land and Water Development Division of FAO. 
http://www.sdnbd.org/sdi/issues/agriculture/database/CROPWAT.htm 
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Third, the current institutional set-up of water use in Uzbekistan does not encourage 
agricultural producers to use their water efficiently. For instance, after independence, water 
charges in agriculture were not introduced and the expenditures for irrigation are covered 
from the state budget. In this context, there is a need to attain a more efficient and productive 
use of water in the agricultural sector which may be achieved via the direct introduction of 
water charges for agricultural producers (Tsur et al. 2004). 
Following the farm restructuring process in 1998, state policy on O&M of the irrigation and 
drainage systems has been reconsidered (Bucknall et al. 2003, Mott MacDonald 2003, 
Zavgorodnyaya 2006, Veldwisch 2008). In the preliminary stage of water reforms, the 
management of irrigation and drainage systems in Khorezm was transferred from state agents 
to public suppliers, i.e. water user associations (WUA). Next, in order to ensure that the costs 
incurred by WUAs are fully or partially covered by agricultural producers, the later will be 
charged for water via membership fees and payments for provided services. In order to 
increase the water productivity, the collected water charges are invested into a series of 
agronomic, technical, managerial and institutional improvements such as clean supply and 
drainage systems and more precise irrigation schedules (Dinar and Latey 1991, Wallace and 
Batchelor 1997; Kyle and Chabot 1997; Batchelor 1999;). Consequently, the second objective 
of implementing water charging can be improvement in water use efficiency18 (WUE) and 
crop yield. 
Although, the WUE is related to water productivity at the system level, and the crop yield 
effect is related to water productivity at the agricultural producer level, both of them are 
interlinked. The WUE improvement refers to the technical efficiency, or to the efficiency of 
water distribution system, resulted via minimization of water losses and adequate quantity of 
irrigation water at the right time. The efficiency of water-use by agricultural producers can be 
increased via the timely supply of irrigation water at particular stages of crop development 
when crops response to irrigation is highest. The rules of water distribution among the 
different locations can be improved by imposing better incentives to agricultural producers to 
reduce their irrigation costs. Furthermore, the producers will benefit from the improved 
managerial and institutional practices of operating the regional irrigation and drainage system 
by WUAs which can increase the crop yields via better quality and more timely supply of 
irrigation water to the farm fields. 
                                                 
18 Water use efficiency is related to water use in crop production and has the same meaning as Gross Production 
Water Use Index which is expressed in terms of total or harvested portion of the crop produced per unit of total 
water applied (NPRID 1999). The volume of water applied includes both leaching and irrigation. 
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5.2.1 Selection of Water Charging Method 
Worldwide, two mechanisms for water charging, volumetric and non-volumetric, are applied, 
each with advantages and disadvantages depending on the situation under consideration (Tsur 
et al. 2004). Prior to the model adaptation, the appropriate method of water charging for the 
agricultural sector in Khorezm was selected by studying the literature on the main features of 
volumetric and non-volumetric area-based methods. 
Volumetric water charge is the most obvious and widely studied economic instrument 
assigning a charge to water and making water charge a direct function of the quantity supplied 
(Hellegers and Perry 2004). The main requirement of this method is regular information on 
the quantity of water used by each agricultural producer below a point where water being 
measured (Dinar et al. 1997). In theory, volumetric pricing can lead to improved allocation 
efficiency, but this method presents several problems which would make its introduction in 
Khorezm less attractive. The first problem of applying the volumetric pricing mechanism is 
absence of facilities for accurate and regular volumetric measuring of supply and use of water 
in Khorezm. The installation and administration of such facilities may be expensive in case of 
a large number of individual water users. The second problem is related to the policy of state 
controlled over farms’ cropping activities according to which irrigation of cotton during the 
vegetation season is decided by local administration rather than by agricultural producers. The 
third problem is related to the fact that the volumetric method ignores equity concerns and the 
pricing of water is not the same among different types of agricultural producers (Tsur et al. 
2004). The forth problem is that in case of continuous water flow, when it is not needed by 
agricultural producers or during the periods of excess water availability such as flooded 
months, the water charge value can be equal to zero. 
The non-volumetric mechanism of water charging is usually applied in cases with a large 
number of water users and in cases with imperfect information about actual volumes of water 
supplied and demanded (Tsur et al. 2004). The main advantage of this mechanism is that it 
generates a predictable revenue stream to recover the O&M costs of water suppliers. The most 
applied non-volumetric method is an area and crop based charging mechanism where charges 
are fixed per hectare depending on the relative crop water requirements and the benefit 
agricultural producers get from the crops (Hamdy 2002). In this case, the water charges per 
hectare can be established at higher rates for cash crops, like paddy rice and vegetables in the 
case of Khorezm, and may also be kept at low rates for staple food production, in the case of 
small-scale households (Prathapar et al. 2001). In order to consider the equity of income 
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distribution over time water charges can be disaggregated by seasons, producer types and 
producer location (Tsur et al. 2004). 
Considering the pros and cons of each mechanism, the method of water charging selected for 
the model simulation is a crop-area-based method. In order to include the concepts of water 
saving and equity, the value of water charge in KhoRASM is defined as shown in Table 5.2. 
Since the cotton producers in Uzbekistan receive subsidized inputs (Guadagni et al. 2005), the 
value of water charge for cotton is assumed only half of the selected value. The production of 
paddy rice by agricultural producers in upstream districts is charged at a 20% higher rate. The 
water used for fodder production in all district and producer aggregates is not charged. 
According to household survey conducted in 2004, the irrigation of potato, vegetables, and 
melons in attached plots (uy tomorka) of rural households (dekhqan farms) is independent 
from the conditions of irrigation and drainage networks and these crops are irrigated by the 
pumping of ground water. The selected water charge rate is 25 USD per 1000 cubic meters of 
water which is comparable to ones practiced in agriculture of Morocco in 2003 (Chohin-
Kuper et al. 2003), Namibia, Algeria, Tunisia, Brazil, Portugal, United States and Spain 
(Dinar and Subramanian 1997) in 1996. In the simulation the value of water charge is 
assigned to the official leaching and irrigation recommendations (norms) for crops, developed 
by research institutes for the study region. 
In the model, the improvement in WUE is simulated by decreasing the original values of the 
technology coefficients of actual crop water requirements by 10%. The WUE and crop yield 
increase (by 10%) depends on the water charging rules specified for crops, producers and 
location as presented in Section 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Variations in water charges from the selected value, % 
District location Producer Cotton Rice Fodder All other 
crops
Shirkats -50 +20 n.a. 0
Private farms -50 +20 n.a. 0
Upstream districts 
Dekhqan farms n.a. +20 n.a. n.a.
Shirkats -57.5 +2 n.a. -15
Private farms -57.5 +2 n.a. -15
Downstream districts 
Dekhqan farms n.a. +2 n.a. n.a.
Source: Own compilation 
5.3 Scenario 3: Liberalization of Cotton and Input Markets 
Like in other transitional countries, which experienced the liberalization of commodity and 
input markets, the question about abolishing the state procurement system, state control over 
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input and output prices, and the practice of selective subsidization in agriculture was one of 
the issues widely discussed in Uzbekistan since 1991 (Rosenberg 2001, Guadagni et al. 2005, 
Müller 2007). According to the current procurement system and subsidization policy, the 
large and medium size agricultural producers, i.e. shirkats and crop growing private farms, 
have to fulfill a production quota for cotton at fixed state prices which are below world 
market prices. In return, these producers receive production inputs at subsidized prices 
(Guadagni et al. 2005). The abolishment of the state procurement system is considered as a 
change in economic policy and economic conditions and the results of such a scenario can be 
highly controversial. This liberalization of cotton markets may increase producer revenues 
from cotton production and stimulate its regional production. However, the liberalization of 
input markets may cause lead to a reduction in income for rural households and put downward 
pressure on domestic commodity prices.  
The cotton market liberalization is defined in the KhoRASM model in a way that the state 
procurement system is eliminated. This means that cotton production, like all other activities 
in the model, will not be constrained by a minimum level of production and will depend 
entirely on its comparative advantage over other activities. Next, the liberalization of cotton 
market assumes the increase in price for raw cotton. The cotton price in Uzbekistan is set by 
the government and therefore it is incorporated exogenously to the demand system in the 
KhoRASM model. There is no empirical value capturing the effects of cotton exports from 
Uzbekistan on the world market price. Consequently, in the simulation, Uzbekistan can be 
treated as a price-taking small country on the international cotton fiber market (Rosenberg 
2001, Müller 2007), and the increase in cotton price is introduced as an exogenous change. 
Since Uzbekistan does not export raw cotton directly, its border price for shipping abroad is 
not observable. However, an export price for raw cotton can be derived based on that for 
cotton fiber and its processing costs (Guadagni et al. 2005, Müller 2006, Müller 2007). An 
alternative value for the simulated raw cotton price would be the price at which farmers in 
Kazakhstan sold raw cotton in 2003, i.e. 493 USD per ton. However, this value is rejected 
because it is 2.27 times higher than the observed state price in 2003 in Uzbekistan. The value 
for a hypothetical border price for raw cotton reported by Guadagni et al. (2005) was about 
276 USD per ton in 2003, which is 28% higher than the observed state price for raw cotton in 
Khorezm in that year. For this scenario, the last value is used as a new price for raw cotton, 
(Table 5.3). 
The input market liberalization is defined as removal of control over distribution of inputs and 
canceling the input subsidies. The main inputs selected for the input market liberalization are 
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the ones which are subsidized by the state: cotton seeds, fertilizers and diesel fuel. The change 
in diesel fuel prices will effects the production costs related to pumping water to the fields. 
Being the main fertilizers used by agricultural producers in Khorezm, the prices for 
ammonium nitrate (selitra) and ammonium phosphate (ammophos) are set to the levels 
observed in Kazakhstan in 2003. The exogenous changes in raw cotton, cotton seeds, 
fertilizers and diesel prices are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Exogenous changes in observed prices of cotton and inputs 
 Inputs Base run (observed 
in 2003) prices,  
USD ton-1 
 
Simulated 
prices,  
USD ton-1 
 
Increase in price values 
in the scenario 
compared to the base 
run, % 
Raw cotton 217 277 28 
Cotton seeds 307 393 28 
Ammonium nitrate 77 174 126 
Ammonium phosphate 157 172 10 
Diesel fuel 122 184 51 
Sources: OblStat 2004c; OblSelHozKhim 2004; OblNeft 2004; Guadagni et al. 2005; Personal 
communication with a farmer from Kazakhstan, 2006 
In context of input market liberalization, the scenario assumes that the constraints for fertilizer 
and diesel at producer levels are removed, meaning that agricultural producers can buy as 
much as desired given the new input prices. According to these exogenous changes in the 
model, the fertilizer and diesel costs are included into the production costs. Thus the model 
specification is changed via new formulation of the production costs (see equation 3.4 in 
Section 3.2.4) as seen in Equation 5.1: 
PrCost   = varc  Xlevl Xlevl feed Pricer, f,x r, f,x r, f,x r, f,i,x r,i
r f x r f i x
               + LabrF   Wage DislF dislp FertF  fertpr1,r, f1, f r r, f r, f
r r1 f f1 r f r f
+∑∑∑ ∑∑∑∑
+ +∑∑∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
 (5.1) 
where i depicts only maize and fodder crops and new variables are the following: 
Code  Indices Description 
DislF  r,f  Diesel purchasing by agricultural producers; 
FertF  r,f  Nitrogen fertilizer purchasing by agricultural producers. 
The undeclared parameters are the following: 
Code    Description 
dislp    New market price for diesel; 
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fertp    New market price for nitrogen fertilizer. 
All other indices, variables and parameters are as declared above. 
Finally, the application raters of fertilizers and diesel (technology coefficients) are decreased 
by 5% for all crops. 
5.4 Scenario 4: Accomplishment of Farm Restructuring 
During the field surveys in 2003, the accomplishment of the nationwide farm restructuring 
process was one of the crucial issues in the agricultural reforms including Khorezm (chapter 
2). The main feature of the farm restructuring process was the dismissal of large state 
enterprises (shirkats), by transferring the land and inputs to the newly established private 
farms. As a final result of the farm restructuring process, the agricultural production in 
Uzbekistan will be conducted by only two types of producers: private farms and rural 
households. In this scenario, the values of input endowments and state procurement policy 
constraints imposed on shirkats were assumed to be transferred to private farm units. Also, 
the input-output parameters of the shirkat were set to zero, and the ones of private farms and 
households remained unchanged. Due to these model conditions, obviously the total regional 
production, commodity consumption and prices, and input use would change to account for 
differences between private farms and shirkats with regards to yields and other coefficients. 
5.5 Scenario 5: Improvement in Livestock Husbandry Technologies 
The current livestock production in Uzbekistan is underdeveloped (Figure 5.1). Even if no 
reliable, accurate and consistent data was available disclosing the different livestock species 
and feeding regimes and practices in Khorezm, the available data underlined a comparably 
low productivity of the livestock sector (Martius et al. 2006). Moreover, comparing to the 
national level, the livestock productivity in Khorezm such as e.g., for beef, has been lower 
than the average value for Uzbekistan (OblStat 2004, FAOSTAT 2007). The ZEF/UNESCO 
Khorezm project has been addressing the regional problems of livestock production, which 
resulted in proposals to improve this sector, which is steadily growing in importance (Martius 
et al. 2006). Iñiguez et al. (2004) formulated several problems of animal keeping in Central 
Asia, which are very much similar to the situation in Khorezm. First of all, there is problem of 
inadequate grazing which includes high feeding costs and scarcity of fodder during winter 
(see sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.4.4). Second, animal health services are provided at an 
inadequate level to satisfy local demand. Given the growing importance of livestock in 
household food security and regional development (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3.2; Müller 2006) 
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but the concurrent limited production level which is recurrently affiliated with the insufficient 
feed availability and the inappropriate feeding regimes, an improvement in livestock feeding 
technologies was included to estimate the options to meet future challenges in this sector. To 
develop the animal husbandry sector, the per-head productivity needs to be improved rather 
than to increase the number of livestock. Livestock productivity can be raised via a set of 
measures for improved feed supply, hygiene, improvement of husbandry and breeding, and 
animal health protection (Martius et al. 2006). 
The model used in the base case was therefore adapted to this experiment. The values of milk 
and meat yield per cattle were increased by 10%. Next, the values of livestock feeding 
technologies were increased by 10% above their modeled values. Additionally, the land 
constraint imposed for animal keeping activities in terms of area of sheds and buildings was 
increased by 10% in each producer aggregate. 
Figure 5.1: Comparison of animal production in Uzbekistan and other countries 
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Source: FAOSTAT 2007 
5.6 Scenario 6: Cumulative Scenario 
This final scenario is a combination of the previous five, and includes changes in production 
yields for crops and livestock; changes in crop input use and animal feeding; changes in 
cotton and input prices; removal of state procurement and input constraints (Table 5.4). The 
original production cost formulation was specified according to Equation 5.1 in Section 5.3. 
Table 5.4: Scenario design in KhoRASM 
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Table 5.4: Scenario design in KhoRASM 
  Exogenous changes EXP1 EXP 2 EXP 3 EXP 4 EXP 5 EXP 6 
1) Production yield  +10% (all crops) +10% (taxed crops) − − +25% (livestock) +10% (all crops) +25% (livestock) 
2) Crop input use per hectare -10% (water) -10% (water) 
-10% (fertilizer and 
diesel) − − 
-10% (water, fertilizers 
and diesel) 
3) Animal feeding coefficients − − − − +20% +20% 
4) Variable costs of production − + (by water tax)  − − − 
5) Produciton costs respecified − − 
+ by amount of 
purchased fertilizer 
and diesel 
− − 
+ by amount of 
purchased fertilizer and 
diesel 
6) Exogenous prices of cotton − − +28% − − +28% 
+28% (cotton seeds) +100% (veterinary services) 
+28% (cotton seeds) 7) 
Exogenous prices of 
inputs − − +20% (pesticides) 
− +100% (veterinary services) 
+20% (pesticides) 
8) State procurement constraint − − Removed − − Removed 
− − − 
Removed 
(for fertilizer and 
diesel) 
9) Input constraints  
  
Removed 
(for fertilizer and 
diesel) 
All constraints of 
shirkats are set to zero 
and their values added 
to ones of private 
farms  
All constraints of 
shirkats are set to zero 
and their values added 
to ones of private farms 
Notes: EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – 
Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario  
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5.7 Simulation Results 
5.7.1 Gross Margins of Production Activities 
The gross margins (GM) were calculated as output value per unit of activity less the sum of 
imputed costs per unit of the activity which are not introduced into the model with input 
constraints. Such production inputs are seeds, pesticides, land tax, and other fixed costs. 
Therefore, the producer expenditures for purchasing diesel, nitrogen fertilizer and labor are 
not included into the original specification of the model, except in scenarios where input 
markets are liberalized. And it would be wrong to discuss the cotton taxation and 
subsidization via comparing its gross margins in base run and in scenario with cotton market 
liberalization. But rather, these absolute values should be compared with values of cotton 
gross margins in Table 2.4. Because under the liberalization of cotton and input markets the 
gross-margin of cotton increases, this comparison can show that the cotton producers were 
taxed rather than subsidized in 2003. 
Two districts are discussed in this section, while the full table of GMs is given in Table A19 
in Appendix 4 to this study. The changes in GM of production activities define the cropping 
pattern and structure of animals in each producer and district aggregates. The shifts in the 
values depend on the exogenous changes imposed in each scenario and the endogenous shifts 
in commodity prices. In the base run of the model, the producers in the district bordering with 
the river have higher GMs of three main crops, i.e. cotton, rice and wheat, than those which 
do not have direct access to the river (Table 5.5). In the base run, paddy rice, potato and 
vegetables are the most attractive production activities for the agricultural producers. 
Scenario 1 assumes a 10% increase in crop yields, and the improvement in water efficiency 
has the highest effect in terms of absolute values on the cropping activities with the largest 
yields. In this scenario, there is a slight decrease in the GMs of livestock due to the decrease 
in the prices of milk and meat (see Section 5.7.6). Although the crop yields increase by 10% 
in Scenario 2, the introduction of water prices reduces the GMs significantly for most 
cropping activities in shirkats and private farms. Since rural households were levied by water 
tax only for paddy rice cultivation activities, the GMs of other crops in rural households did 
not change significantly. After the introduction of water prices, rice remains the crop with the 
highest GM for private farms, while in shirkats and rural households the highest GMs are 
observed for potato and vegetables. Since in this scenario the water pricing of cotton in 
shirkats and private farms is assumed being subsidized, its GM for private farms in districts 
bordering with the river decreases at a relatively smaller rate than in the case of other crops. 
However, although being subsidized, cotton does not become more attractive for producers 
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which still cultivate at the level dictated by the state procurement constraint. The 
liberalization of cotton and input markets (Scenario 3) has the highest impact on GMs for 
cotton, wheat and fodder crops. Under the scenario of farm restructuring (Scenario 4), a 
higher positive effect on crop GMs is found in districts bordering the river than in those which 
do not have direct access to the river.  
Table 5.5: Gross margins of production activities 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
SK CTN USD ha-1 198 18 -60 -65 - 0 - 170 19 -54 -74 - 0 -
WWT USD ha-1 245 14 -25 -97 - -6 - 241 14 -17 -102 - -1 -
RCE USD ha-1 865 16 -79 -27 - 3 - 906 12 -62 -29 - -2 -
POT USD ha-1 604 19 -31 -25 - 1 - 878 17 -10 -21 - 1 -
FRT USD ha-1 431 17 -24 -27 - -1 - 278 20 -32 -35 - 11 -
VGL USD ha-1 1,297 17 -7 -14 - 0 - 978 18 -7 -10 - 2 -
MZE USD ha-1 507 12 -30 -45 - 0 - 379 13 -32 -58 - 0 -
FOD USD ha-1 12 59 0 -784 - 0 - 35 27 0 -321 - 0 -
MLK USD head-1 106 -1 -3 6 - 20 - 136 -1 0 6 - 18 -
EGG USD head-1 2 1 0 4 - 7 - 4 1 1 7 - 7 -
MEA USD head-1 121 -1 0 7 - 16 - 147 0 0 7 - 19 -
PF CTN USD ha-1 333 14 -32 -41 0 0 -69 164 18 -57 -60 0 0 -113
WWT USD ha-1 252 13 -24 -72 3 2 -96 223 14 -20 -66 1 -1 -86
RCE USD ha-1 1,004 11 -67 -16 19 6 -83 841 12 -68 -22 2 -2 -87
POT USD ha-1 281 26 -79 -71 2 2 -150 253 29 -65 -81 4 2 -146
FRT USD ha-1 72 35 -212 -174 2 -3 -387 59 42 -204 -235 5 -9 -440
VGL USD ha-1 404 24 -50 -50 2 1 -99 401 24 -35 -41 11 2 -75
MZE USD ha-1 178 17 -103 -106 0 0 -209 146 19 -97 -129 0 0 -226
FOD USD ha-1 79 18 0 -235 0 0 -217 85 17 0 -149 0 0 -132
MLK USD head-1 179 -1 -2 7 16 22 36 148 -1 0 6 32 32 26
EGG USD head-1 2 1 0 3 15 7 1 2 1 0 6 18 7 2
MEA USD head-1 117 -1 0 7 18 16 37 146 0 0 7 34 39 32
HH WWT USD ha-1 421 12 2 -35 1 -2 -23 410 12 0 -34 1 -1 -22
RCE USD ha-1 1,108 11 -60 -22 18 5 -83 1,070 12 -51 -28 4 2 -77
POT USD ha-1 812 18 1 -45 1 1 -27 536 22 0 -67 2 1 -45
FRT USD ha-1 191 31 1 -90 1 -1 -111 317 25 0 -117 1 -2 -92
VGL USD ha-1 574 26 0 -49 2 -1 -23 780 24 0 -22 11 2 3
MZE USD ha-1 404 13 0 -74 0 0 -61 401 13 0 -72 0 0 -59
FOD USD ha-1 155 14 0 -117 0 0 -104 157 14 0 -98 0 0 -84
MLK USD head-1 328 -1 -1 7 19 23 36 326 0 0 6 28 20 18
EGG USD head-1 4 1 23 3 14 6 1 3 1 0 6 17 6 2
MEA USD head-1 245 -1 0 7 19 17 35 217 0 0 7 30 37 31
changes to base (in percent)
Activity KSPBGT KKRSVTProducer
 
Notes: SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; 
RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; MLN – Melons; MZE – Maize; FOD – Fodder crops; 
MLK – Cows; EGG – Poultry; MEA – Bulls; KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; 
KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; BASE – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – 
Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – 
Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – 
Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
Under an improved livestock sector (Scenario 5), the GMs of livestock increased significantly 
across all producer aggregates. When all exogenous changes are introduced at once in the 
cumulative scenario (Scenario 6), the values of GMs decline for all cropping activities, while 
the GMs in the livestock sector increase for all producers in all modeled districts. Fodder 
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cultivation may become, therefore, more attractive to those producers than potatoes, 
vegetables and fruits. Nevertheless, in this scenario, rice cultivation remains the most 
profitable cropping activity in Khorezm. 
5.7.2 Shadow Prices of Constraints 
The discussion of changes in the shadow values (prices) of input and state procurement 
constraints of KhoRASM are important for the regional policy makers. Although these values 
are called prices, they have nothing to do with resource supply and demand in the market and 
depend solely on the basic information of the optimization problem. A zero shadow value of 
input constraint indicates that this abundant is underutilized by a producer, i.e. not binding his 
production activities, due to scarcity of other resources. First, after achieving the exact fit of 
the model’s variables to their observed values in the base run, the comparison of shadow 
prices of input constraints to their actual prices can be used in evaluating the behaviour of 
optimization sector model (Hazell and Norton 1986). Hence, the right level of a shadow price 
of input constraints and policy instruments can be considered an indication of the consistency 
of KhoRASM. Secondly, with respect to the aim of this study, the KhoRASM model can also 
be used as a source of information on shadow prices of fixed resources and the state 
procurement constraint. Looking at the shadow prices of farm resources reveals that each 
scenario affects the value of these production factors in a different way. In the case of the 
study region, such information can be valuable for the policy-makers at district and region 
levels when considering a policy option on the resource pricing, amounts of supplied resource 
to agricultural producers and the levels of production quota for cotton. 
Shadow Price of Land. The land constraint is divided into different periods of the year to 
reflect the cropping calendar; the shadow values of land are, therefore, also presented in 
different seasons of the year. Although there is no official land market in Uzbekistan, the 
shadow prices for land are validated using information on unofficial rents observed during the 
period of farm and household surveys in Khorezm in 2003 and 2004 respectively. In case of 
modelling the agricultural sector of Khorezm, the shadow prices for land can be compared 
with the unofficial payment for renting one hectare of land for a short-period of rice 
cultivation. In Khorezm in 2003 and 2004, such payments were between 100 USD and 350 
USD, depending on soil quality, field location and water availability. 
Due to the large size of the full table of shadow values for land, two cases are presented in 
Table 5.6 for the discussion, while the full table is presented in Table A16 in Appendix 4. 
Similar to the previous section, these case studies include an aggregate of districts which 
Policy Simulations with KhoRASM 
 106
border the river and an aggregate of districts which do not have direct access to the river. The 
shadow value of land is the highest in the seasons when it is sown to paddy rice, i.e. between 
July and September months. Additionally, this season is the peak period for land use since 
various crops compete with rice for land occupation during this period, including fodder 
crops, vegetables, melons and potato. Outside the peak period, land is valued very low or 
close to zero. When the land constraint is not binding, i.e. its value is zero, the agricultural 
producers’ activities are constrained by endowments of other resources and the land is not 
fully sown. The shadow prices of land in the districts which have direct access to the river are 
generally higher than those located further from the river because of higher crop yields and 
lower shadow values of water. Moreover, in the base-run scenario, when the districts 
bordering with the river have the highest shadow value of land, the land value is zero in the 
districts which do not have direct access to the river. Thus, this shows that during the peak 
season of water use, in July, in the districts which do not have direct access to the river, some 
areas of land remain idle due to the shortage of water. Among agricultural producers, the 
value of land is highest for rural households, which cultivate crops in small household plots 
(see Section 2.2), and the value the least in large scale enterprises (shirkats). As Table 5.6 
shows, in the water scarce districts, the shadow values of land in shirkats and private farms 
are smaller than those in rural households. Hence, even a slight decline in crop yields or an 
increase in costs, e.g. via an increase in input prices, can reduce the values of land to zero and 
other inputs may become constraining the production activities of producers. In the case when 
one type of agricultural producer does not fully cultivate the land, i.e. the value of the land is 
zero, and the activities of other producers are constrained by their land endowments, one may 
assume that the land could be transferred from the first producers to the latter. However, the 
model specification assumes that there is no land market (even unofficial) due to the fact that 
in Khorezm any transfer of land use rights between producers is prohibited and penalized by 
the government. Among the scenarios, in the one with improvement in water efficiency 
(Scenario 1) higher values of land in the water scarce districts are found, meaning that with 
the more water available to the agricultural producers, the value of land increases 
significantly. The introduction of water prices (Scenario 2) reduces the value of land for all 
agricultural producers among all modeled districts. In districts located next to the river, the 
value of land drops below its observed level, while in the water scarce districts it stays at the 
level above the base run situation. In this scenario, when the water prices are introduced, the 
cropping pattern might shift towards fodder crops, which require less water, and towards the 
animal sector. In the districts bordering the river, abolishment of state procurement for cotton 
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and input market liberalization (Scenario 3) increase the value of land for shirkats and private 
farms at a relatively higher rate rather than for the rural households. In this scenario, although 
the input prices rise, the land value increases due to the abolishment of the cotton production 
quota for shirkats and private farms, and the release of fertilizer and diesel constraints for all 
three producer aggregates. At the same time, the cotton and input market liberalization does 
not affect significantly the value of land in the districts which do not have direct access to the 
river since water remains the significant limiting factor in that area.  
Table 5.6: Shadow prices of land, USD ha -1 
District Producer Season BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
KSPBGT SK Jan-Jun 71 132 98 - - - -
Jul-Sep 327 524 323 435 - 337 -
Oct 101 353 143 220 - 202 -
Nov - - - 57 - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
PF Jan-Jun 92 162 129 - 147 - 93
Jul-Sep 367 519 249 471 - 391 488
Oct 92 306 206 269 - 128 291
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
HH Oct-Jun 265 346 260 291 229 293 299
Jul-Sep 463 527 363 497 353 462 472
KKRSVT SK Jan-Jun 15 76 54 - - - -
Jul-Sep - 480 324 - - 105 -
Oct - 129 114 - - 314 -
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
PF Jan-Jun 19 83 63 - - - 64
Jul-Sep - 493 351 - - 67 367
Oct 5 53 - 11 - - 7
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
HH Oct-Jun 120 313 288 127 118 231 239
Jul-Sep - 456 382 - - - 395  
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir 
and Shavat districts; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; BASE – Base 
situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction 
of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of 
farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
The completion of the farm restructuring process (Scenario 4) increases the land endowments 
for private farms and, therefore, the shadow value of land on private farms drops or becomes 
zero. Increased production in the livestock sector (Scenario 5) also increases the shadow value 
of land. Although the input prices increase and the water price is introduced, one can observe 
that, among the simulations tested, the cumulative experiment (Scenario 6) produces one of 
the highest values for land. 
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Shadow Price of State Procurement. In the model, the state procurement constraint is imposed 
as a minimum restriction for area under cotton cultivation in shirkats and private farms. 
Hence, the shadow price of the state procurement constraint is equal to the increase in 
regional income once the state quota for mandatory land allocation under cotton production is 
reduced by one hectare and their values are negative. The existence of a state quota on cotton 
production for shirkats and private farms implies that these producers would not select, or 
select lower levels of this activity if they were not forced to do so (Müller 2006). In all 
scenarios except the ones where it is removed, the state procurement constraint forces the 
cotton growing activities in shirkats and private farms to its mandatory levels. This means that 
under any exogenous change introduced during the simulations, cotton production remains 
unattractive for shirkats and private farms and its production is only dictated by the level of 
state procurement constraint. According to the simulation results, the shadow value of the 
state procurement constraint is higher than the shadow value of land, which is given in multi-
seasonal dimension. On the other hand, the state procurement constraint is given on an annual 
basis and, despite that there is no observed information which can be used to validate the 
shadow price of the state procurement constraint, its value can be assumed to be equal to the 
opportunity costs of land occupation through an entire agricultural cycle, which in Khorezm 
also implies a double cropping strategy of agricultural production, e.g. when winter wheat is 
followed by rice. 
The base run results on values of state procurement constraint include valuable information 
for regional policy-makers. The shadow value for the state procurement quota is the highest 
for private farms in the base situation (Table 5.7) and, thus, one may conclude that the income 
of the regional agricultural sector might have higher benefits if the state procurement for 
cotton for private farms is reduced, rather than for shirkats. Moreover, the districts which 
border the river have higher shadow values of state procurement both for shirkats and private 
farms, than those in the districts which have no direct access to the river. 
In case of improving the water efficiency (Scenario 1), the shadow value of state procurement 
in private farms decreases, meaning that other resources became more binding the production 
activities of private farms, as more water became available. At the same time, the value of the 
state procurement in shirkats has increased, meaning that the state quota is more constraining 
for shirkats’ activities, as more water becomes available. Consequently, in case of a change in 
policy, one may argue that under improved water efficiency, the reduction of state 
procurement for cotton cultivation in shirkats can bring a higher increase in regional income, 
than in case where the state quota imposed on private farms is reduced. The increase of 
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producer costs after introducing water prices (Scenario 2) decreases the value of the state 
procurement constraint. This may indicate that the attractiveness of livestock keeping 
activities in the region increases and, in general, the GMs of crops decrease. The next 
simulation shows that, despite the increase of regional income in comparison to 2003, the 
increase of land endowment for private farms through the completion of the farm 
restructuring process (Scenario 4), the shadow value of state procurement will decrease. The 
reduction is due to the fact that although the state procurement for private farm increases, its 
share to total land endowment in private farms has declined. Hence, the availability of other 
inputs, e.g. water, fertilizers and diesel, becomes more binding the agricultural activities in 
private farms. 
Table 5.7: Shadow prices of state procurement constraint, USD ha -1 
District Producer BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
KSPBGT SK -523 -979 -523 - - -846 -
PF -1,139 -885 -505 - -855 -1,016 -
KKAURG SK -425 -773 -531 - - -701 -
PF -1,255 -722 -431 - -694 -1,158 -
YZRGLN SK -577 -776 -534 - - -681 -
PF -977 -650 -406 - -538 -919 -
KVAYRK SK -487 -767 -467 - - -622 -
PF -812 -587 -329 - -479 -792 -
KKRSVT SK -409 -626 -399 - - -607 -
PF -767 -518 -303 - -457 -731 -  
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and 
Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – 
Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat 
districts; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; BASE – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment 
into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of 
cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in 
livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
Shadow Price of Water. According to the model specification, the shadow prices of water 
constraint vary by district and by month, but are equal among crops and agricultural 
producers. The validation of the shadow values of irrigation water is problematic for Khorezm 
since the water charging mechanism has not yet been introduced in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, 
the calculated values of shadow prices for water are comparable to shadow prices for water 
obtained by Müller (2006). Additionally, these shadow prices meet the water charge levels 
practiced in agriculture of Morocco in 2003 (Chohin-Kuper et al. 2003) which was in the 
range of 20 USD per 1000 cubic meters to 50 USD per 1000 cubic meters of irrigation water. 
Dinar and Subramanian (1997) present the data for water charges in Namibia (3.8 USD per 
1000 cubic meters to 28 USD per 1000 cubic meters), Algeria (19 USD per 1000 cubic meters 
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to 220 USD per 1000 cubic meters), Tunisia (20 USD per 1000 cubic meters to 78 USD per 
1000 cubic meters), Brazil (4.2 USD per 1000 cubic meters to 32 USD per 1000 cubic 
meters), the United States (12.4 USD per 1000 cubic meters to 43.8 USD per 1000 cubic 
meters) and Spain, all in 1996 (0.1 USD per 1000 cubic meters to 28 USD per 1000 cubic 
meters). 
Table 5.8: Shadow prices of water, USD 10 -3 m -3 
District Month BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
KSPBGT May 1.5 - - 1.6 - - -
Jun - - - - - - -
Jul - - - 16.6 9.2 - 9.1
Aug - - - 8.1 7.2 - 8.7
Sep - - - - - - -
KKAURG May - - - - - - -
Jun - - - 10.5 - - -
Jul - - - 15.7 8.7 - 7.9
Aug - - - 15.2 5.8 - -
Sep - - - - - - -
YZRGLN May - - - 9.6 - - -
Jun 3.5 - - - 13.1 - -
Jul - - - 14.1 18.1 - 10.5
Aug - - - - 16.8 - -
Sep - - - - - - -
KVAYRK May - - - 5.1 2.2 - 4.0
Jun 15.7 - - - 13.1 15.3 -
Jul 24.8 11.1 - 29.6 26.1 22.5 -
Aug 19.9 - - 26.4 24.6 20.6 -
Sep - - - - - - -
KKRSVT May 2.7 - 1.4 - 3.4 4.4 1.2
Jun 6.2 - - - 4.6 - 2.6
Jul 25.6 10.6 2.9 32.6 23.5 24.8 21.7
Aug 23.1 - - 30.3 22.9 23.9 13.6
Sep - - - 3.0 - - -  
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and 
Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate 
for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; BASE – 
Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – 
Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – 
Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative 
scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
For all simulations, the shadow value of water, i.e. the water scarcity indicator, is highest in 
the districts without direct access to the river. Among the irrigation months, the highest 
shadow price for water is observed in periods when the field is under rice production, i.e. July 
and August (Table 5.8). Accordingly, if the water pricing mechanism is introduced in 
Khorezm, it may have values which vary across irrigation months. According to the 
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simulation results, if the water pricing system is to be introduced in Khorezm, any small value 
of water charge will affect the total water use in districts with abundant water. At the same 
time, to reduce the total amount of water use in districts which do not have direct access to the 
river, the value of water charge should be above the shadow price of water. The districts 
bordering with the river are not constrained by water in the base run scenario. Although the 
same amount of water results in higher marginal productivity, the improvement of water 
efficiency (Scenario 1) reduces the value of water and the shadow values of other inputs, e.g. 
land, fertilizer and diesel, may increase. The introduction of water prices (Scenario 2) 
decreases the value of water due to the decline in total regional income. The shadow value of 
water increases after the liberalization of cotton and input markets (Scenario 3) and 
completion of the farm restructuring program (Scenario 4). 
The liberalization of cotton and input markets allows shirkats and private farms to allocate 
land, which was previously reserved for cotton cultivation by the state procurement quota, to 
other more profitable and more water consuming cropping activities which is paddy rice 
cultivation. Complete decollectivization increases the land, fertilizer and diesel endowments 
for private farms and does not change the amount of water available to the region. Moreover, 
although the area under state procurement remains at the base level, the completion of farm 
restructuring gives private farms additional land for the cultivation of paddy rice. Most 
surprisingly, the highest values of water are observed in the case where state procurement for 
cotton cultivation is removed and prices are increased. An improvement of the livestock 
sector (Scenario 5) contributed to the value of water via an increase of livestock productivity 
which depends on the cultivation of fodder crops. 
Shadow Price of Labor. In the model specification, the shadow price of labor is equal to the 
agricultural wage for which shirkats and private farms hire one working hour of labor from 
rural households. Since labor is transferable input between districts, its value differs according 
to the transport costs within the observed range of wages between 47.9 to 51.4 USD per 1000 
working hours. Furthermore, the shadow price of labor is equal to the price for leisure time 
(see Section 3.5). Hence, the model assumes that the utility of rural household consumers is 
defined over their income and leisure according to which they shift their available time 
between work and leisure until the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal 
utility of income is equal to the wage rate. The shadow value of labor, i.e. leisure price, is 
driven by the dominance of an income effect over a substitution effect for leisure. The 
changes in shadow values of labor through scenarios are presented in Table 5.9. The 
improvement of water efficiency (Scenario 1) increases the opportunity of agricultural 
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producers to expand the area under cultivation, thereby increasing the demand for labor and 
decreasing the agricultural wage. The introduction of water prices (Scenario 2) makes 
livestock sector, which is less labor intensive, more attractive and, thus, releases labor from 
shirkats and private farms increasing the agricultural wage. According to the results for the 
cotton and input market liberalization (Scenario 3) and completion of farm restructuring 
(Scenario 4), it appears that the high reliance on mechanization during field preparation and 
cultivation can also reduce the labor demanded for agriculture, while increasing the wage. The 
improvement of the livestock sector also releases labor from shirkats and private farms since 
the livestock keeping become more attractive to those producers. Although the water 
efficiency improved in cumulative experiment (Scenario 6), the income losses from 
introduction of water price dominate over the gains from increase in water efficiency. This is 
observable though decline of shadow values of all resources except for the price of labor. 
Table 5.9: Shadow prices of labor, USD 10 -3 h -1 
District Producer BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
KSPBGT SK 51.4 49.5 57.1 65.7 - 52.1 -
PF 51.4 49.5 57.1 65.7 57.5 52.1 68.5
HH 51.4 49.5 57.1 65.7 57.5 52.1 68.5
KKAURG SK 48.8 46.3 55.8 61.4 - 52.8 -
PF 48.8 46.3 55.8 61.4 54.5 52.8 69.5
HH 48.8 46.3 55.8 61.4 54.5 52.8 69.5
YZRGLN SK 50.2 49.4 55.2 64.3 - 50.5 -
PF 50.2 49.4 55.2 64.3 55.0 50.5 72.4
HH 50.2 49.4 55.2 64.3 55.0 50.5 72.4
KVAYRK SK 50.5 48.5 55.8 60.9 - 53.8 -
PF 50.5 48.5 55.8 60.9 52.3 53.8 71.4
HH 50.5 48.5 55.8 60.9 52.3 53.8 71.4
KKRSVT SK 47.9 47.0 59.1 56.9 - 49.3 -
PF 47.9 47.0 59.1 56.9 57.9 49.3 68.3
HH 47.9 47.0 59.1 56.9 57.9 49.3 68.3  
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and 
Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – 
Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat 
districts; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; BASE – Base situation 
(observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water 
pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm 
restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
As the next section shows, being charged for water the shirkats and private farms shifted their 
cropping pattern from cash crop production towards fodder crops and the expansion of 
livestock production, both of which require relatively less labor. In all cases, the decrease in 
rural household income driven by the shift in cropping pattern was compensated by the 
increase of the agricultural wages, even if some amount of rural household labor was released 
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by shirkats and private farms. Due to the high density of the rural population in Khorezm, the 
shadow price of labor is relatively low compared to wages in the agricultural sector of 
developed countries. Most interestingly is that the ratio of shadow values of land (Table 5.6) 
to labor (Table 5.7) is high. This can be supported by the fact that in the Khorezm region the 
population density per arable land is high (see Section 2.4.2) and labor is not a significant 
limiting factor to agricultural production in the rural areas. 
Shadow Price of Nitrogen Fertilizer. The shadow value of fertilizer presented in this study is 
a shadow price of nitrogen fertilizer in physical equivalents for the chemical composition of 
applied fertilizers. In the base situation, the nitrogen fertilizer does not constrain the cropping 
activities of rural households and shirkats (Table 5.10). The first apply manure to their plots 
as an additional fertilizer. The latter are state controlled enterprises and receive a large amount 
of fertilizer from state controlled organizations.  
Table 5.10: Shadow prices of nitrogen fertilizer, USD t -1 
District Producer BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
KSPBGT SK - - - 800 - - -
PF 655 690 579 800 - 612 800
HH - 720 651 800 - - 800
KKAURG SK - - - 800 - - -
PF 640 685 596 800 - 571 800
HH - 731 689 800 - - 800
YZRGLN SK - - - 800 - - -
PF 590 661 591 800 - 565 800
HH - 741 673 800 - - 800
KVAYRK SK - - - 800 - - -
PF 533 620 558 800 - 528 800
HH - 674 614 800 - - 800
KKRSVT SK - - - 800 - - -
PF 528 609 538 800 - 516 800
HH - 645 602 800 - - 800  
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and 
Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – 
Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat 
districts; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; BASE – Base situation 
(observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water 
pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm 
restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
Due to higher agricultural productivity, the districts located next to the river have a higher 
value of fertilizer in comparison to the districts located far from the river. After the 
improvement of water efficiency (Scenario 1), when more water becomes available, the 
availability of fertilizer starts binding the cropping activities of the rural households in all 
modeled districts. Moreover, among the three types of producers, the value of nitrogen 
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fertilizer becomes the highest in rural households. The introduction of water prices (Scenario 
2) and improvement of livestock productivity (Scenario 5) reduces the value of nitrogen 
fertilizer in private farms. When the input markets are liberalized (Scenarios 3 and 6), the 
shadow value of fertilizer is equal to the value introduced as a new price system for nitrogen 
fertilizer. The results of all simulations show that crop production in shirkats is not 
constrained by availability of nitrogen fertilizer, but rather by their land and water availability 
at the districts level. 
Shadow Price of Diesel. In the base situation, diesel does not constrain the cropping activities 
of shirkats which receive a sufficient amount of diesel from the state controlled organization 
(Table 5.11). Diesel is a constraining input in private farms and households. Like in the case 
of nitrogen fertilizer, due to higher agricultural productivity, the districts bordering with the 
river have a higher value of diesel in comparison to the districts which have no access to the 
river. 
Table 5.11: Shadow prices of diesel, USD t -1 
District Producer BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
KSPBGT SK - - - 200 - - -
PF 201 214 176 200 - 146 200
HH 224 276 183 200 221 - 200
KKAURG SK - - - 200 - - -
PF 209 222 189 200 - 137 200
HH 228 289 196 200 227 - 200
YZRGLN SK - - - 200 - - -
PF 204 218 184 200 - 144 200
HH 227 281 191 200 229 - 200
KVAYRK SK - - - 200 - - -
PF 195 209 173 200 - 142 200
HH 212 272 179 200 214 - 200
KKRSVT SK - - - 200 - - -
PF 198 212 173 200 - 144 200
HH 213 275 182 200 218 - 200  
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and 
Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – 
Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat 
districts; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; BASE – Base situation 
(observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water 
pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm 
restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
After the improvement of water efficiency (Scenario 1), the value of diesel constraints 
increases both for private farms and rural households in all modeled districts. Moreover, the 
value of diesel remains higher in rural households. This because the improvement of water 
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efficiency implies also increase of crop yields while the diesel use rates are kept fixed at their 
observed levels. When the input markets are liberalized (Scenario 3), the shadow value of 
diesel is equal to the value introduced as a new price system for diesel market. The simulation 
results show that crop production in shirkats remains unconstrained by diesel, but rather by 
their land and water availability at district level. Most interestingly, the shadow values of 
diesel and nitrogen fertilizers are higher than their observed values for Khorezm in 2003. The 
considerable differences between shadow prices and observed values19 can indicate the failure 
of the market20 to supply necessary quantities of diesel and fertilizer to agricultural producers. 
As follows from the farm survey conducted by the author in Khorezm in 2003, the higher 
values of fertilizer and diesel in districts located far from the river may be caused by delayed 
availability of these inputs and by their scarcity. 
5.7.3 Production Activities 
In each scenario, the shift in the levels of production activities is related to the changes in 
their GMs. Depending on producers’ resource endowments and water availability in districts, 
the fields cleared after winter wheat are used for rice or fodder cultivation in a second 
cropping cycle. Therefore, producer’s total area of cropping activities can be greater than total 
land endowment. The relative changes of production activities in each scenario to the base 
situation are presented for two modeled district aggregates (Table 5.12). For the full results on 
production activities see Table A20 in Appendix 4 to this thesis. Due to the applied 
calibration approaches, in the base run, the production activity levels replicate exactly the 
observed situation in Khorezm in 2003. The improvement in water efficiency (Scenario 1) 
means more water is available for agricultural producers. Although, the production of paddy 
rice increases in all districts, its highest relative increase is observed in the districts which 
have no direct access to the river, i.e. the areas where the rice cultivation is constrained by 
low water availability. Furthermore, the increase in rice cultivation area in shirkats and 
private farms is mostly at the expense of area under fodder crops, which in its turn might lead 
to the decrease in number of livestock. For rural household plots, water efficiency, which also 
implies an increase in crop yields, substitutes the fruit production in attached household plots 
(uy tomorqa) by potato and vegetables. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 In 2003 in Khorezm the price of diesel and nitrogen fertilizer was 110 USD and 500 USD per ton respectively. 
20 In case of Khorezm, special state companies function as fertilizer and diesel distributing agencies. 
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Table 5.12: Production activity levels in the districts 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
SK CTN 103 ha 17.565 0 0 -70 - 0 - 16.654 0 0 -75 - 0 -
WWT 103 ha 5.186 10 -33 -100 - -9 - 6.065 12 -14 -100 - -10 -
RCE 103 ha 1.772 8 -70 158 - 9 - 1.497 28 -40 226 - -5 -
POT 103 ha 0.064 156 -63 245 - 63 - 0.143 339 272 329 - 280 -
FRT 103 ha 0.159 1 -36 92 - 0 - 0.205 61 -73 120 - -100 -
VGL 103 ha 0.346 335 520 3,482 - 149 - 0.680 33 50 2,211 - 34 -
MZE 103 ha 0.027 0 548 2,817 - 45 - 0.051 -7 70 106 - 126 -
FOD 103 ha 1.104 -53 3 -100 - 25 - 1.845 -55 5 -100 - 31 -
MLK 103 head 0.729 -71 -58 44 - 99 - 0.565 -67 61 -80 - 113 -
EGG 103 head 2.540 48 20 34 - -24 - 5.846 -7 23 42 - -27 -
MEA 103 head 1.648 -63 49 49 - 30 - 1.489 -13 25 36 - 72 -
PF CTN 103 ha 1.708 0 0 -29 1,028 0 1,000 5.959 0 0 -48 279 0 -100
WWT 103 ha 1.134 20 0 1 457 0 150 3.346 -5 0 36 131 0 454
RCE 103 ha 3.749 11 -14 24 58 11 67 1.336 41 -19 121 -21 20 262
POT 103 ha 0.010 -80 -40 -90 410 40 -100 0.023 774 -100 239 3,655 -100 -100
FRT 103 ha 0.098 105 -100 -100 2 -11 -100 0.150 -93 -100 -100 34 -100 -100
VGL 103 ha 0.045 112 -84 502 791 256 -38 0.201 276 -74 988 456 25 4,448
MZE 103 ha 0.007 0 -100 43 386 -2 -100 0.091 -11 220 -100 276 0 -100
FOD 103 ha 0.677 9 166 -100 18 18 333 1.496 -2 26 -100 270 20 194
MLK 103 head 1.056 -2 17 -8 14 55 128 1.377 -5 37 -54 410 34 481
EGG 103 head 4.890 0 -58 27 81 -11 -67 3.901 -16 6 -63 171 -53 143
MEA 103 head 3.458 -3 33 -25 63 30 71 4.556 0 6 -53 19 22 49
HH WWT 103 ha 3.965 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.400 0 0 0 0 0 0
RCE 103 ha 1.336 8 -40 -3 0 -14 -85 0.141 502 -41 71 326 228 -100
POT 103 ha 0.126 110 60 77 24 2 419 0.567 -53 -81 3 -58 -100 -90
FRT 103 ha 0.293 -80 -85 -86 -45 -4 -100 0.230 -11 -20 -100 -100 -72 -100
VGL 103 ha 0.838 24 21 -49 12 0 -28 0.746 44 68 29 75 36 68
MZE 103 ha 0.113 0 177 0 -1 -7 259 0.291 -1 -17 0 -1 -56 52
FOD 103 ha 0.768 0 26 65 5 38 109 1.607 -25 3 -6 -16 20 21
MLK 103 head 37.069 3 5 11 0 7 5 36.879 -1 1 0 0 8 9
EGG 103 head 225.527 0 13 0 7 5 3 274.516 -2 -17 0 -14 -18 1
MEA 103 head 83.737 1 5 18 3 50 -2 93.305 -1 0 -1 0 5 1
changes to base (in percent)
ActivityProducer KSPBGT KKRSVT
 
Notes: SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – 
Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; MLN – Melons; MZE – Maize; FOD – Fodder crops; MLK – 
Cows; EGG – Poultry; MEA – Bulls; KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKRSVT 
– Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; BASE – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment 
into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton 
and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock 
sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
In the case of improving the water efficiency with introduced water pricing (Scenario 2), the 
rice production drops in all districts. In shirkats, the rice cultivation is substituted by 
vegetable production, while in rural households it is substituted by fodder crops. In most 
cases, an increase in the price of water (i.e. the introduction of a price for water) shifts the 
cropping pattern towards less water intensive crops, i.e. for fodder, and therefore, livestock 
production increases. This leads to reduction of total water use in all districts and shifting 
towards less water intensive cropping structure. By improving water efficiency and with the 
introduction of subsidized water pricing for cotton (see Section 5.2), the area sown to cotton 
does not increase. In cotton and input market liberalization (Scenario 3), the raw cotton price 
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is increased exogenously by 28%. Thus, despite the absence of subsidies for diesel and 
fertilizers, the cotton production in some districts reduces, but does not become zero. The area 
under potato and rice production, both in shirkats and private farms, increases due to the 
removal of the state procurement quota for cotton cultivation, while the livestock sector is 
positively affected by an increase in factor prices which decreased the gross margins of most 
cropping activities. After accomplishment of farm restructuring process (Scenario 4), private 
farms in districts bordering the river produce more rice in the place of potatoes, fruits and 
fodder crops. At the same time, the private farms in districts without direct access to the river 
reduce cultivated area under rice and increase the production of potatoes, vegetables and 
fodder crops. The area under rice in rural households in districts located further from the river 
increases at the expense of fodder crops. The improvement of livestock productivity (Scenario 
5) increases the area under fodder crops at the expense of rice, wheat, potato and fruits. Due 
to the absence of alternative options for the first crop in the double cropping system, in all 
scenarios no changes are observed in areas under winter wheat in distant plots of rural 
households (qushimcha tomorqa). Most interestingly, in case of cumulative scenario in 
Scenario 6, cotton cultivation in private farms does not decrease drastically in districts with 
abundant water, while in districts with water scarcity its cultivated area becomes zero. 
Cotton production as a share of regional agriculture remains very sensitive to a reduction in 
the state procurement (Table 5.13). Introduction of all exogenous shocks at once (Scenario 6) 
reduces the total land cultivated under cotton and rice in favor of fodder production and 
increases livestock production in the region. Thus, in the cumulative scenario, although the 
cotton and input markets are liberalized, the introduction of water prices leads to a decrease in 
land use and the cropping pattern shifts towards less water intensive crops and towards 
livestock production. The water pricing, input market liberalization, farm restructuring and 
increase in livestock productivity negatively affect the total area under wheat production. At 
the same time, more land is allocated under rice cultivation in all scenarios except the 
scenario when water prices are introduced, and the state procurement for cotton is not 
abolished. In fact, the cotton market liberalization almost doubles the area under rice. 
The introduction of water prices reduces the area under potato production as producers find it 
more attractive to engage in livestock production and, thus, increase the area under fodder. 
Introduction of water prices, farm restructuring and improvement of livestock productivity, all 
decrease the area under fruit production in favor of vegetable cultivation. In fact, vegetable 
production benefits all scenarios, especially when the cotton market is liberalized under 
increased input prices. Similar to vegetables, maize production increases except in the case of 
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increased livestock productivity. When the livestock productivity increases, producers prefer 
to increase the production of short season fodder crops which are used for feeding their 
livestock. The number of livestock in the region increases in all scenarios due to 
improvements in its productivity, similarly, when there is an increase in fodder crop yields, a 
rise in factor prices, and introduction of water charges for rice production in rural households. 
Table 5.13: Production activity levels in the Khorezm region 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
changes to base (in percent)
CTN 103 ha 97.7 0 0 -67 0 0 -72
WWT 103 ha 50.8 4 -12 -45 -6 -4 15
RCE 103 ha 27.2 17 -30 90 1 3 9
POT 103 ha 2.9 25 -3 63 56 -11 12
FRT 103 ha 2.5 13 -19 5 -34 -15 -23
VGL 103 ha 8.5 66 84 726 16 14 382
MZE 103 ha 1.7 24 69 87 39 -1 -10
FOD 103 ha 16.4 -13 9 -52 -4 33 55
MLK 103 head 202.1 0 4 8 3 1 12
EGG 103 head 1,437.6 -4 0 5 -5 -7 -7
MEA 103 head 492.3 0 3 3 2 19 4
Activity
 
Notes: CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; MLN – 
Melons; MZE – Maize; FOD – Fodder crops; MLK – Cows; EGG – Poultry; MEA – Bulls; BASE 
– Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – 
Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – 
Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – 
Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
The complete table of producers’ profits is given in Table A21 in Appendix 4. In the base 
situation, unlike in shirkats and private farms, the total profit of rural households from 
livestock keeping activities dominates over those from crop growing activities (Table 5.14). 
While the profit per hectare of rural households seems exceptionally large, one needs to bear 
in mind that this type of producer is the smallest in Uzbekistan, with average holdings of 0.19 
hectare of arable land (see Section 2.2). The structure of total agricultural profits of each 
producer group remains over all simulations. Improvement of water efficiency (Scenario 1) 
produces the highest profit per hectare for all producers in all districts due to the increase of 
crop yields and reduction of costs related to irrigation. At the same time the introduction of 
water prices (Scenario 2) gives the highest decrease in producers’ profits per hectare. The 
market liberalization (Scenario 3) increases profits from cropping activities in shirkats 
because more land becomes available for more profitable cropping activities after the state 
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procurement for cotton is removed. At the same time, market liberalization decreases profits 
from crop growing activities per hectare in private farms and rural households due to the 
increase of factor prices. The increase in factor prices shifts the production activities of rural 
households towards livestock production. Thus, although the profits from the animal sector 
for private farms drops, in rural household the profits from animal keeping activities increase. 
Table 5.14: Profits from agricultural production activities 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
SK CROP 103 USD 6,858 47 -30 156 -100 11 -100 6,581 37 -38 168 -100 5 -100
ANIMAL 103 USD 282 -63 19 58 -100 74 -100 318 -25 34 16 -100 107 -100
TOTAL 103 USD 7,140 43 -28 153 -100 13 -100 6,899 34 -34 161 -100 10 -100
CROPHA USD ha-1 262 40 -27 185 -100 8 -100 242 32 -36 180 -100 4 -100
TOTHA USD ha-1 272 36 -25 181 -100 11 -100 254 30 -33 172 -100 8 -100
PF CROP 103 USD 4,700 23 -61 -8 227 16 -41 3,081 41 -52 -3 147 7 -38
ANIMAL 103 USD 603 -3 26 -13 73 62 155 879 -1 13 -50 180 70 221
TOTAL 103 USD 5,302 20 -51 -9 209 21 -19 3,960 32 -37 -13 154 21 19
CROPHA USD ha-1 633 11 -64 -7 -26 7 -86 245 31 -52 -5 -21 3 -79
TOTHA USD ha-1 714 8 -54 -7 -30 11 -81 314 23 -37 -15 -19 17 -59
HH CROP 103 USD 3,952 22 -22 -39 9 -3 -49 2,873 47 0 -37 27 7 -22
ANIMAL 103 USD 33,676 1 6 23 21 58 35 33,059 -1 0 6 29 37 30
TOTAL 103 USD 37,628 3 3 16 20 51 26 35,931 3 0 2 29 35 26
CROPHA USD ha-1 531 19 -20 -38 8 -5 -49 411 -2 1 2 25 35 24
TOTHA USD ha-1 5,058 0 5 18 19 49 26 5,146 41 1 -37 24 7 -24
DIST CROP 103 USD 15,510 34 -37 57 27 9 -69 12,535 40 -32 79 -10 6 -67
ANIMAL 103 USD 34,561 0 6 22 21 58 36 34,256 -1 1 4 32 39 34
TOTAL 103 USD 50,070 11 -7 33 23 43 3 46,791 10 -8 24 21 30 7
TOTHA USD ha-1 1,219 5 -6 43 25 38 11 1,001 5 -7 27 21 28 13
CROPHA USD ha-1 377 26 -36 68 29 5 -67 268 34 -31 82 -10 4 -65
KSPBGTProducer Activity KKRSVT
changes to base (in percent)
 
Notes: SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; CROP – total profits of producer from crop 
growing activities; ANIM – Total profits from livestock and poultry keeping activities; TOTAL – Total 
profits from crop growing and livestock and poultry rearing activities; TOTHA – Total profit per 
hectare of sown area; CROPHA – Profit from cropping activities per hectare of sown area; KSPBGT – 
KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; Base – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – 
Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – 
Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – 
Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
Most interestingly, in districts with abundant water, the benefits are higher in case of the 
elimination of state procurement for cotton and farm restructuring reforms, while the districts 
with water scarcity have higher benefits in case of improving water efficiency and increasing 
the productivity of the livestock sector. The modeled districts and the region, in general, are 
better off in case of improvement in water efficiency (Scenario 1), development of the 
livestock sector (Scenario 5), farm restructuring (Scenario 4) and market liberalization 
(Scenario 3). While in the cumulative scenario (Scenario 6), the decrease of district and 
regional profits from cropping activities are compensated by the profit increase from the 
livestock sector, the introduction of water pricing (Scenario 2) decreases the profits from crop 
growing at levels for which the profit increase in the livestock sector cannot fully compensate. 
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5.7.4 Land and Water Use 
An important question in the context of this research is related to the effects of selected 
policies on land and water use in the region. The full simulation results on land and water use 
are presented in Table A18 in Appendix 4. As Table 5.15 shows, in the base-run simulation, 
the districts bordering the river use more water per hectare than those without direct access to 
the river. At the same time, the private farms with the highest share of area sown to rice have 
the highest water use per hectare among the producers. 
Table 5.15: Land and water use 
Districts Producer BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
Land Use (103 ha)
KSPBGT SK 26.2 1.2 -0.1 -0.1 - -0.1 -
PF 7.4 -0.1 -0.6 2.0 342.7 1.1 364.6
HH 7.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.9 0.8
KKRSVT SK 27.1 10.2 9.5 -2.7 - 0.3 -
PF 12.6 9.9 9.7 -4.1 213.1 1.6 249.9
HH 7.0 10.2 9.5 4.3 0.5 3.1 10.7
REGION ALL 207.7 5.7 0.3 -2.3 -0.4 1.5 -3.9
Water Use (106 m3)
KSPBGT SK 479.8 -5.1 -11.3 1.2 - -0.1 -
PF 141.0 -8.1 -11.9 3.0 336.4 -1.1 315.6
HH 133.5 -5.8 -2.7 -2.6 -0.1 -3.6 -4.8
KKRSVT SK 473.7 0.0 -0.5 0.1 - 0.0 -
PF 232.6 -0.1 -0.9 0.1 173.5 -0.1 172.1
HH 121.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.4
REGION ALL 5,968.9 -4.1 0.0 2.4 6.8 8.8 -11.1
Water Use (103 m3 ha-1)
KSPBGT SK 18.3 -6.2 -11.2 1.3 - 0.0 -
PF 19.0 -7.9 -11.3 1.0 -1.4 -2.2 -10.5
HH 17.9 -5.5 -2.2 -2.8 -0.1 -2.7 -5.6
KKRSVT SK 17.5 -9.2 -9.1 2.9 - -0.3 -
PF 18.5 -9.1 -9.7 4.4 -12.6 -1.7 -22.2
HH 17.3 -9.3 -8.7 -4.1 -0.5 -3.2 -10.0
REGION ALL 18.0 -6.4 -7.5 2.8 -3.0 -2.5 -12.1
change to base (in percent)
 
Notes:  KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir 
and Shavat districts; REGION – Khorezm region; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural 
households; ALL – All agricultural producer groups; BASE – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – 
Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – 
Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 
– Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
Simulations which reduce the value of crop gross margins (Scenarios 2, 3 and 6) decrease the 
land and water use in the Khorezm region compared to the base situation. Improving the 
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water use efficiency (Scenario 1) decreases the total water consumption in the districts with 
direct access to the river. Despite greater water availability in this scenario, land remains the 
main restraining factor in these districts. In contrast, the improvement of water efficiency in 
districts without direct access to the river increases the total sown area. Consequently, the 
total water use in those districts does not drop significantly. The introduction of water prices 
(Scenario 2) shifts the cropping pattern towards less water intensive crops and the total water 
use in both districts declines while the total sown area may increase. Liberalization of cotton 
and input markets (Scenario 3) does not increase the cultivated area in shirkats which are 
considered fertilizer and diesel abundant producers in Khorezm, while the sown area in 
private farms and household producers, which receive a relatively low amount of fertilizer 
and diesel, increases significantly. Removing the state procurement quota for cotton increases 
rice cultivation in shirkats and private farms significantly. This new cropping pattern leads to 
higher water use per hectare in water abundant districts, while land remains the limiting factor 
of production. In contrast, shirkats and private farms in the districts without direct access to 
the river reduce the total cultivated area in favor of rice production. The decline in water use 
per hectare in private farms after the completion of the farm restructuring process (Scenario 4) 
is due to the increased procurement quota for cotton. The improvement in livestock 
productivity (Scenario 5) shifts the production activities towards fodder cultivation and, thus, 
leads to a slight increase in the cultivated area in the districts located far from the river. In the 
case multiple policies are implemented simultaneously (Scenario 6), the water use in the 
district with direct access to the river decreases; the cropping pattern in these districts shifts 
towards less water intensive crops. At the same time, the cultivated area in rural households in 
districts without direct access to the river is the largest in Scenario 6. This shows that, despite 
the increase in factor prices, water use efficiency and market liberalization improve conditions 
for increasing the cultivated area in these districts. 
5.7.5 Use of Other Production Factors 
Table 5.16 shows the changes in input use per hectare in two selected district aggregates. In 
the presented table, the production costs per hectare are total costs of crop growing and 
animal keeping activities of all producers in a district aggregate divided by total sown area in 
the district aggregate. In the base situation, the districts without direct access to the river have 
higher application rates for the listed inputs than those which border the river. Improving 
water efficiency (Scenario 1) increases the total sown area in districts where cropping 
activities are constrained by water availability; thereby leading to a decrease in labor, nitrogen 
fertilizer and diesel use in those districts. Increased water efficiency does not, however, 
Policy Simulations with KhoRASM 
 122
significantly affect application rates of these inputs in districts with direct access to the river 
where water is an abundant production factor. Although the water efficiency is improved, the 
introduction of water prices (Scenario 2) will decrease the input application rates in all 
districts. This indicates that the agricultural producers shift their cropping patterns towards 
cropping activities which require less intensive use of these inputs, i.e. fodder crops, and find 
livestock keeping activities more attractive. Abolishment of state procurement for cotton and 
liberalization of input market (Scenario 3) reduce the labor use per hectare in all districts due 
to a significant reduction in cultivated area under cotton which among the most labor 
intensive crops in Khorezm. Furthermore, more nitrogen fertilizers and diesel become 
available for private farms and households, shifting their cropping pattern towards more 
profitable crops with lower requirements in labor and higher requirements in fertilizer and 
diesel such as rice, potato and vegetables. Under the scenario of accomplishment of farm 
restructuring process (Scenario 4) there is a decrease in the labor demand in the agricultural 
sector mostly because private farms, if compared to shirkats, use labor less intensively and 
more intensively fertilizer and machinery. The reduction in labor use is can be seen by the 
increase of fertilizer and diesel use per hectare in all districts. 
Table 5.16: Labor, nitrogen fertilizer and diesel use 
Parameter District BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
LABRHA KSPBGT 1,920 1.1 -2.6 -9.2 0.5 1.2 -11.4
(h ha-1) KKRSVT 1,983 -7.0 -9.3 -5.5 0.4 0.6 -17.3
REGION 1,932 -5.4 -0.3 -7.6 0.4 1.1 -17.9
FERTHA KSPBGT 210 0.7 -3.6 8.2 1.6 -3.6 2.0
(kg ha-1) KKRSVT 211 -8.5 -9.0 5.8 0.5 -3.0 -4.7
REGION 210 0.6 -7.3 7.7 1.6 -3.9 0.7
DISLHA KSPBGT 244 0.0 -2.4 7.3 1.9 -3.8 4.0
(kg ha-1) KKRSVT 237 -4.6 -6.1 5.2 0.9 -2.5 -8.1
REGION 238 -2.1 -3.7 5.5 1.0 -1.8 1.9
COSTHA KSPBGT 399 1.3 47.9 24.7 5.1 -4.1 66.2
(USD ha-1) KKRSVT 394 1.2 44.8 23.0 5.5 -3.5 66.0
REGION 397 -1.3 42.1 19.8 3.9 -3.3 57.8
change to base (in percent)
 
Notes: LABRHA – Labor use in the agricultural production per hectare; FERTHA – Nitrogen fertilizer 
applied per hectare; DISLHA – Diesel used per hectare; COSTHA – Total costs of agricultural 
production per hectare; KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKRSVT – 
Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; REGION – Khorezm region; BASE – Base situation 
(observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water 
pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm 
restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
Improvement in livestock productivity (Scenario 5) increases livestock production and area 
under fodder crops and, thus, similarly puts downward pressure on rural employment. 
Moreover, in this scenario, a shift in cropping patterns towards fodder crops causes a slight 
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decrease in fertilizer and diesel use rates in all districts. The cumulative application of all 
exogenous changes (Scenario 6) decreases employment in the agricultural sector in all 
districts. In contrast to the districts which have direct access to the river, the production 
activities in those with water scarcity shift towards the fodder production and livestock 
keeping and, thus, fertilizer and diesel use in these districts declines. 
5.7.6 Regional Commodity Balance and Prices 
The commodity prices change within a limit defined by the commodity prices outside of the 
region and the transportation costs fulfilling the arbitrage condition (Table 5.17). 
Table 5.17: Commodity prices 
Commodity District BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
WWT KSPBGT 104 4 3 4 1 -4 3
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 107 4 3 4 2 -4 3
RCE KSPBGT 264 4 14 4 4 3 2
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 254 4 14 4 6 3 3
POT KSPBGT 86 5 5 5 5 5 3
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 89 5 6 5 8 4 4
FRT KSPBGT 41 4 5 5 5 -4 3
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 43 4 5 4 7 -4 3
VGL KSPBGT 104 3 4 3 4 4 1
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 102 3 3 5 5 4 5
MLK KSPBGT 155 -2 -2 7 19 -3 4
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 149 -2 -2 6 27 -3 4
EGG KSPBGT 56 1 1 3 14 6 1
(USD 10-3 piece-1) KKRSVT 54 1 1 6 16 6 2
MEA KSPBGT 1,877 -2 -2 8 18 -8 5
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 1,792 -2 -2 8 28 -5 4
OTH KSPBGT 990 0 0 0 0 0 0
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 1,025 0 0 0 0 0 0
MFR KSPBGT 990 0 0 0 0 0 0
(USD t-1) KKRSVT 1,025 0 0 0 0 0 0
LSR KSPBGT 51 -4 11 28 12 -1 33
(USD 10-3 h-1) KKRSVT 48 -2 23 19 21 3 43
change to base (in percent)
 
Notes: WWT – Winter wheat; RCE –Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; MLN – Melons; MLK 
– Milk; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat; LSR – Leisure; KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and 
Bagat districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; BASE – Base 
situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – 
Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – 
Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – 
Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
The regional production and consumption of the commodities is presented in Table 5.17 and 
Table 5.18. The full data on consumption and prices is given in Table A17 in Appendix 4. 
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Table 5.18: Regional commodity production and consumption 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
Production change to base (in percent)
CTN 103 t 153.0 10 10 -66 7 0 -58
WWT 103 t 184.0 14 -5 -37 -1 -3 29
RCE 103 t 119.0 28 -27 84 6 1 23
POT 103 t 39.2 36 2 51 31 -14 24
FRT 103 t 38.1 24 3 15 -39 -8 -1
VGL 103 t 164.0 73 93 628 8 12 326
MZE 103 t 5.4 33 72 103 24 -3 9
FOD 103 t 211.8 0 11 -40 9 31 105
MLK 103 t 427.3 0 3 7 2 19 31
EGG 103 pieces 131.6 -3 2 9 -16 -5 -18
MEA 103 t 64.2 1 2 3 2 44 24
OTH 103 t - - - - - - -
MFR 103 t - - - - - - -
LSR 106 h - - - - - - -
Consumption / Animal Feeding change to base (in percent)
CTN 103 t - - - - - - -
WWT 103 t 247.3 -2 -1 -2 -1 3 -2
RCE 103 t 19.5 -6 -14 -6 -9 -6 -4
POT 103 t 63.8 -3 -4 -3 -5 -3 -2
FRT 103 t 74.4 -2 -2 -2 -3 3 -1
VGL 103 t 132.4 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
MZE 103 t 14.4 -4 0 5 -5 -7 -7
FOD 103 t 2,083 0 3 4 2 36 28
MLK 103 t 198.5 2 2 -4 -8 5 -3
EGG 103 pieces 80.5 -2 -2 -6 -14 -8 -3
MEA 103 t 34.4 1 1 -3 -5 4 -1
OTH 103 t 48.3 0 0 10 12 1 8
MFR 103 t 271.2 0 0 27 7 4 28
LSR 106 h 205.2 -5 7 17 5 0 31
Commodity
 
Notes: CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; MLN – 
Melons; MZE – Maize; FOD – Fodder crops; MLK – Milk; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat; OTH 
– Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food manufactured commodities; LSR – Leisure; 
BASE – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; 
EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; 
EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; 
EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
Total regional leisure consumption in rural households increases in all scenarios except in one 
with improvement of water efficiency, where unemployment among rural workers decreases 
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at lower wage levels (Table 5.17). This indicates that the selected setting of demand in the 
model establishes a positive relation between agricultural wage and leisure consumption. 
According to this, the increase in wages leads to increase of rural households’ income and, 
therefore, increases leisure consumption. Thus, the total income of rural household consumer 
increases enough to compensate this decline on overall employment in the agricultural sector 
and, thus, to increase the total consumption of leisure. This means the positive income effect 
in rural households outweighs a negative price effect in leisure consumption. Regional export 
and import values are related to changes in values of production activities in shirkats, private 
farms and rural households, as well as commodity consumption by rural and urban 
households. In the base situation, the region is an exporter of cotton, rice, vegetables, milk, 
eggs and meat, and an importer of wheat, potato, fruits, maize, fodder other food and 
manufactured commodities (see Section 2.5). The same regional position for all listed 
commodities stays over all simulation (Table 5.19). 
Table 5.19: Regional commodity export and import 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
Export change to base (in percent)
CTN 103 t 153.0 10 10 -66 7 0 -58
RCE 103 t 99.4 35 -29 101 8 3 28
VGL 103 t 31.7 388 496 3,268 54 76 1,703
MLK 103 t 228.8 -1 4 17 11 32 62
EGG 103 pieces 51.0 -5 9 32 -21 1 -43
MEA 103 t 29.7 0 4 10 10 89 54
Import change to base (in percent)
WWT 103 t 63.4 -50 10 100 1 19 -91
POT 103 t 24.6 -66 -14 -89 -62 14 -44
FRT 103 t 36.3 -29 -7 -19 36 14 -2
MZE 103 t 8.9 -27 -44 -54 -22 -9 -17
FOD 103 t 1,871.4 0 2 9 2 37 19
OTH 103 t 48.3 0 0 10 12 1 8
MFR 103 t 271.2 0 0 27 7 4 28
Commodity
 
Notes: CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; 
MLN – Melons; MZE – Maize; FOD – Fodder crops; MLK – Milk; EGG – Eggs; MEA – 
Meat; OTH – Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food manufactured commodities; 
BASE – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage 
system; EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input 
markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in 
livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
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According to the model specification, cotton yields are higher in private farms than in 
shirkats, and, thereby, the completion of the farm restructuring process (Scenario 4) increases 
regional production and exports of cotton under the same area of its cultivation. Improving 
water efficiency (Scenario 1) increases wheat production and, thus, decreases its imports. 
Furthermore, regional production and export of rice increases in response to increased water 
efficiency. Under Scenario 3, although liberalization of the input market increases total 
regional production for all food commodities; wheat becomes less favorable for producers and 
its regional production decreases. In scenarios which shift the production from crop growing 
activities towards livestock production (Scenario 2, 5 and 6), the production of fodder crops is 
not sufficient to cover the increased number of livestock in the region and, thus, the regional 
import of forage increases. The abolishment of cotton procurement quota (Scenarios 3 and 6) 
reduced the total export of cotton. Moreover, the market liberalization leads to a significant 
increase in rice and vegetable exports, and imports of wheat and manufactured commodities. 
An increase in cotton production and exports is observed only in cases with an increase in 
crop yield under improved water efficiency (Scenarios 1 and 2), but only at its observed level 
of land allocation according to the state procurement quota. 
The model specification according to which the commodity prices change within a range 
determined by the arbitrage conditions is one of the major limitations of the model, since it 
does not allow agricultural producers to get higher commodity prices when the factor prices 
increase. The largest deviations are observed in prices for leisure and animal products. The 
increase in commodity prices explains the declining level of rural and urban consumption. 
Although, in the model, the consumed quantity and prices of commodities have negative 
relation, the substitution effect dominates over the price effect in all commodities, except for 
leisure. Furthermore, the simulation results uncover one of the weaknesses of the model 
specification. Since the model allows for imports and exports to be infinitely small or large, 
the agricultural producers eventually expand or reduce area under certain crops at once. 
Hence, it might be argued that the model should require minimum and maximum levels for 
export and import activities. Technically, this is only possible via structural change of the 
model. Incorporating such structural change in the model was not carried out to date, but 
would be an area of future research. 
5.7.7 Rural Household Income 
The changes in rural household income in the modeled district aggregates are shown in Table 
5.20. Although, the water efficiency improved (Scenario 1) and the cropping pattern changes 
in favor of crops with the highest gross margins, rural household income decreased as 
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agricultural wages decreased. With the introduction of a water pricing system (Scenario 2), 
annual production of most crops became less profitable. The shirkats and private farms 
reduced the level of cropping activities under this scenario, thereby demanding less labor. 
Household income can be expected to drop drastically in this situation. However, losses in 
household income are compensated by the expansion of livestock production, increase in crop 
yields and commodity prices. Furthermore, as the agricultural wages increase in Scenario 3, 
leading to an increase in household income level, the removal of input subsidies for cotton 
producers might also have a positive impact on household income. In this scenario, the 
abolishment of state procurement quota for cotton, which is the most labor intensive crop in 
Khorezm, discharges labor from the agricultural sector and increases the level of agricultural 
wages. The completion of the farm restructuring process (Scenario 4) discharges labor from 
agricultural sector, since private farms rely mostly on seasonal hired. This might lead to a 
decrease in household income level. However, farm restructuring increases the price received 
for livestock and poultry products significantly, which may compensate the income loss of 
households. In Scenario 5, the livestock sector shows the potential to positively influence 
household income both in districts bordering the river and districts without direct access to the 
river. Hence, further development of the livestock sector could present a sustainable 
development path for Khorezm. Despite the introduction of water prices and an increase in 
factor prices in the cumulative scenario (scenario 6), household income levels increase. This 
indicates that the positive effects of improving water efficiency and livestock productivity 
dominate over the effects if water pricing and input market liberalization are in effect. 
Table 5.20: Income levels of rural households, 106 USD 
District BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
KSPBGT 89.2 -0.4 4.3 1.6 3.2 3.2 16.3
KKAURG 78.8 -0.8 4.6 1.4 3.0 3.1 21.8
YZRGLN 51.9 -0.7 4.1 1.8 5.5 3.3 19.9
KVAYRK 68.4 -0.2 2.0 0.9 3.4 3.0 20.9
KKRSVT 74.5 -0.5 2.4 1.0 4.9 2.1 23.0
change to base (in percent)
 
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for 
Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; 
KVAYRK – Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for 
Kushkupir and Shavat districts; BASE – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into 
irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization 
of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – 
Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
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There are several key findings that can be drawn from the different scenarios. Firstly, the 
model simulations indicate regional gains when the productivity of inputs is increased; 
similarly, large losses are seen under conditions which impose an increase in factor prices. 
Districts with abundant water will have the greatest benefit when the markets are liberalized 
and farm restructuring is completed. The water scarce districts will have higher benefits when 
the water efficiency improves and productivity of the livestock sector increases. Abolishment 
of cotton procurement quota might drastically increase profits of shirkats, because of releasing 
their activities from mandatory cotton cultivation. At the same time, market liberalization 
decreases profits of private farms and rural households due to the increase in factor prices. 
Unlike for private farms, the rural household could compensate losses under this scenario by 
shifting towards livestock production. Additionally, losses by private farms and rural 
households caused by the increase in factor prices are compensated by the profit increase in 
shirkats and, thus, in general, the market liberalization might have a positive effect on regional 
income. Next, the districts and region are better off in the case of improved water efficiency, 
development of the livestock sector and farm restructuring. In the final scenario, the decrease 
of district and regional profits from cropping activities are compensated by increased profits 
from livestock production; however, water pricing can present an additional burden on 
agricultural producers which cannot be compensated by increased profitability of the livestock 
sector. Under the base-case scenario, due to the higher factor productivity in private farms 
than in shirkats, the abolishment of cotton procurement will have a greater and positive impact 
on private farms than on shirkats. In contrast, with improved water efficiency, regional 
income might rise at a higher rate when the state requirements for cotton production are 
reduced for shirkats, than for private farms. Nevertheless, through all simulated exogenous 
changes, cotton production remains unattractive for agricultural producers. Consequently, 
under the simulated conditions, regional production remains sensitive to changes in the cotton 
procurement quota. Under the given condition of input markets, when the producer’s 
endowments of fertilizer and diesel are regulated centrally by the state agency, and the land 
markets being absent, the completion of the farm restructuring program might create a 
situation where land in private farms is not fully cultivated. Land remains the main 
constraining factor of production in districts bordering the river and the improvement of water 
efficiency will significantly decrease total water consumption in these districts. At the same 
time, the improvement of water efficiency significantly increases total land use in the districts 
without direct access to the river and, thus, the total water use in these districts does not show 
a dramatic decrease. Abolishment of state procurement quota for cotton and input market 
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liberalization, combined with an increase in water use efficiency, might allow the use of arable 
land by agricultural producers to its full capacity resulting in higher shadow values of land 
both in districts with direct access to the river and in districts with water scarcity. In general, 
abolishment of state procurement quota and input market liberalization increases the value of 
land in districts which border the river and the shadow value of water in districts which do not 
have direct access to the river. With respect to production factors, the lower the availability of 
fertilizer, diesel or water, the lower are the prices which agricultural producers will be willing 
to pay for additional land. Due to a significant reduction in cultivated area under cotton, 
combined with the liberalization of input markets, the labor use per hectare drops in all 
districts. The accomplishment of the farm restructuring process also might decrease labor 
employment in the agricultural sector. The labor discharge by the shirkats and private farms 
under increased factor productivity and prices is the main concern of the results of the various 
policy simulations. Although the introduction of water prices makes the production of most 
crops less profitable, the income loss in rural households might be compensated by the 
expansion of the livestock sector, increase of crop yield and commodity prices. Furthermore, 
the introduction of water prices might increase the level of agricultural wages. Consequently, 
rural households will additionally offset for income losses caused by increased water pricing 
through increases in the level of agricultural wages. The introduction of water pricing shifts 
the cropping pattern towards fodder production and livestock production. Market liberalization 
has a positive effect on the regional rice and potato sector releasing land from the cotton 
procurement quotas in shirkats and private farms. Livestock production is also positively 
affected by the input market liberalization, since it becomes more attractive for agricultural 
producers when prices for fertilizer and diesel increase. The accomplishment of the farm 
restructuring process increases the production of rice at the expenses of potato, fruit and 
fodder production in private farms in districts bordering the river. At the same time, the farm 
restructuring process would decrease rice production and increase potato, vegetable and 
fodder production in private farms in districts located far from the river. An increase in 
livestock productivity will lead to an increase in the area under fodder crops at the expense of 
rice, wheat, potato and fruits. In the cumulative scenario, although the cotton and input 
markets are liberalized, the introduction of water prices leads to a decrease in land use and the 
cropping pattern shifts towards less water intensive crops and towards livestock production. 
Furthermore, the cumulative scenario shows that the effects of increased water efficiency and 
improved livestock production appear to dominate over the effects of introduced water pricing 
and increased factor prices. 
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6. Summary, Policy and Research Conclusions 
6.1 Problem Statement 
After Uzbekistan declared its independence in 1991, a set of economic reforms was 
implemented in the agricultural sector affecting agricultural production activities. This study 
has described several agricultural reforms, such as farm restructuring, national wheat self-
sufficiency, developments in the state procurement policy and agricultural subsidization for 
shirkats and private farms. Since the economy of Uzbekistan is in transition from a planned to 
a market-driven economy, further reforms in the agricultural sector will include the policies 
which do not have historical observations for Uzbekistan. These reforms in this study include 
the improvement of water efficiency, introduction of water charges, full abolishment of state 
procurement system and input market liberalization, accomplishment of farm restructuring 
process, and increase in livestock productivity. 
The condition of the irrigation and drainage system in Khorezm is poor and water efficiency 
has, as a consequence, been declining. The maintenance and rehabilitation of the existing 
system can increase water availability to the agricultural producers, which is of particular 
interest for the producers in water scarce districts and increase their crop yields. Regarding the 
introduction of a price for water, the water management in Khorezm is transferred entirely to 
the newly established non-governmental organizations, which deliver water and maintain and 
operate irrigation and drainage system while receiving payments from the water users. The 
further introduction of water pricing system will ultimately affect production levels and less 
water will be consumed by agricultural producers. 
With the abolishment of the state procurement for cotton, it is recurrently mentioned that 
incentives for cotton production will rise and lead to more profitable production pattern in 
Uzbekistan (Guadagni et al. 2005). After the intensification of the farm restructuring process, 
the fragmentation of large state enterprises into private farms became the most tangible 
reform in Uzbekistan. The final goal of this reform is to fully transfer land and non-land 
production assets from shirkats to private farms. Like any policy change, the substitution of 
large scale production technologies to smaller-scale ones will affect the production activities 
of the latter and the regional commodity prices. Furthermore, the current livestock 
productivity is underdeveloped in Khorezm, although of paramount importance for household 
security. It is believed that an improvement of livestock rearing practices and feeding regimes 
will lead to increased livelihood and higher agricultural incomes in the region.  
All these agricultural reforms will impact but in a different way on the activity levels of 
different types of agricultural producers and consumers performing in different areas of the 
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study region Khorezm. To increase the understanding how the different policies may impact 
on the regional production of specific agricultural commodities, much can be learned from 
assessing these policies with the help of a quantitative model such as the mathematical 
programming model. 
This study is a first application of the modeling framework for the agricultural sector of 
Khorezm, while splitting the regional agricultural production into several districts and the by 
considering the major agricultural producer and consumer groups as well as their location to 
the Amu Darya river as a proxy for the availability of irrigation water. The consideration of 
the regional agricultural system in such partial equilibrium model will support decision 
makers and researchers to understand the policy or non-policy effects on the levels of regional 
prices, production activities and quantities. The results of such a sector model can be used to 
improve decision making. 
6.2 Objectives 
The study itself has aimed at providing a suitable instrument for analyzing the agricultural 
sector in Khorezm. Therefore, the overall objective of this study was to develop an economic 
framework to analyze the impact of different policies on the agricultural sector of the region. 
Additionally, the study includes a set of specific objectives: such as to develop an agricultural 
sector model for improved policy analysis, reflecting the unique features of supply and 
demand of agricultural commodities in Khorezm. The second specific objective is, following 
the completion of the agricultural sector model, to develop and apply an alternative technique 
for calibrating the model. The third objective is to simulate a set of selected policies. Based on 
the simulation results, modified agricultural policies to improve the welfare of regional 
producers and consumers are proposed. These specific objectives allowed an increased 
understanding of the possibilities to restructure the agricultural production while concurrently 
improving the economic efficiency of land and water. 
6.3 Analytical Approach 
KhoRASM reflects the unique features of the region’s agriculture. The model integrates three 
components: (1) agricultural sector model; (2) linear supply module; (3) non-linear demand 
module. The developed model follows closely the general guidelines of the non-linear 
agricultural sector models presented by Hazell and Norton (1986). The optimization 
mechanism in the model is not driven by exogenous changes but within the model via a price-
endogenous solution mechanism. Following a standard welfare analysis, in the objective 
function of the model, total welfare of the study region consists of money metric indirect 
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utility function, i.e. consumer surplus, and agricultural income, i.e. producer surplus. Hence, 
to join the demand and supply modules in the objective function of the model, the cross-
effects of consumption, prices and income, established by the demand module, are introduced 
via the rescaling of the indirect utility function into a money metric indirect utility function.  
For reasons of computational necessity and data needs, the model’ demand and supply sides 
are aggregated over districts, producers, consumers and commodities. The supply module is 
linear and reflects the basic crop and animal production activities in the region divided into 
three different submodels representing main farm aggregates in the study region. The 
constraints are imposed due to limited supplies of resources and the existing state 
procurement system which implies that a pre-determined share of agricultural land has to be 
used for cotton production which is then sold at pre-determined prices to parastatal agencies. 
The supply module incorporates trade flows between modeled districts and with external 
regions under a small country assumption. Thus, import and export prices are constant and 
defined exogenously, applying the small country assumption. The demand module is specified 
at district aggregates for rural and urban households based on a Normalized Quadratic – 
Quadratic Expenditure System (NQ-QES) which assumes the non-linear income effect and 
cross-price effects on households’ consumption. The demand module consists of food and 
non-food commodities and leisure time with endogenous prices over two types of consumers 
such as rural and urban households. According to the concept of nonseparability, the rural 
households’ decisions regarding their production are affected by their consumer 
characteristics and, thus, in the optimum solution, the marginal revenue product of labor 
(agricultural wages) in the supply module is equal to the price of leisure time in the demand 
module. The study is based on the large amount of data and information dealing with 
agricultural sector in Khorezm. The data used in the model mostly include micro-economic 
data for 2003. Information about input-output coefficients of agricultural production, resource 
quality and quantity, input-output prices were collected via farm and household surveys 
conducted in Khorezm in 2003 and 2004 respectively. The background information on the 
empirical environment of the agricultural sector of Khorezm was collected from the official 
statistical reports. 
The KhoRASM model is especially interesting because it raises a discussion about calibration 
techniques for mathematical programming models. The calibration of the KhoRASM model 
needed an innovative approach since the traditional calibration approaches require large set of 
additional information, which was unavailable, incomplete or unreliable. While most other 
agricultural sector models have used the standard calibration approach of positive 
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mathematical programming, an alternative approach was developed and applied for 
calibrating the KhoRASM model under assumption that the micro-economic information 
included into the model is incomplete. To ensure that the activity values of the base-run 
solution of the model fits the observed values of modelled activities and to ensure that the 
model simulations include the characteristics of regional demand and supply, the model 
parameters both for demand and supply sides were adjusted separately. The supply module 
was calibrated via simultaneous adjustments in technology coefficients and the shadow values 
of constraints. To ensure that the observed levels of prices, income and demanded quantities 
represent the point of optimum utility for consumers, the demand module parameters were 
adjusted using an approach advocated by Frohberg and Winter (2001). The model calibration 
underlined the model’s ability to simulate the impact of different policies and its use as a 
supportive tool for decision-making on future agricultural policy planning for Khorezm. 
Following the calibration of the model, different simulations of agricultural policies became 
possible as to measure their impacts on regional supply and demand. Results obtained after 
implementing an exogenous shock in the model are compared with the observed situation in 
2003 and discussed. The model is programmed using the GAMS modelling language; it was 
then calibrated and solved as a non-linear optimization, using the numerical solver 
CONOPT3. 
6.4 Results 
Two types of results are covered in this study. The first results are related to the developed 
calibration approach for the supply module, whereas the second group of results is related to 
the simulation of policy scenarios. 
The study shows that, as a starting point for policy simulations, the chosen calibration 
approach allows the modeller to calibrate the model using the basic amount of data included 
into the original specification of the model. The advantage of this calibration approach is that 
it avoids overspecialization, retains the model’s flexibility, and calibrates exactly without 
changing the specification of the original objective function of the model. Moreover, the 
presented calibration approach allowed calibrating the supply module of KhoRASM while 
using the original dataset of the model and while incorporating more properties of information 
on the agricultural technologies obtained via the farm and household surveys.  
The results of the policy simulations in the study depend on assumptions of the model. These 
assumptions were mandatory in order to reduce the complexity of the situation and to be able 
to represent in a relatively sophisticated model which is not only theoretically sound but is 
also based on primary and secondary data. Therefore, the simulation results should be treated 
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with caution. Nevertheless, it is believed that these results are reliable and can contribute to 
the discussion on how the simulated policy can affect the regional income, production pattern 
and factor use in the agricultural sector. 
The improvement of water efficiency in districts with less water availability increases total 
land use, and water use in these districts does not decrease dramatically. Despite relatively 
more water availability after improving water efficiency, land remains the restraining factor in 
water abundant districts. The improvement in water efficiency will increase the area under the 
crops with the highest gross margins in water scarce districts. However, this does not affect 
the area under cotton and its production level is still determined by the state procurement 
quota. 
The introduction of water prices shows that under the given assumptions the water pricing 
will decrease the total production of rice, the most water intensive crop in the region, and shift 
the cropping pattern towards fodder. Despite the fact, that introduction of water charging as a 
single policy decreases regional income, the model is comparative static and the negative 
income effects of water pricing may well turn positive if long-term effects would be taken 
into account, such as investments into water efficiency and positive environment effects. 
Furthermore, the income loss caused by the introduction of water prices may be compensated 
by the expansion of the livestock sector. Hence, the second hypothesis is accepted that the 
introduction of water prices will shift the regional cropping pattern towards the less water 
demanding production pattern. 
As such, the model shows that in the base situation, the reduction of state procurement of 
cotton for private farms may have a higher positive impact on regional income than its 
reduction in shirkats. However, as the model simulation shows, the abolishment of the cotton 
procurement system under an input market liberalization scenario might decrease the profits 
of private farms, while increasing profits for shirkats. Unlike private farms, in case of an 
increase in factor prices, the rural household could offset the losses of profits from cropping 
activities from shifting towards livestock keeping activities. In general, the region benefits 
from market liberalization since the losses by private farms and rural households are 
overcompensated by profit increase in shirkats. Furthermore, despite the removal of input 
subsidies after the market liberalization, the cotton production in some districts reduces, but 
does not become zero. Thus, the results of this policy experiment reject the third hypothesis of 
this study which says that market liberalization will lead to an increase in the regional 
production of cotton. 
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As such, the market liberalization shows the better conditions for rice production and the 
livestock sector. The new cropping pattern leads to higher water consumption in water 
abundant districts under the same cultivated area. In contrast, shirkats and private farms in the 
districts with the water scarcity reduce total cultivated area in favor of rice production. In 
general, this reform increases the regional income, but it may reduce labor employment in 
agriculture due to significant reduction of cultivated area under cotton, which is one of the 
most labor intensive crops in Khorezm. This indicates that currently, the state procurement 
system which also implies subsidies for cotton production in shirkats and private farms may 
have a positive impact also on the income of rural households such as it allows employment 
in rural areas to be maintained. 
The completion of the farm restructuring process will lead to increased regional income and 
allow achieving higher regional income using less land and water. Thus, the first hypothesis is 
accepted that while no land market is yet functioning, inter-farm shift of land is one 
possibility to increase the efficiency of land and water use in the region. However, the 
completion of the farm restructuring process might also decrease the labor employment in the 
agricultural sector, because in Khorezm private farms mostly rely on seasonal workers and 
use labor less intensively than shirkats. 
An improvement in livestock feeding regimes may shift production activities towards fodder 
and lead to a slight increase in cultivated area in water scarce districts. The improvement in 
livestock productivity shows the potential to maintain and positively influence household 
income and decrease the total water use in the agricultural sector. This result accepts the forth 
hypothesis of the study according to which the livestock sector may act as a tool for 
supporting the incomes of rural households when the input market is liberalized and water 
pricing is introduced. Hence, further development of the livestock sector in Khorezm can be a 
reasonable endeavor for the government and research organizations. 
In general, among the simulated policies, the ones related to improved water efficiency, 
improvement of the livestock sector and liberalizing cotton and input markets have the highest 
positive effect for the income of agricultural producers and the overall sector. Most 
interestingly, the effects of policies vary between districts with respect to their access to the 
river. The districts with direct access to the river, i.e. with abundant water, will benefit the 
most from the market liberalization and farm restructuring reforms, while the districts with no 
direct access to the river, i.e. with water scarcity, will have higher, positive effect in the case 
of improving water efficiency and increasing productivity in the livestock sector. 
Furthermore, if water efficiency is improved, a reduction of the state procurement for cotton 
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production for shirkats may bring a higher increase in agricultural income, than its reduction 
for private farms. For any exogenous change set by the policy experiments, however, cotton 
production remains unattractive for agricultural producers which are more in favor of rice 
cultivation. Thus, cotton and rice production in regional agriculture is very sensitive to a 
reduction in cotton production targets. 
In the cumulative scenario, the area under cotton and rice cultivation is decreased in favor of 
less water intensive crops, e.g. fodder, and livestock production. Furthermore, the cumulative 
scenario shows that it is possible to increase household income levels if water prices are 
introduced and the input prices are increased, meaning that the effects from increasing water 
efficiency, liberalizing cotton market and improving livestock keeping appear to dominate 
over the effects of introducing the water pricing and liberalizing the input markets. 
Furthermore, scenarios related to the improvement of factor productivity, such as 
improvement of water efficiency and the livestock sector, have the highest increase in 
regional welfare, as measured by consumer and producer surpluses. In contrast, the scenarios 
related to the increase in factor prices, such as the introduction of water prices and input 
market liberation, may decrease the regional welfare comparing to the level observed in the 
base case scenario. 
6.5 Policy Implications 
This section addresses decision-makers in government and non-government organizations at 
regional and national levels. From these simulated results as well as discussion of the main 
characteristics of the regional agriculture, we can derive several policy recommendations.  
Diversity in water prices. The introduction of water prices has the greatest negative impact on 
the incomes of agricultural producers. Thus, several implications should be considered in this 
respect. First, the water pricing mechanism should be promoted only gradually over a period 
of time to allow water users to adjust to higher production costs. Secondly, the water pricing 
system might have values which differentiate across irrigation months. Therefore, in the 
periods when the water is in scarcity and the intensity of water use is the highest, the 
agricultural producers should be charged the highest water price. Furthermore, the water 
prices should vary between crops. In setting an appropriate price for water, care must be taken 
to ensure that the districts located furthest from the river are not prevented from meeting their 
irrigation water needs. Next, water policies should be set such as to protect the poor, i.e. a 
‘free’ allowance of irrigation water to rural households, with payments only for cash crops 
such as rice. Finally, introduction of water pricing needs to be combined with other measures 
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in order to solve the qualitative and quantitative water resource management problems in the 
region. The improved management of the irrigation and drainage system via investing the 
collected payments for water use can provide a more responsive physical environment for 
adopting new production technologies, new crop varieties within the opportunities for double 
cropping in Khorezm. Furthermore, effective water management practices tend to increase the 
effectiveness of fertilizer application and maintain more sustainable systems. 
Development of processing sector and input markets. The simultaneous increase in the price 
for raw cotton to the level of its ‘pseudo’ border price (by 28%) and input market 
liberalization does not increase the cultivated area of cotton. This can indicate that cotton 
producers may still require a set of subsidies in case the government decides to maintain 
cotton production and increase regional cotton processing. Furthermore, it is clear that under 
market liberalization, future growth in cotton production will still depend on regional exports. 
There is much scope for improvement by the development of the cotton processing industry 
as recently was underlined (Rudenko 2008). The development of such a system could also 
rely on capital investments by the private sector which would demand a reduction of the state 
monopoly on cotton processing and an increase in private access to credit and information. 
However, the producers in Khorezm can be unable to adjust properly to the liberalization and 
to gains from these programmes if the market channels are limited.  
Among the cropping activities, the results of all scenario shows that when, the cotton market 
is liberalized under increased factor prices, vegetable production becomes more attractive for 
agricultural producers. Thus, the regional policy makers should also pay more attention to 
revitalize the vegetable and its processing sectors in Khorezm. During the Soviet era, 
Uzbekistan was a supplier of fruit and vegetables to other Soviet republics. These processing 
capacities have been collapsed following independence and the region has lost its comparative 
advantage for this market segment. A promotion of on-farm processing technologies should 
receive more attention, especially in locations next to the rural and urban markets. Greater 
attention should also be given to developing the non-farm economy and improvement of 
processing the agricultural products into higher-valued agricultural commodities. But with the 
regeneration of processing facilities this sector could contribute immense to the regional 
welfare. 
Next, the shadow values of fertilizer and diesel in cases of improved water efficiency and 
after completion of farm restructuring showed the potential of investments into establishing 
distribution centers where such inputs can be accessed by agricultural producers without 
restraints at higher prices. 
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Development of farm support centers. The completion of the farm restructuring will challenge 
the development of new institutional arrangements between the state and private farms which 
would promote the production development on private farms. Furthermore, at present the 
former agricultural practices still dominate the mind-set of agricultural specialists, and the 
output of research on many cultivation practices such as fertilization and the general use of 
chemicals for different crops is needed to be delivered to newly established private farms via 
systematic brochures on crop fertilization techniques and the development of information 
systems for nutrient management at the field and farm level. Also there will be a need to 
establish services indispensable for private farming such as laboratories, research stations, 
food safety controls which presently are lacking. This, alongside improved irrigation 
scheduling and better pesticide techniques might improve factor productivity.  
Furthermore, when input markets are liberalized, the private sector can fail to adjust to new 
factor prices. Similarly, when input subsidies are removed, rational producers may be forced 
to apply less inputs which in turn could lead to a decline in output. Consequently, the 
reduction of transaction costs and risks that inhibit presently the private sector should be 
eased, e.g. via improving infrastructure and communications, and relaxing the present 
regulations that partly paralyze activities of a private sector. The access to finance, 
particularly short-term seasonal credits, can help mastering obstacles caused by the increase in 
factor prices. 
Worldwide, agricultural extension and farmer education programs have been used as policy 
instruments for improving the productivity of agriculture while protecting the environment. 
However, care should be taken as to avoid a poor performance of extension and informal 
education systems which, worldwide were caused by bureaucratic inefficiency, deficient 
program design, and some generic weaknesses inherent in publicly-operated, staff-intensive, 
information delivery systems. The present farm privatization process will certainly profit from 
the establishment of extension approaches focusing on strengthening the demand for services 
and on a larger role for the private sector, non-governmental organizations, producer 
organizations, and a more inclusive approach regarding women, indigenous peoples, and the 
poor. A series of innovative approaches to financing extension were developed and promoted 
and could form a suitable starting point. Furthermore, the density of roads in Khorezm could 
support the access of private farms to the market when their share in total agricultural 
production increases. However, these policies should be considered by the government 
without leaving rural household producers isolated, meaning that the latter should be included 
into these programs. 
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Development of improved production technologies. The results of liberalization policies such 
as abolishment of state procurement for cotton, input market liberalization and 
accomplishment of the farm restructuring process show that it is possible to achieve higher 
regional income with less land and water use. However, the improvement of land productivity 
remains the key issue to consider for policy makers in Khorezm where most of the increase in 
output should be driven by technological change including the improvement in irrigation 
practices. For instance, after input prices increase during input market liberalization, the 
problem of possible crop yield declines can be offset and overcome via programmes that aim 
at increasing the productivity of these inputs such as high-yielding crop varieties, fertilizers, 
and plant protection. The input application schemes such as for fertilizers, water and 
machinery in Khorezm is outdated and, therefore, the development of proper input application 
schemes and their distribution among agricultural producers is vital, especially in the location 
where the factor values are the highest. The development of improved production 
technologies, such as soil conservation agriculture, low till or no till technologies for cotton 
and wheat will reduce production costs while maintaining present yield levels (Tursunov 
2008). 
Improvement of livestock productivity. Given the present low productivity of the livestock 
sector in the Khorezm region, even a slight improvement in feeding technologies and 
veterinary services will very likely have a high impact on regional welfare. Irrespective of the 
scenarios analyzed such as improving the productivity of livestock, increasing yields of 
fodder crops, increasing prices of production factors, introducing water charges for rice 
production in rural households, the regional livestock sector showed its enormous potential to 
increase further. The improvement of livestock rearing should receive particular attention in 
districts with regular water scarcity. 
Furthermore, since most rural households keep livestock in their backyards, an 
implementation of programs for improving livestock productivity will generally imply an 
increase in income for the majority of the rural population and can be used by rural 
households as a shield against income decreases when factor markets are liberalized or water 
prices are introduced. Apart from maintaining household income in case of liberalization of 
the input market, improvements in livestock productivity may have positive impacts on 
regional environmental indicators without requiring high investments costs as compared to the 
high investments needed to improve the irrigation and drainage system. Hence, the livestock 
sector development in Khorezm should receive more attention by the administrative and 
research institutions, e.g. improved disease management. The latter in particular should focus 
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on the adequate production of fodder crops and grain byproducts, since at present access to 
sufficient and high quality feed is short in supply. Even so, it needs to be considered that the 
livestock sector highly depends on the cultivated fodder crops and the grain byproducts, and 
its access to cheap forage such as haylands and pastures is limited in Khorezm. 
In case of further development of the livestock sector, the regional producers might not be 
able to supply enough forage. Hence, the share of imported forage in total regional fodder use 
will rise making the regional livestock sector highly sensitive to the fodder supplies from 
outside of the region and subject to variation in transportation conditions. The fodder prices 
are introduced into the model as exogenous and, therefore, changes due to the changes in 
supply and demand are not considered in this study. Consequently, to avoid significant 
increases in forage prices that would reduce the attractiveness of the livestock sector, 
emphasis should be given to the promotion of new varieties of fodder crops, intercropping 
systems and the production of crops with a high feed value such as alfalfa, or annual crops 
such as clover and the like. Also the present inadequate feeding practices bear much room for 
improvement of the service provision by veterinarians and zootechnicians. Next, the 
improvement of the livestock sector can be supported by the investment into the processing 
industry of, in particular, dairy and meat products. 
Employment opportunities for rural population. The results of the model simulations indicate 
that land and water use can be improved via a set of policy reform which joins both 
liberalization and tax reforms. Nevertheless, since labor is not a significant limiting factor of 
agricultural production in Khorezm, it may be possible that such policies will discharge labor 
from private farms. Although the model specification does not show this, a decrease in 
employment opportunities may lead to a decrease in rural household incomes. Hence, when 
concentrating on liberalization programs it should be taken into consideration that the increase 
of rural unemployment will limit the positive impact on incomes of rural households unless 
additional programmes would join such liberalization efforts. The government could e.g. 
consider a set of subsidies for rural households and develop programmes to increase the 
opportunities of employment in non-agricultural sectors, encourage diversification of rural 
incomes, improve the livestock productivity, and expand the processing sectors. 
Although it is argued that both land, which is a significant limiting factor for the agricultural 
production, and labor productivity must rise to reduce poverty, the land productivity must rise 
faster in case of Khorezm. Hence, the consequences for future interventions is that, instead of 
focusing on increasing labor productivity in the regional agriculture, more attention should be 
given to methods of increasing crop yields and productivity of land and livestock sector to 
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offset the pressure on land by e.g. research and extension services, public market information, 
investing in communication infrastructure, implementing market regulations. 
The listed activities of improving the regional productivity might consider the fact that the 
districts with abundant water will benefit the most from the market liberalization and farm 
restructuring reforms, while the water scarce districts can expect higher positive effects under 
improved water efficiency and increased productivity of the livestock sector. This therefore 
does not call for a blue print approach in development but a more targeted approach. 
Consequently, support programs and policies would be ill-advised if they ignore the locations 
of agricultural producers to the river. 
6.6 Limitations 
The main limitation of this study was the availability of data in Khorezm during the period if 
field work. For instance, the demand module calibration uses information obtained from 
international sources. As the model is limited by available data, certain restrictions on the 
model specification and applicability of the results are inevitable. 
First, the model is static and does not incorporate information on regional agriculture over 
several periods. Such a model, therefore, can only be interpreted based on the base year 
conditions and may be inconsistent for observations in other periods. Secondly, the model 
does not allow for uncertainty and imperfect information in the markets. The spatial 
disaggregation presented in the model does not incorporate market imperfections which 
normally occur in the agricultural sector, such as farm-to-market transportation costs and 
imperfect flows of market information. Moreover, the model does not include marketing, 
processing, transportation, exporting, importing and home consumption activities. Next, in the 
simulations the commodity prices at the district level change within a range defined by the 
commodity prices outside of the region and the transportation costs. This, the model 
specification limits the agricultural producers in gaining the higher commodity prices when 
the factor prices increase. Since the model specification allows for import and export to be 
infinitely small or large, the agricultural producers eventually expand or reduce area under 
certain crops at once. Thus, it might be argued that minimum and maximum levels for export 
and import activities should be incorporated. Furthermore, the environmental issues such as 
soil salinity and water logging are also essential in Khorezm, but are not included in the 
analysis. Since no labor flow to other sectors is included, the model treats any labor discharge 
by the agricultural sector as an increase in leisure consumption in rural households. 
Furthermore, the national price of commodities is assumed to be exogenous to the regional 
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production, i.e. the commodity price in Uzbekistan is not affected by changes of production 
pattern and commodity prices in Khorezm. Although this in general is correct, in the case of 
regional rice production, during 1992-2003 Khorezm had about 32% of total rice production 
in Uzbekistan and this would conflict the assumption of exogenous price formulation outside 
of the region. 
Further limitations of the study are related to the procedure used for calibrating the supply 
module. Since the original model and calibration process are static, information is used on 
production activity levels for only one reference year, the model can be applied only under the 
base year conditions and can be inconsistent for observations in other periods. Moreover, the 
calibration outcome is very sensitive to the choice of the support points for modified 
parameters. During the calibration, the technology coefficients are adjusted arbitrary, meaning 
that there are an infinite number of values for each modified technology coefficient which 
might be selected within the calibration process. Finally, the calibration approach applied for 
the supply module is ad hoc. It must be noted here, that the outcomes of the simulations are 
likely to be different if the model was calibrated with information obtained for later periods. 
Nevertheless, none of these limitations are believed to fundamentally decrease applicability of 
the KhoRASM model as a tool to investigate in a comprehensive manner the impacts of 
different agricultural policies in Khorezm. 
6.7 Further Research 
The study successfully provided a quantitative model for analyzing the agricultural sector of 
the Khorezm region. The model results were useful in replicating the performance of the 
agricultural sector of Khorezm in the base year of 2003 and in simulating selected policies. 
The model design has considered plentiful flexibility for its future development. Further 
research could address agro-ecological questions such as the development of alternative land 
uses on the marginal lands in the region such as tree plantations, livestock rearing, 
improvement of soil characteristics, adoption of conservation agricultural technologies; and 
production economics such as introduction of multi-period dimension for analysis of 
improvement of livestock sector, integration of tree components into the model. Due to the 
time limitations and data availability, the model is static. As such, the model can be developed 
into a dynamic agricultural sector model by establishing some extra predicting and adjusting 
parts to reflect the dynamic processes in agricultural development of Khorezm, such as 
dynamic definitions of crop and animal production systems and taking into account 
modifications in soil quality during the production cycles. This may require a development of 
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agro-ecological and socio-economic analytical framework with continuous production 
functions incorporating factor substitution on different soil attributes. 
Next, the complete model can be expected to introduce the inter-farm and inter-district trades 
of factors such as fertilizers, diesel, and machinery. Land transfers, such as sub-renting, 
between competing agricultural producers in a district, could more realistically explain the 
existing unofficial land markets in the Khorezm region. To gain further insight into overall 
agricultural development, the linkages between the agricultural sector and other sectors such 
as food processing and input markets can be introduced into a more comprehensive version of 
the model. The model’s aggregation shortcomings can be solved by introducing more types of 
farms according to size, more commodities according to season and quality, and 
disaggregating the district subaggregates. The disaggregated version of the model can give 
more farm, product and district specific results of the policy simulations. Considering the ad 
hoc limitation of the presented calibration approach of the supply module, its applicability can 
be tested for calibrating other nonlinear programming models. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Brief Excursion into Evolving Farm Structure in Khorezm (1991 - 2004) 
Since the dominant form of agricultural production in Uzbekistan during the first years of 
independence existed in large-scale collective and state farms, one of the crucial issues in 
reforming the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan has been farm restructuring (Guadagni et al. 
2005). In an effort to achieve this, state owned and collectively operated properties have been 
transferred into private hands (Khan 2005). In the first stage of the farm restructuring process, 
the transformation of sovkhozs into kolkhozs was undertaken via Uzbekistan’s very first 
legislative act in regards to farm restructuring (Sirajiddinov 2004). This had some fiscal 
implications: Discrepancies between central production targets and actually realizable farm 
output in the late 1980’s led to continuing substantial losses at the level of the sovkhozs 
(Wegren 1989, Aminova 1993), so that reducing the governments financial responsibility for 
on-farm sovkhoz operations, provided the state budget with some expenditure relief (Bloch 
2002, Guadagni et al. 2005). 
The transformation of sovkhozs into kolkhozs was accompanied by the liberalization of 
commodity markets such as those for fruits, vegetables and livestock products, for which state 
procurement quotas had existed prior to this reform (Kyle and Chabot 1997, Müller 2006). 
State procurement tasks remained only for cotton and grains (Guadagni et al. 2005). However, 
the reform was not accompanied by much change in the actual management of kolkhozs in 
post-independence Uzbekistan, as compared to their management during the Soviet Rule 
(Wegren 1989, Lerman et al. 2002). First, the agricultural production in kolkhozs - being the 
main components in the state procurement system - was still regulated by the Ministry of 
Agriculture (Salimov et al. 2004). Secondly, the basic concepts of the Soviet management of 
agricultural labor persisted; e.g. the policy of lifetime employment of workers at equal wages, 
lack of land ownership and production assets (Lerman et al. 2002). 
The second stage of farm restructuring started in 1998 with the adoption of laws on 
agricultural cooperatives (shirkats) and private farms (Khan 2005). The adoption of these 
laws made the land reform and farm restructuring processes more palpable. First, the majority 
of kolkhozs in Uzbekistan were reorganized into shirkats (Bloch 2002, Spoor 2004). The 
process of restructuring sovkhozs and kolkhozs into shirkats implied also a change in the 
concept of labor management (Bloch and Kutuzov 2001). In order to increase individual 
responsibility for the products, the production units of kolkhozs, i.e. brigades, were entirely 
substituted by family contracting units (pudrat); making them the backbone of the shirkats’ 
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production. Under this form of labor management the shirkat acts as both a customer and 
supplier, providing the land and all necessary physical inputs and services to employed 
peasants, who perform as contractors (pudrats) who, in turn, supply labor service and deliver 
the total product output to the shirkats. Nevertheless, the reorganization of kolkhozs into 
shirkats still did not bring about significant changes in agricultural management as it did not 
involve any significant internal restructuring (Salimov et al. 2004, Khan 2005). Even though 
it was broadcast by the government as a decollectivization process, the reorganization of 
kolkhozs into shirkats did not result in a different system from that of the collective farms. In 
the ‘stay as is’ approach of farm restructuring implemented by the government, collective 
farms underwent external restructuring by re-registering and distributing non-land asset shares 
to their members. But these were in return deposited back to the reorganized collective farm 
under its new name: agricultural cooperative (Lerman et al. 2002). However, the farm 
restructuring undertaken during the period of 1998 to 2002 can be considered as the first 
attempt towards extensive downsizing of agricultural production from large-scale agricultural 
cooperatives into private farms (Bloch 2002, Khan 2005). 
Prior to the introduction of new farm legislations in 1998, private farming in Uzbekistan was 
based on the system of the lessor-lessee relationships, which resembled the system of private 
farming in the Soviet Union of the 1980s (Wegren 1989, Salimov et al. 2004, Khan 2005). 
According to these leasing arrangements, kolkhozs and sovkhozs leased abandoned and 
unused land to teams, cooperatives within farms, individual families, kolkhoz members or 
sovkhoz workers for long-term periods of up to 50 years (Wegren 1989). In addition, output 
destination was prescribed by contract between lessor (sovkhoz or kolkhoz) and lessee, 
according to which the harvest was sold to the lessor or on his behalf to procurement 
agencies. The lessee, i.e. the private farm, only held decision power over output that exceeded 
the contractual amounts. The next feature of private farming in the Soviet Union was that 
private farms depended entirely on the availability of inputs from its lessor of land (Wegren 
1989). The introduction of the law on private farms in 1998 has changed this interpretation of 
private farming in Uzbekistan. According to the 1998 legislation, private farms were to be 
entirely independent from kolkhozs and shirkats; both in terms of input and output allocation 
Bloch and Kutuzov 2001, Bloch 2002, Khan2005). Nevertheless, the old concepts of private 
farming were once again maintained despite the reform efforts of the second stage of farm 
restructuring. The main reasons for this seem to have been firstly, that private farms were still 
established via partial allocation of low-yield and low quality lands, operated by shirkats at a 
net loss (Khan 2005). And secondly, private farms were still being required to fulfill certain 
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state procurement quotas (Salimov et al. 2004). By the end of the second stage of farm 
restructuring in 2002, the combination of production activities of large-scale shirkats, middle-
scale private farms and small-scale rural households had led to a “three-farm” system in 
Uzbekistan, in which shirkats, however, dominated over private farms in terms of factor 
endowment and total production. With implementation of this third stage of farm 
restructuring, the transition to private farm production was meant to be completed by the end 
of 2006 (Salimov et al. 2004). This process of farm restructuring, by totally dismantling entire 
shirkats into private farms, can be considered as the process of decollectivization (Swinnen 
and Mathijs 1997) and it did not lead to the emergence of large-scale private enterprises. 
In general, the farm restructuring process can be described as a process of transferring the 
property rights for agricultural output from state ownership to collective and finally to private 
ownership (Lerman et al. 2002). In contrast to other countries of the former Soviet Union, the 
main objective of land reform in Uzbekistan was not a privatization of land per se, but rather a 
change of land ownership through a restructuring of state and collective farms and an 
allocation of agricultural land to individuals for private farming via land leasing (Khan 2005). 
Consequently, farm restructuring in Uzbekistan represents a form of land reform according to 
which only user and income rights are privatized, while long-term land leasing arrangements 
are merely transferred from one type of agricultural producer to another21. Restitution of 
collective land and non-land assets to former owners, or their distribution to farm workers and 
previous contributors to the former sovkhozs and kolkhozs, as practiced in many countries of 
East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (Swinnen and Mathijs 1997), did not occur 
in Uzbekistan. The assets of fully dismantled shirkats were either transferred in their entirety 
to the successive type of agricultural producer, i.e. private farms, via local auctions, or 
transferred by decree to newly established machinery and tractor parks and water user 
associations. Moreover, input markets do not seem to have emerged (Block and Kutuzov 
2001), and inputs are still supplied and distributed by the same channels that provided inputs 
to the collective farms and shirkats. Similarly, during the process of fragmentation of shirkats 
into private farms, the state procurement quotas and subsidies have likewise been transferred 
from shirkats to private farms (Spoor 1999, Salimov et al. 2004). Issues regarding the features 
of agricultural producers, the state procurement system, as well as a system of subsidization 
and taxation of the agricultural sector are discussed in detail in sections 2.4 and 2.6. 
                                                 
21 Agricultural land is still considered state property, meaning it is limited to nontransferable usufruct rights such 
as statutory prohibition of land sales, mortgaging, exchanging, and sub-renting between individuals and 
enterprises. The only exception is small household plots granted to families according to lifetime inheritable land 
rights. 
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Appendix 2: Algebraic Description of the Model and Calibration Procedures 
Table A1: The indices of the model 
Code Description Items included 
x Production activities such as land 
allocation under crop growing and 
number of livestock and poultry 
Crop growing: cotton; winter wheat; 
rice; potato; fruits and melons; 
vegetables; maize; fodder crops. 
Animal rearing: cows; bulls; poultry. 
i,j,k,l Commodities Food commodities: wheat and other 
food grains; rice; potato; fruits and 
melons; vegetables; milk and milk 
products; eggs; meat and meat 
products; other food commodities. 
Non-food manufactured commodities. 
Leisure. 
r,r1 Districts aggregates Khazarasp – Bagat; 
Khanka – Urgench; 
Yangibazar – Gurlen; 
Khiva – Yangiarik; 
Kushkupir – Shavat. 
z Production inputs and resources Land; water; nitrogen fertilizer; diesel; 
grain harvester combines; transporting 
vehicles, forage. 
f,f1 Agricultural producer and consumer 
groups 
Agricultural producers: shirkats; 
private farms; rural households. 
Consumers: rural households; urban 
households. 
t Support space in maximum entropy 
calibration models 
Points: minimum; maximum. 
 
 
Table A2: The variables of the model 
Code  Indices Description 
Welf    Regional welfare 
MoneyM   Money metric indirect utility function 
NTSurp   Definition of net trade surplus of producers 
PrCost    Definition of production costs 
Xlevl  r,f,x  Production activity levels 
Xflows  r,i  Export flows of commodities (not allowed for leisure) 
Mflows r,i  Import flows of commodities (not allowed for leisure) 
LabrF  r,r1,f,f1 Inter-district and inter-farm labor flow between producers 
Incm  r,f  Total income (consumption expenditure) of consumers 
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AgrIncm r,f  Agricultural profit in rural households including leisure time 
Wage  r  Agricultural wages 
Demand r,f,i  Consumption level 
Price  r,i  Endogenous commodity prices 
λ  r,f,z  Shadow price of input constraints 
ν  r,f  Shadow price of labor constraints 
μ  r,f,x  Shadow price of state procurement constraint for cotton 
π  r,i  Shadow price of commodity market balance 
ε   r,f,i,j   Calibrated price elasticity of demand 
ε y  r,f,i,  Calibrated income elasticity of demand 
εF  r,f,i,j  Final price elasticity of demand 
εyF  r,f,i  Final income elasticity of demand 
g  r,f  Component of NQ-QES 
S  r,f,i,j  Slutsky substitution matrix 
L  r,f,i,j  A lower triangular matrix where LT is its transpose 
ε   t,r,f,i,j  Probabilities of calibrated price elasticity of demand 
yε   t,r,f,i  Probabilities of calibrated income elasticity of demand 
einpt   r,f,z,x  Modified technology coefficients 
elabr   r,f, x  Modified labor use coefficients 
evarc   r,f,x  Modified production costs 
eλ   r,f,z  Modified shadow prices of input constraints 
eν   r,f  Modified shadow prices of labor constraints 
eμ   r,f,x  Modified shadow prices of state procurement constraints 
inpt   t,r,f,z,x  Probabilities of technology coefficients 
labr   t,r,f,x  Probabilities of labor use coefficients 
λ   t,r,f,z  Probabilities of shadow prices of input constraints 
ν   t,r,f  Probabilities of shadow prices of labor constraints 
μ   t,r,f,x  Probabilities of shadow prices of state procurement constraints 
π   t,r,i  Probabilities of shadow prices of market balance 
eπ   r,i  Modified shadow prices of commodity market balance 
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Table A3: The parameters of the model 
Code  Indices Description 
Xlevl0  r,f,x  Observed levels of production activities 
LabrF0 r,r1,f,f1 Observed levels of labor flows between producers and districts 
Flows0  r,r1,i  Observed levels of commodity flows between districts 
XFlows0 r,i  Observed levels of commodity export 
MFlows0 r,i  Observed levels of commodity import 
wage0  r  Observed level of agricultural wages 
pex  i  Border (outside) price of commodity 
dist  r,r1  Distance between districts 
edist  r  Distance from districts to the border (outside market point) 
trc  r,i  Transportation costs of commodity 
lc  r  Labor flow costs 
yild  r,f,i,x  Production yield per activity 
varc  r,f,x  Production costs 
labr  r,f,x  Labor use for production activity 
inpt  r,f,z,x  Input application for production activity 
feed  r,f,i,x  Livestock and poultry feeding regimes 
labrav  r,f,x  Labor availability for agricultural work and leisure 
inptav  r,f,z  Input endowments 
sord  r,f,x  State procurement constraint for cotton 
Incm0  r,f  Observed level of consumers’ income (expenditure)  
nagrIncm0 r,f  Observed level of non-agricultural income in rural households 
Price0  r,i  Observed level of commodity prices 
Demand0 r,f,i  Observed level of consumption in rural and urban households 
g0  r,f  Demand system element at reference point 
a  r,f,i  Independent parameter of NQ-QES 
b  r,f,i  Independent parameter of NQ-QES 
d  r,f,i  Independent parameter of NQ-QES 
B  r,f,i,j  Independent parameter of NQ-QES 
α  r,i  Positive predetermined parameter 
δ  i,j  Kronecker’s delta 
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Table A4: The equations of the model 
Name of equation Equation 
KhoRASM model 
Objective function of the 
KhoRASM model 
max  Welf    = MoneyM + NTSurp PrCost−  
Money metric indirect 
utility function 
ogr, fMoneyM  =  Incmr, fgr f r, f
∑∑  
Net trade surplus of 
producers 
NTSurp   = (XFlows  -MFlows ) pex   r,i r,i i
r i
(XFlows  +MFlows ) edist  trc  r,i r,i r r,i
r i
Flows   dist  trc  r,r1,i r,r1 r,i
r r1 f i
∑∑
−∑∑
−∑∑∑∑
 
Production costs PrCost   = varc  Xlevlr, f,x r, f,x
r f x
Xlevl feed Pricer, f,x r, f,i,x r,i
r f x i
+ LabrF   Wager1,r, f1, f r
r r1 f f1
∑∑∑
+∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑ ∑
 
Production costs respecified 
in Scenario 3 and 6 
PrCost   = varc  Xlevlr, f,x r, f,x
r f x
Xlevl feed Pricer, f,x r, f,i,x r,i
r f i x
+ LabrF   Wager1,r, f1, f r
r r1 f f1
DislF dislp FertF  fertpr, f r, f
r f r f
∑∑∑
+∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑ ∑
+ +∑∑ ∑∑
 
Supply module 
Inout constraints XLevl    inpt   inptavr, f,x r, f,z,x r, f,z
x
≤∑  
Labor constraints labrav + LabrF   r1,r, f1, fr, f r1 f1
XLevl  labr + LabrFr, f,x r, f,x r,r1, f, f1
x r1 f1
≥∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑  
State procurement 
constraints for cotton 
XLevl   sordr, f,x r, f,x≥  
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Commodity balance Xlevl yild + MFlows + Flowsr, f,x r, f,i,x r1,r,ir,if x r1
 Demand + Xlevl feed + XFlows + Flowsr, f,i r, f,x r, f,i,x r,r1,ir,if f x r1
∑∑ ∑
≥∑ ∑∑ ∑
 
Demand module 
Full version of the demand 
function 
2ar, f,iDemand = Incm Price dr, f r,k r, f,kr, f,i Price g kr,i r, f
B Price B Price Pricer, f,i,k k r, f,k,l r,k r,l
k k l1b + αr, f,i r,i2 2α Pricer,k k
k α Pricer,k r,k
k +
B Price Pricer, f,k,l r,k r,
1Price b +r,k r, f,k 2k
⎛ ⎞−∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑∑
−∑ ⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
   
l
k l
α Pricer,k r,k
k
Incm Price d +dr, f r,k r, f,k r, f,ik
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞∑∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞−∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
Condition for positive 
predetermined parameter 
oPrice =1r,k r,k
k
α∑  
Total income (expenditure) 
of consumers 
Incm = Demand Pricer, f r, f,i r,i
i
∑  
First derivatives of the 
shorter version of demand 
function with respect to 
income 
o oDemand 2a Incm br, f,i r, f,i r, f r, f,i= +o o o oIncm Price Price b Price br, f r,i r,k r, f,k r,k r, f,k
k k
∂
∂ ∑ ∑
 
First derivatives of the 
shorter version of demand 
function with respect to 
prices 
o 2 o oa Incm δ Price b +Price bo i r, f i, j r,k r, f,k r,i r, f, jDemandr, f,i k=o 2Pricer, j o oPrice Price br,i r,k r, f,k
k
o o2a d Incm Incmr, f,i r, f, j r, f r, f+ Br, f,i, jo o oPrice Price b Price br,i r,k r, f,k r,k r, f,k
k k
⎛ ⎞− ∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∂ ⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
−
−
∑ ∑
−
oIncm b b b dr, f r, f,i r, f, j i r, f, j
2 oPrice br,k r, f,koPrice b kr,k r, f,k
k
−
∑⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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Links between supply and demand modules 
Total profit of rural 
households 
oIncm =AgrIncm +nagrIncmr, f r, f r, f  
Profits from agricultural 
activities in rural households ( ), , ,AgrIncm = Price Yild varc Xlevlr,i r f i x r, f,x r, f,xr, f i x
Xlevl feed Price  r, f,x r, f,i,x r,i
i x
+ LabrF Wage LabrF dist lcr,r1, f, f1 r, f r,r1, f, f1 r,r1 r
r1 f1 r1 f1
−∑∑
−∑∑
−∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
Observed non-agricultural 
profit in rural households 
( )
,
, , , ,
o o onagrIncm = Demand Pricer, f,i r ir, f i
o oPrice Yild varc Xlevlr i r f i x r, f,x r, f,x
i x
o oXlevl feed Pricer, f,x r, f,i,x r,i
i x
o o oLabrF Wage LabrF dist lcr,r1, f, f1 r r,r1, f, f1 r,r1 r
r1 f1 r1 f1
∑
− −∑∑
+∑∑
− +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
 
 
Table A5: Equations of the supply and demand modules calibration 
Name of Equation Equation 
Calibration of supply module 
Stage 1: Estimation of shadow prices 
The objective function of 
the dual version of the 
supply module for deriving 
the shadow values of 
constraints 
          
min W = inptav λ + labrav νr, f,z r, f,z r, f r, f
r f z r f
osord μ Demand πr, f,x r, f,x r, f,i r,i
r f x r f i
∑∑∑ ∑∑
− −∑∑∑ ∑∑∑
 
First derivative of 
Lagrangian over production 
activities 
( )
     
L     = π yild feed varc        r,i r, f,i,x r, f,i,x r, f,xXLevl ir, f,x
           ν  labr  λ inpt μ 0r, f r, f,x r, f,z r, f,z,x r, f,x
z
∂ − −∑∂
− − + ≤∑
 
First derivative of 
Lagrangian over labor flows  
L     =  dist lc  ν  ν  0r,r1 r r, f r1, f1LabrF  r,r1, f, f1
∂ − + − ≤∂  
First derivative of 
Lagrangian over commodity 
inter-district flows 
  L     =  dist trc  + π  π 0r,r1 r, f,i r,i r1,iFlows  r,r1,i
∂ − − ≤∂  
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First derivative of 
Lagrangian over export 
L     =  pex  edist trc   π 0i r r,i r,iXFlowsr,i
∂ − − ≤∂  
First derivative of 
Lagrangian over import  
L     =  pex edist trc  π 0i r r,i r,iMFlowsr,i
∂ − − + ≤∂  
Stage 2: Adjusting technology coefficients 
The objective function of 
the calibration model of 
supply side 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
maxH = inpt ln inptt,r, f,z,x t,r, f,z,x
t r f z x
λ ln λ labr ln labrt,r, f,x t,r, f,xt,r, f,z t,r, f,z
t r f z t r f x
ν ln ν π ln πt,r, f t,r, f t,r,i t,r,i
t r f t r i
μ ln μt,r, f,x t,r, f,x
t r f x
−∑∑∑∑∑
− −∑∑∑∑ ∑∑∑∑
− −∑∑∑ ∑∑∑
−∑∑∑∑
 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to 
achieve the observed 
production activity levels 
( )
    
e eπ yild feed varc     =   r,i r, f,i,x r, f,i,x r, f,xi
e e e e e           ν  labr λ inpt μr, f r, f,x r, f,z r, f,z,x r, f,x
z
− −∑
+ −∑
 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to 
achieve the observed labor 
flow levels 
e eν  =ν dist lcr1, f1 r, f r,r1 r−  
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to 
achieve the observed 
commodity flow levels 
e e π = π dist trc  r1,i r,i r,r1 r,i−  
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to 
achieve the observed export 
flow levels 
eπ  =  pex  edist trcr,i i r r,i−  
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to 
achieve the observed import 
flow levels 
 +eπ =  pex edist trc  r,i i r r,i  
The complementary 
slackness equalities of input 
constraints 
o e eXlevl  inpt   inptav λ  =0r, f,x r, f,z,x r, f,z r, f,z
x
⎛ ⎞−∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
The complementary 
slackness equalities of labor 
constraint 
olabrb + LabrFr, f r1,r, f1, f
r1r1
o e o eXlevl  labr LabrF  = 0r, f,x r, f,x r,r1, f, f1 r, fx r1r1
ν
⎛ ∑ ∑⎜⎜⎝
⎞− −∑ ∑ ∑ ⎟⎟⎠
 
The original model’s input 
constraint  
o eXlevl  inpt   inptav  r, f,x r, f,z,x r, f,z
x
≤∑  
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The original model’s labor 
constraint 
o labrb + LabrFr1,r, f1, fr, f r1r1
o e oXlevl  labr LabrFr, f,x r, f,x r,r1, f, f1
x r1r1
≥∑ ∑
+∑ ∑ ∑
 
Calibration of demand module  
Stage 1: Calibration of income and price elasticities of demand 
The objective function of 
the calibration model of 
income and price elasticities 
of the demand side 
y y0= ε ln(ε ) ε ln(ε )maxZ t,r, f,i, j t,r, f,i, j t,r, f,i t,r, f,i
t r f i j t r f i
− −∑ ∑∑∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
 
Adding-up budget 
restriction 
o oDemand Pricer, f,i r,iyε =1r, f,i oIncmi r, f
∑  
Homogeneity condition for 
price and income elasticities , , , , ,
y
r f i j r f ij
ε ε=−∑  
Symmetry in substitution 
effect between two products 
, , ,, , ,
,
,
, , , ,
,
oDemandr, f, j
r f j ir f i j oPricer i
o o oDemand Demand Pricer, f,i r, f, j r jy y
r f j r f i o oIncm Demandr f r, f,i
ε ε
ε ε
⎛⎜= ⎜⎜⎝
⎞⎟⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎟⎠
 
Definition of Slutsky matrix 
, , , , , , , ,
, ,
o o oDemand Demand Demandr, f,i r, f,i r, f, jySr f i j r f i j r f io oPrice Incmr j r f
ε ε= +  
Cholesky–decomposition of 
Slutsky matrix to impose a 
negative semidefinite 
condition 
and TS LL= −  
Stage 2: Calibration of functional parameters of NQ-QES 
The objective function of 
the calibration model for 
deriving the functional 
parameters of the demand 
y yFF 2 2F = (ε -ε ) + (ε - ε )minZ r, f,i, j r, f,i, j r, f,i r, f,ir f i j r f i
∑∑∑∑ ∑ ∑∑  
Symmetry restriction of the 
demand parameter 
B =Br, f,i, j r, f, j,i  
Adding-up restriction of the 
demand parameters ,
oB Price =0r, f,i,k r k
k
∑  
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Adding-up restriction of the 
demand parameters 
0, ,ar f k
k
=∑  
Adding-up restriction of the 
demand parameters 
b =1r, f,k
k
∑  
Adding-up restriction of the 
demand parameters 
od Price =0k r,k
k
∑  
Definition of final calibrated 
price elasticities of demand 
     
o 2 o oa Incm δ Price b +Price br, f,i r, f i, j r,k r, f,k r,i r, f, j
k
2
o oPrice Price bF r,i r,k r, f,k=ε kr, f,i, j
o2a d Incmr, f,i r, f, j r, f
o oPrice Price br,i r,k r, f,k
k
oIncmr, f+ BoPrice br,k r, f,k
k
⎛ ⎛ ⎞⎜ − ∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎜ −⎜−⎜⎜ ∑⎜⎝
∑
oIncm b br, f r, f,i r, f, j
r, f,i, j 2
oo PricePrice b r, jr,k r, f,k
k oDemandb d r, f,ir, f,i r, f, j
oPrice br,k r, f,k
k
⎞⎟− ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎟∑⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎟⎟⎟− ⎟∑ ⎟⎠  
Definition of final calibrated 
income elasticities of 
demand 
o o2a Incm b Incmr, f,i r, f r, f,i r, fyFε = +r, f,i o o o oPrice Price b Price b Demandr,i r,k r, f,k r,k r, f,k r, f,i
k k
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∑ ∑⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Shorter version of demand 
requiring that the quantities 
demanded meet their 
observed values 
ar, f,io o 2Demand = Incmr, f,i r, fo oPrice Price br,i r,k r, f,k
k
br, f,i o+ Incm +dr, f r, f,ioPrice br,k r, f,k
k
∑
∑
 
where d is set to zero 
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Appendix 3: Information on Demand System 
Table A6: Observed consumption per capita in households and prices in 2003 
REG RUR URB KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT
WWT kg 177 179 170 104 106 108 105 107
RCE kg 14 13 15 255 249 244 250 245
POT kg 44 45 43 86 88 89 88 89
FRT kg 51 52 49 47 50 50 50 52
VGL kg 94 95 90 96 94 94 95 94
MLK kg 142 138 153 154 150 147 151 148
EGG piece 57 58 55 54 52 51 52 52
MEA kg 24 23 29 1,790 1,743 1,700 1,748 1,709
OTH kg 33 32 38 990 1,010 1,029 1,008 1,025
MFR kg 189 179 224 990 1,010 1,029 1,008 1,025
LSR h 145 188 0 55 54 53 54 53
Commodity Consumption, per capita    1) Commodity prices, 10-3 USD     2)
 
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure; REG – Average in the 
region; RUR – Rural households; URB – Urban households; KSPBGT – Aggregate of Khazarasp 
and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate 
of Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik districts; 
KKRSVT – Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: FAO Statistics Division 2007; OblStat 2004c 
 
Table A7: Observed demand in households and expenditures in 2003 
KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT
WWT 103 t 48.8 42.9 27.3 37.1 39.0 5.5 30.1 4.9 8.8 5.5
RCE 103 t 3.7 3.2 2.1 2.8 2.9 0.5 2.7 0.4 0.8 0.5
POT 103 t 12.2 10.7 6.8 9.3 9.7 1.4 7.5 1.2 2.2 1.4
FRT 103 t 14.2 12.5 7.9 10.8 11.3 1.6 8.8 1.4 2.5 1.6
VGL 103 t 25.8 22.7 14.5 19.6 20.7 2.9 16.0 2.6 4.6 2.9
MLK 103 t 37.7 33.1 21.1 28.6 30.1 4.9 27.2 4.4 7.9 4.9
EGG 106 piece 15.9 14.0 8.9 12.0 12.7 1.8 9.8 1.6 2.9 1.8
MEA 103 t 6.3 5.6 3.5 4.8 5.0 0.9 5.1 0.8 1.5 0.9
OTH 103 t 8.8 7.7 4.9 6.7 7.0 1.2 6.7 1.1 2.0 1.2
MFR 103 t 48.9 43.0 27.4 37.2 39.1 7.2 39.7 6.5 11.5 7.2
LSR 106 h 51.3 45.2 28.7 39.0 41.0 - - - - -
EXP 106 USD 88.0 78.1 50.1 67.4 71.5 12.0 66.8 11.0 19.4 12.2
Rural Households Urban HouseholdsCommodity
 
Note: WWT –Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure; EXP – Total consumption 
expenditure; KSPBGT – Aggregate of Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of 
Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate of Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – 
Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: FAO Statistics Division 2007; OblStat 2004b; Own calculation 
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Table A8: Observed primal values for income and price elasticities 
WWT RCE POT FRT VGL MLK EGG MEA OTH MFT LSR
WWT -0.34 0.18 0.15 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.20 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.70
RCE 0.20 -0.36 0.15 0.10 0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.25 -0.15 0.10 0.05 0.80
POT 0.05 0.15 -0.30 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.05 -0.20 -0.15 -0.15 0.01 0.50
FRT -0.05 0.10 0.10 -0.35 0.25 0.20 -0.10 -0.25 -0.25 0.05 0.05 0.85
VGL -0.30 0.10 0.30 0.20 -0.35 -0.35 0.10 0.10 0.05 -0.30 0.05 0.70
MLK -0.10 -0.15 0.10 0.25 -0.20 -0.35 -0.25 -0.20 0.05 -0.05 0.05 1.00
EGG -0.10 -0.15 0.20 -0.10 0.20 -0.25 -0.54 -0.20 0.05 0.10 -0.10 1.00
MEA -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.25 0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.40 0.05 -0.10 0.01 1.00
OTH 0.10 -0.20 -0.10 -0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 -0.60 0.01 0.01 0.90
MFR -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -1.25 -0.15 1.40
LSR -0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.70 1.00
Cross-Price Elasticity Income 
Elasticity
 
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice, POT – Potato, FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables, MLK – Milk and milk products, EGG – Eggs, MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure 
Source: WATSIM model’s base-run dataset on the rest of the world 
 
 
 
Table A9: Calibrated values of income elasticity of demand 
KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT
WWT 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
RCE 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
POT 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
FRT 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
VGL 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75
MLK 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
EGG 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
MEA 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85
OTH 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.47
MFR 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.21 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
LSR 1.50 1.50 1.49 1.50 1.49 - - - - -
Commodity Rural Households Urban Households
 
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure; KSPBGT – Aggregate of 
Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – 
Aggregate of Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik districts; 
KKRSVT – Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: Demand module calibration results 
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Table A10: Calibrated cross-price elasticity of demand for rural households 
WWT RCE POT FRT VGL MLK EGG MEA OTH MFR LSR
KSPBGT WWT -0.444 0.065 0.096 -0.029 -0.162 -0.250 -0.033 -0.193 0.271 0.132 0.002
RCE 0.344 -0.582 0.105 0.096 0.392 -0.467 -0.233 -0.361 -0.468 0.339 0.224
POT 0.466 0.095 -0.450 0.068 0.169 0.455 0.303 -0.401 -0.511 -0.709 0.030
FRT -0.261 0.156 0.123 -0.523 0.498 0.657 -0.315 -0.439 -0.723 0.151 0.027
VGL -0.337 0.149 0.070 0.116 -0.545 -0.295 0.150 0.448 0.258 -0.664 0.008
MLK -0.234 -0.078 0.079 0.064 -0.130 -0.379 -0.038 -0.180 0.268 -0.187 0.002
EGG -0.213 -0.260 0.371 -0.214 0.430 -0.264 -0.582 -0.344 0.294 0.196 -0.285
MEA -0.098 -0.031 -0.041 -0.023 0.095 -0.088 -0.025 -0.495 0.133 -0.184 0.008
OTH 0.165 -0.048 -0.061 -0.046 0.079 0.204 0.033 0.214 -1.017 0.038 0.015
MFR -0.027 0.000 -0.025 -0.002 -0.051 -0.051 0.000 -0.107 -0.074 -0.901 -0.009
LSR -0.052 0.065 -0.001 0.000 -0.017 -0.042 -0.092 -0.065 -0.060 -0.295 -0.946
KKAURG WWT -0.445 0.063 0.097 -0.029 -0.159 -0.246 -0.031 -0.191 0.270 0.131 0.001
RCE 0.349 -0.581 0.107 0.099 0.394 -0.473 -0.236 -0.363 -0.472 0.340 0.224
POT 0.469 0.093 -0.452 0.069 0.166 0.451 0.301 -0.390 -0.509 -0.711 0.030
FRT -0.261 0.152 0.122 -0.525 0.491 0.643 -0.308 -0.426 -0.715 0.152 0.026
VGL -0.344 0.148 0.071 0.120 -0.545 -0.295 0.149 0.450 0.259 -0.666 0.008
MLK -0.241 -0.079 0.081 0.066 -0.132 -0.383 -0.038 -0.181 0.273 -0.188 0.001
EGG -0.214 -0.262 0.385 -0.223 0.431 -0.264 -0.582 -0.344 0.295 0.196 -0.285
MEA -0.102 -0.032 -0.041 -0.024 0.097 -0.089 -0.025 -0.497 0.137 -0.188 0.008
OTH 0.164 -0.047 -0.061 -0.046 0.077 0.199 0.032 0.211 -1.008 0.038 0.015
MFR -0.027 0.000 -0.025 -0.002 -0.049 -0.049 0.000 -0.102 -0.075 -0.904 -0.008
LSR -0.053 0.065 -0.001 0.000 -0.017 -0.041 -0.092 -0.062 -0.060 -0.295 -0.947
YZRGLN WWT -0.446 0.061 0.097 -0.029 -0.158 -0.244 -0.030 -0.189 0.270 0.131 0.001
RCE 0.352 -0.581 0.110 0.101 0.396 -0.476 -0.238 -0.364 -0.474 0.341 0.224
POT 0.471 0.091 -0.453 0.068 0.163 0.446 0.300 -0.381 -0.506 -0.713 0.030
FRT -0.261 0.151 0.122 -0.525 0.492 0.637 -0.308 -0.421 -0.712 0.152 0.025
VGL -0.350 0.147 0.072 0.121 -0.545 -0.293 0.147 0.451 0.261 -0.667 0.007
MLK -0.248 -0.079 0.084 0.067 -0.132 -0.385 -0.039 -0.181 0.277 -0.189 0.001
EGG -0.216 -0.264 0.398 -0.227 0.431 -0.267 -0.584 -0.345 0.295 0.196 -0.283
MEA -0.106 -0.032 -0.042 -0.024 0.099 -0.090 -0.025 -0.499 0.142 -0.192 0.007
OTH 0.163 -0.045 -0.061 -0.046 0.076 0.195 0.031 0.208 -0.998 0.038 0.007
MFR -0.027 0.000 -0.025 -0.002 -0.048 -0.046 0.000 -0.098 -0.074 -0.907 -0.008
LSR -0.054 0.064 -0.001 0.000 -0.016 -0.039 -0.089 -0.059 -0.083 -0.285 -0.926
KVAYRK WWT -0.445 0.063 0.097 -0.029 -0.160 -0.247 -0.032 -0.191 0.270 0.131 0.001
RCE 0.348 -0.582 0.107 0.099 0.394 -0.472 -0.235 -0.362 -0.472 0.340 0.224
POT 0.469 0.093 -0.452 0.069 0.166 0.451 0.301 -0.392 -0.509 -0.711 0.030
FRT -0.261 0.153 0.122 -0.525 0.492 0.645 -0.309 -0.427 -0.716 0.152 0.026
VGL -0.343 0.148 0.071 0.120 -0.545 -0.295 0.149 0.450 0.259 -0.666 0.008
MLK -0.240 -0.078 0.081 0.066 -0.131 -0.382 -0.038 -0.181 0.272 -0.188 0.001
EGG -0.214 -0.262 0.383 -0.222 0.431 -0.264 -0.582 -0.344 0.295 0.196 -0.285
MEA -0.102 -0.032 -0.041 -0.024 0.097 -0.089 -0.025 -0.497 0.137 -0.187 0.008
OTH 0.164 -0.047 -0.061 -0.046 0.077 0.200 0.032 0.212 -1.009 0.038 0.015
MFR -0.027 0.000 -0.025 -0.002 -0.049 -0.049 0.000 -0.102 -0.075 -0.903 -0.008
LSR -0.053 0.065 -0.001 0.000 -0.017 -0.041 -0.092 -0.062 -0.060 -0.295 -0.947
KKRSVT WWT -0.446 0.061 0.097 -0.030 -0.158 -0.244 -0.031 -0.189 0.270 0.131 0.001
RCE 0.352 -0.581 0.109 0.102 0.395 -0.476 -0.238 -0.364 -0.473 0.341 0.224
POT 0.471 0.092 -0.453 0.069 0.164 0.447 0.301 -0.383 -0.506 -0.714 0.029
FRT -0.261 0.149 0.121 -0.526 0.486 0.633 -0.304 -0.416 -0.706 0.152 0.025
VGL -0.348 0.147 0.072 0.123 -0.546 -0.294 0.149 0.451 0.261 -0.668 0.007
MLK -0.246 -0.079 0.083 0.068 -0.132 -0.385 -0.039 -0.181 0.277 -0.189 0.001
EGG -0.215 -0.262 0.392 -0.227 0.429 -0.265 -0.583 -0.345 0.295 0.196 -0.281
MEA -0.105 -0.032 -0.042 -0.024 0.098 -0.090 -0.025 -0.499 0.141 -0.191 0.007
OTH 0.164 -0.045 -0.061 -0.047 0.076 0.196 0.031 0.209 -0.999 0.038 0.007
MFR -0.027 0.000 -0.025 -0.002 -0.048 -0.047 0.000 -0.098 -0.074 -0.907 -0.008
LSR -0.054 0.065 0.000 0.000 -0.016 -0.039 -0.091 -0.059 -0.083 -0.285 -0.926  
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure; KSPBGT – Aggregate of 
Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – 
Aggregate of Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik 
districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: Demand module calibration results 
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Table A11: Calibrated cross-price elasticity of demand for urban households 
WWT RCE POT FRT VGL MLK EGG MEA OTH MFR
KSPBGT WWT -0.553 0.143 0.096 -0.031 -0.196 -0.274 -0.041 -0.198 0.314 0.151
RCE 0.661 -0.671 0.102 0.087 0.428 -0.433 -0.230 -0.345 -0.456 0.222
POT 0.465 0.107 -0.478 0.080 0.196 0.515 0.302 -0.485 -0.525 -0.686
FRT -0.279 0.164 0.145 -0.553 0.541 0.796 -0.351 -0.528 -0.784 0.146
VGL -0.408 0.188 0.081 0.126 -0.575 -0.350 0.164 0.506 0.277 -0.752
MLK -0.218 -0.072 0.077 0.067 -0.131 -0.420 -0.040 -0.199 0.270 -0.208
EGG -0.258 -0.297 0.371 -0.238 0.474 -0.318 -0.641 -0.392 0.264 0.212
MEA -0.079 -0.027 -0.038 -0.021 0.082 -0.088 -0.023 -0.537 0.142 -0.245
OTH 0.153 -0.045 -0.051 -0.041 0.070 0.196 0.024 0.247 -1.055 0.039
MFR -0.017 -0.002 -0.018 -0.001 -0.040 -0.043 0.000 -0.108 -0.068 -0.907
KKAURG WWT -0.557 0.142 0.097 -0.032 -0.193 -0.268 -0.040 -0.195 0.313 0.151
RCE 0.682 -0.673 0.103 0.089 0.429 -0.440 -0.231 -0.348 -0.463 0.220
POT 0.469 0.104 -0.480 0.081 0.193 0.510 0.300 -0.473 -0.524 -0.689
FRT -0.279 0.160 0.144 -0.555 0.535 0.781 -0.344 -0.514 -0.775 0.147
VGL -0.417 0.187 0.083 0.131 -0.575 -0.350 0.163 0.509 0.278 -0.752
MLK -0.223 -0.074 0.079 0.069 -0.132 -0.424 -0.041 -0.200 0.274 -0.209
EGG -0.259 -0.299 0.385 -0.247 0.476 -0.319 -0.642 -0.391 0.264 0.211
MEA -0.082 -0.028 -0.038 -0.022 0.084 -0.089 -0.023 -0.540 0.147 -0.249
OTH 0.153 -0.043 -0.051 -0.041 0.068 0.191 0.023 0.243 -1.046 0.039
MFR -0.018 -0.002 -0.018 -0.001 -0.039 -0.041 0.000 -0.103 -0.068 -0.910
YZRGLN WWT -0.561 0.140 0.097 -0.031 -0.191 -0.264 -0.039 -0.191 0.313 0.151
RCE 0.702 -0.675 0.105 0.090 0.431 -0.446 -0.233 -0.351 -0.469 0.219
POT 0.471 0.102 -0.481 0.080 0.190 0.507 0.299 -0.461 -0.524 -0.690
FRT -0.278 0.157 0.145 -0.555 0.537 0.775 -0.344 -0.509 -0.774 0.147
VGL -0.425 0.185 0.084 0.132 -0.574 -0.350 0.161 0.511 0.279 -0.750
MLK -0.229 -0.074 0.082 0.070 -0.133 -0.427 -0.041 -0.199 0.277 -0.210
EGG -0.262 -0.301 0.398 -0.253 0.476 -0.320 -0.643 -0.392 0.264 0.211
MEA -0.085 -0.028 -0.039 -0.022 0.085 -0.089 -0.023 -0.542 0.151 -0.254
OTH 0.152 -0.042 -0.051 -0.040 0.066 0.185 0.022 0.239 -1.038 0.039
MFR -0.018 -0.002 -0.018 -0.001 -0.037 -0.039 0.000 -0.099 -0.068 -0.913
KVAYRK WWT -0.556 0.142 0.097 -0.031 -0.193 -0.269 -0.040 -0.195 0.313 0.151
RCE 0.679 -0.673 0.103 0.089 0.429 -0.440 -0.231 -0.348 -0.462 0.220
POT 0.468 0.104 -0.480 0.081 0.193 0.511 0.300 -0.474 -0.524 -0.688
FRT -0.278 0.160 0.144 -0.555 0.535 0.783 -0.344 -0.516 -0.777 0.147
VGL -0.416 0.187 0.083 0.130 -0.575 -0.350 0.163 0.509 0.278 -0.752
MLK -0.223 -0.073 0.079 0.069 -0.132 -0.424 -0.040 -0.199 0.273 -0.209
EGG -0.259 -0.299 0.383 -0.246 0.476 -0.319 -0.642 -0.391 0.264 0.211
MEA -0.082 -0.028 -0.038 -0.022 0.084 -0.089 -0.023 -0.539 0.146 -0.249
OTH 0.153 -0.043 -0.051 -0.041 0.068 0.191 0.023 0.244 -1.047 0.039
MFR -0.017 -0.002 -0.018 -0.001 -0.039 -0.041 0.000 -0.104 -0.068 -0.910
KKRSVT WWT -0.560 0.140 0.097 -0.032 -0.191 -0.264 -0.039 -0.192 0.313 0.151
RCE 0.698 -0.674 0.105 0.091 0.430 -0.445 -0.234 -0.350 -0.468 0.219
POT 0.471 0.102 -0.482 0.081 0.191 0.507 0.300 -0.465 -0.523 -0.691
FRT -0.278 0.156 0.143 -0.556 0.531 0.771 -0.340 -0.503 -0.769 0.147
VGL -0.422 0.186 0.084 0.134 -0.575 -0.351 0.163 0.511 0.278 -0.753
MLK -0.227 -0.074 0.081 0.071 -0.133 -0.428 -0.041 -0.199 0.277 -0.210
EGG -0.260 -0.299 0.391 -0.252 0.475 -0.318 -0.642 -0.391 0.264 0.211
MEA -0.084 -0.028 -0.039 -0.023 0.085 -0.089 -0.023 -0.541 0.150 -0.253
OTH 0.153 -0.043 -0.051 -0.041 0.067 0.187 0.022 0.240 -1.039 0.039
MFR -0.018 -0.002 -0.018 -0.001 -0.038 -0.039 0.000 -0.100 -0.068 -0.912  
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; KSPBGT – Aggregate of Khazarasp and 
Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate of 
Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – 
Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: Demand module calibration results 
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Table A12: Values of calibrated functional parameter α of NQ-QES 
KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT
WWT -8.9E-08 -1.0E-07 -1.6E-07 -1.2E-07 -1.1E-07 -6.0E-07 -1.1E-07 -7.0E-07 -3.8E-07 -6.3E-07
RCE -1.4E-08 -1.5E-08 -2.4E-08 -1.8E-08 -1.7E-08 -1.1E-07 -2.0E-08 -1.2E-07 -7.0E-08 -1.1E-07
POT -2.1E-08 -2.4E-08 -3.8E-08 -2.8E-08 -2.7E-08 -1.5E-07 -2.7E-08 -1.7E-07 -9.4E-08 -1.5E-07
FRT -7.8E-09 -9.1E-09 -1.4E-08 -1.0E-08 -1.0E-08 -4.9E-08 -9.2E-09 -5.6E-08 -3.2E-08 -5.2E-08
VGL -3.4E-08 -3.7E-08 -5.7E-08 -4.4E-08 -4.0E-08 -1.8E-07 -3.2E-08 -1.9E-07 -1.1E-07 -1.7E-07
MLK -4.1E-08 -4.5E-08 -6.6E-08 -5.2E-08 -4.7E-08 -2.4E-07 -4.1E-08 -2.3E-07 -1.4E-07 -2.1E-07
EGG -4.3E-09 -4.8E-09 -7.4E-09 -5.5E-09 -5.2E-09 -4.3E-08 -7.6E-09 -4.6E-08 -2.6E-08 -4.2E-08
MEA -1.1E-07 -1.2E-07 -1.7E-07 -1.4E-07 -1.2E-07 -7.1E-07 -1.2E-07 -6.8E-07 -4.1E-07 -6.2E-07
OTH -1.9E-07 -2.2E-07 -3.5E-07 -2.6E-07 -2.4E-07 -1.7E-06 -3.0E-07 -1.9E-06 -1.0E-06 -1.7E-06
MFR 4.6E-07 5.1E-07 8.0E-07 6.0E-07 5.6E-07 3.8E-06 6.7E-07 4.1E-06 2.3E-06 3.7E-06
LSR 5.4E-08 6.0E-08 9.0E-08 7.0E-08 6.3E-08 - - - - -
Commodity Rural Households Urban Households
 
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice, POT – Potato, FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables, MLK – Milk and milk products, EGG – Eggs, MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure; KSPBGT – Aggregate of 
Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – 
Aggregate of Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik districts; 
KKRSVT – Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: Demand module calibration results 
 
 
 
Table A13: Values of calibrated functional parameter β of NQ-QES 
KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVT
WWT 0.240 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.238 0.239 0.240 0.239 0.240
RCE 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
POT 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
FRT 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064
VGL 0.119 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112
MLK 0.151 0.150 0.149 0.151 0.150 0.171 0.170 0.169 0.170 0.169
EGG 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.064
MEA 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
OTH 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.057
MFR 0.125 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.176 0.177 0.178 0.177 0.178
LSR 0.086 0.086 0.089 0.086 0.088 - - - - -
Commodity Rural Households Urban Households
 
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure; KSPBGT – Aggregate of 
Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – 
Aggregate of Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik districts; 
KKRSVT – Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: Demand module calibration results 
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Table A14: Calibrated functional parameters B of NQ-QES in rural households 
WWT RCE POT FRT VGL MLK EGG MEA OTH MFR LSR
KSPBGT WWT -1.3E-03 5.1E-05 2.2E-04 -8.2E-05 -2.1E-04 -1.8E-04 -6.7E-05 -3.0E-06 7.1E-05 9.1E-05 5.3E-05
RCE 5.1E-05 -4.7E-05 1.8E-05 3.2E-05 5.6E-05 -3.1E-05 -5.1E-05 -1.4E-06 -3.9E-06 9.5E-06 5.5E-05
POT 2.2E-04 1.8E-05 -4.5E-04 7.8E-05 9.0E-05 1.4E-04 2.4E-04 -5.5E-06 -1.5E-05 -1.2E-05 3.5E-05
FRT -8.2E-05 3.2E-05 7.8E-05 -1.0E-03 2.7E-04 2.3E-04 -2.7E-04 -7.5E-06 -2.7E-05 2.7E-05 3.7E-05
VGL -2.1E-04 5.6E-05 9.0E-05 2.7E-04 -7.9E-04 -1.2E-04 2.6E-04 3.0E-05 3.7E-05 -2.2E-05 3.8E-05
MLK -1.8E-04 -3.1E-05 1.4E-04 2.3E-04 -1.2E-04 -4.0E-04 -6.5E-05 -1.4E-06 5.5E-05 2.9E-05 4.0E-05
EGG -6.7E-05 -5.1E-05 2.4E-04 -2.7E-04 2.6E-04 -6.5E-05 -7.0E-04 -5.5E-06 2.4E-05 3.3E-05 -2.6E-04
MEA -3.0E-06 -1.4E-06 -5.5E-06 -7.5E-06 3.0E-05 -1.4E-06 -5.5E-06 -7.0E-06 6.2E-06 5.0E-06 9.3E-06
OTH 7.1E-05 -3.9E-06 -1.5E-05 -2.7E-05 3.7E-05 5.5E-05 2.4E-05 6.2E-06 -4.3E-05 1.4E-05 1.7E-05
MFR 9.1E-05 9.5E-06 -1.2E-05 2.7E-05 -2.2E-05 2.9E-05 3.3E-05 5.0E-06 1.4E-05 -4.0E-05 2.1E-05
LSR 5.3E-05 5.5E-05 3.5E-05 3.7E-05 3.8E-05 4.0E-05 -2.6E-04 9.3E-06 1.7E-05 2.1E-05 -1.4E-03
KKAURG WWT -1.3E-03 5.1E-05 2.2E-04 -8.0E-05 -2.1E-04 -1.9E-04 -6.5E-05 -3.5E-06 7.0E-05 9.0E-05 5.2E-05
RCE 5.1E-05 -4.8E-05 1.8E-05 3.2E-05 5.7E-05 -3.3E-05 -5.3E-05 -1.5E-06 -3.9E-06 9.4E-06 5.5E-05
POT 2.2E-04 1.8E-05 -4.4E-04 7.6E-05 8.9E-05 1.4E-04 2.5E-04 -5.6E-06 -1.4E-05 -1.2E-05 3.5E-05
FRT -8.0E-05 3.2E-05 7.6E-05 -9.9E-04 2.7E-04 2.3E-04 -2.7E-04 -7.5E-06 -2.6E-05 2.7E-05 3.7E-05
VGL -2.1E-04 5.7E-05 8.9E-05 2.7E-04 -8.0E-04 -1.3E-04 2.7E-04 3.0E-05 3.6E-05 -2.1E-05 3.8E-05
MLK -1.9E-04 -3.3E-05 1.4E-04 2.3E-04 -1.3E-04 -4.1E-04 -6.7E-05 -1.9E-06 5.4E-05 3.0E-05 4.0E-05
EGG -6.5E-05 -5.3E-05 2.5E-04 -2.7E-04 2.7E-04 -6.7E-05 -7.2E-04 -5.8E-06 2.4E-05 3.3E-05 -2.7E-04
MEA -3.5E-06 -1.5E-06 -5.6E-06 -7.5E-06 3.0E-05 -1.9E-06 -5.8E-06 -7.2E-06 6.2E-06 5.0E-06 9.2E-06
OTH 7.0E-05 -3.9E-06 -1.4E-05 -2.6E-05 3.6E-05 5.4E-05 2.4E-05 6.2E-06 -4.2E-05 1.4E-05 1.7E-05
MFR 9.0E-05 9.4E-06 -1.2E-05 2.7E-05 -2.1E-05 3.0E-05 3.3E-05 5.0E-06 1.4E-05 -3.9E-05 2.2E-05
LSR 5.2E-05 5.5E-05 3.5E-05 3.7E-05 3.8E-05 4.0E-05 -2.7E-04 9.2E-06 1.7E-05 2.2E-05 -1.4E-03
YZRGLN WWT -1.3E-03 5.0E-05 2.1E-04 -7.7E-05 -2.1E-04 -1.9E-04 -6.5E-05 -3.9E-06 6.9E-05 9.0E-05 5.2E-05
RCE 5.0E-05 -4.9E-05 1.8E-05 3.2E-05 5.7E-05 -3.4E-05 -5.5E-05 -1.6E-06 -3.8E-06 9.3E-06 5.5E-05
POT 2.1E-04 1.8E-05 -4.4E-04 7.5E-05 8.8E-05 1.4E-04 2.5E-04 -5.6E-06 -1.4E-05 -1.1E-05 3.5E-05
FRT -7.7E-05 3.2E-05 7.5E-05 -9.8E-04 2.7E-04 2.3E-04 -2.8E-04 -7.6E-06 -2.6E-05 2.7E-05 3.6E-05
VGL -2.1E-04 5.7E-05 8.8E-05 2.7E-04 -8.0E-04 -1.3E-04 2.7E-04 3.1E-05 3.5E-05 -2.0E-05 3.8E-05
MLK -1.9E-04 -3.4E-05 1.4E-04 2.3E-04 -1.3E-04 -4.2E-04 -7.0E-05 -2.4E-06 5.4E-05 3.0E-05 4.0E-05
EGG -6.5E-05 -5.5E-05 2.5E-04 -2.8E-04 2.7E-04 -7.0E-05 -7.4E-04 -6.2E-06 2.4E-05 3.3E-05 -2.7E-04
MEA -3.9E-06 -1.6E-06 -5.6E-06 -7.6E-06 3.1E-05 -2.4E-06 -6.2E-06 -7.4E-06 6.2E-06 4.9E-06 9.1E-06
OTH 6.9E-05 -3.8E-06 -1.4E-05 -2.6E-05 3.5E-05 5.4E-05 2.4E-05 6.2E-06 -4.1E-05 1.3E-05 1.3E-05
MFR 9.0E-05 9.3E-06 -1.1E-05 2.7E-05 -2.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.3E-05 4.9E-06 1.3E-05 -3.9E-05 2.4E-05
LSR 5.2E-05 5.5E-05 3.5E-05 3.6E-05 3.8E-05 4.0E-05 -2.7E-04 9.1E-06 1.3E-05 2.4E-05 -1.4E-03
KVAYRK WWT -1.3E-03 5.1E-05 2.2E-04 -8.0E-05 -2.1E-04 -1.9E-04 -6.6E-05 -3.4E-06 7.0E-05 9.1E-05 5.2E-05
RCE 5.1E-05 -4.8E-05 1.8E-05 3.2E-05 5.7E-05 -3.3E-05 -5.3E-05 -1.5E-06 -3.9E-06 9.4E-06 5.5E-05
POT 2.2E-04 1.8E-05 -4.5E-04 7.6E-05 8.9E-05 1.4E-04 2.4E-04 -5.6E-06 -1.4E-05 -1.2E-05 3.5E-05
FRT -8.0E-05 3.2E-05 7.6E-05 -9.9E-04 2.7E-04 2.3E-04 -2.7E-04 -7.5E-06 -2.7E-05 2.7E-05 3.7E-05
VGL -2.1E-04 5.7E-05 8.9E-05 2.7E-04 -8.0E-04 -1.3E-04 2.7E-04 3.0E-05 3.6E-05 -2.1E-05 3.8E-05
MLK -1.9E-04 -3.3E-05 1.4E-04 2.3E-04 -1.3E-04 -4.1E-04 -6.7E-05 -1.9E-06 5.4E-05 3.0E-05 4.0E-05
EGG -6.6E-05 -5.3E-05 2.4E-04 -2.7E-04 2.7E-04 -6.7E-05 -7.2E-04 -5.8E-06 2.4E-05 3.3E-05 -2.7E-04
MEA -3.4E-06 -1.5E-06 -5.6E-06 -7.5E-06 3.0E-05 -1.9E-06 -5.8E-06 -7.2E-06 6.2E-06 5.0E-06 9.2E-06
OTH 7.0E-05 -3.9E-06 -1.4E-05 -2.7E-05 3.6E-05 5.4E-05 2.4E-05 6.2E-06 -4.2E-05 1.4E-05 1.7E-05
MFR 9.1E-05 9.4E-06 -1.2E-05 2.7E-05 -2.1E-05 3.0E-05 3.3E-05 5.0E-06 1.4E-05 -3.9E-05 2.2E-05
LSR 5.2E-05 5.5E-05 3.5E-05 3.7E-05 3.8E-05 4.0E-05 -2.7E-04 9.2E-06 1.7E-05 2.2E-05 -1.4E-03
KKRSVT WWT -1.3E-03 5.0E-05 2.1E-04 -7.8E-05 -2.1E-04 -1.9E-04 -6.4E-05 -3.8E-06 6.9E-05 9.0E-05 5.2E-05
RCE 5.0E-05 -4.8E-05 1.8E-05 3.2E-05 5.7E-05 -3.4E-05 -5.4E-05 -1.6E-06 -3.8E-06 9.3E-06 5.6E-05
POT 2.1E-04 1.8E-05 -4.4E-04 7.4E-05 8.8E-05 1.4E-04 2.5E-04 -5.6E-06 -1.4E-05 -1.1E-05 3.5E-05
FRT -7.8E-05 3.2E-05 7.4E-05 -9.6E-04 2.7E-04 2.3E-04 -2.7E-04 -7.5E-06 -2.6E-05 2.7E-05 3.7E-05
VGL -2.1E-04 5.7E-05 8.8E-05 2.7E-04 -8.0E-04 -1.3E-04 2.7E-04 3.1E-05 3.6E-05 -2.0E-05 3.7E-05
MLK -1.9E-04 -3.4E-05 1.4E-04 2.3E-04 -1.3E-04 -4.2E-04 -6.9E-05 -2.3E-06 5.4E-05 3.0E-05 4.0E-05
EGG -6.4E-05 -5.4E-05 2.5E-04 -2.7E-04 2.7E-04 -6.9E-05 -7.2E-04 -6.1E-06 2.4E-05 3.3E-05 -2.7E-04
MEA -3.8E-06 -1.6E-06 -5.6E-06 -7.5E-06 3.1E-05 -2.3E-06 -6.1E-06 -7.3E-06 6.2E-06 4.9E-06 9.1E-06
OTH 6.9E-05 -3.8E-06 -1.4E-05 -2.6E-05 3.6E-05 5.4E-05 2.4E-05 6.2E-06 -4.1E-05 1.3E-05 1.3E-05
MFR 9.0E-05 9.3E-06 -1.1E-05 2.7E-05 -2.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.3E-05 4.9E-06 1.3E-05 -3.9E-05 2.4E-05
LSR 5.2E-05 5.6E-05 3.5E-05 3.7E-05 3.7E-05 4.0E-05 -2.7E-04 9.1E-06 1.3E-05 2.4E-05 -1.4E-03  
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure; KSPBGT – Aggregate of 
Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – 
Aggregate of Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik 
districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: Demand module calibration results 
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Table A15: Calibrated functional parameters B of NQ-QES in urban households 
WWT RCE POT FRT VGL MLK EGG MEA OTH MFR
KSPBGT WWT -1.5E-03 1.0E-04 2.2E-04 -1.0E-04 -2.9E-04 -2.2E-04 -1.0E-04 -3.4E-06 8.0E-05 1.1E-04
RCE 1.0E-04 -5.9E-05 2.0E-05 3.4E-05 7.1E-05 -3.5E-05 -6.1E-05 -1.5E-06 -4.5E-06 1.0E-05
POT 2.2E-04 2.0E-05 -4.7E-04 9.0E-05 9.9E-05 1.6E-04 2.4E-04 -7.6E-06 -1.6E-05 -9.1E-06
FRT -1.0E-04 3.4E-05 9.0E-05 -1.0E-03 2.9E-04 2.8E-04 -3.1E-04 -1.0E-05 -3.1E-05 3.1E-05
VGL -2.9E-04 7.1E-05 9.9E-05 2.9E-04 -7.5E-04 -1.6E-04 2.9E-04 3.3E-05 3.9E-05 -2.5E-05
MLK -2.2E-04 -3.5E-05 1.6E-04 2.8E-04 -1.6E-04 -4.7E-04 -8.8E-05 -3.2E-06 6.5E-05 4.1E-05
EGG -1.0E-04 -6.1E-05 2.4E-04 -3.1E-04 2.9E-04 -8.8E-05 -8.3E-04 -7.1E-06 2.3E-05 3.8E-05
MEA -3.4E-06 -1.5E-06 -7.6E-06 -1.0E-05 3.3E-05 -3.2E-06 -7.1E-06 -8.7E-06 8.6E-06 6.6E-06
OTH 8.0E-05 -4.5E-06 -1.6E-05 -3.1E-05 3.9E-05 6.5E-05 2.3E-05 8.6E-06 -5.5E-05 1.9E-05
MFR 1.1E-04 1.0E-05 -9.1E-06 3.1E-05 -2.5E-05 4.1E-05 3.8E-05 6.6E-06 1.9E-05 -5.1E-05
KKAURG WWT -1.4E-03 1.0E-04 2.1E-04 -9.7E-05 -2.9E-04 -2.2E-04 -9.9E-05 -3.8E-06 7.8E-05 1.1E-04
RCE 1.0E-04 -6.1E-05 2.0E-05 3.4E-05 7.2E-05 -3.7E-05 -6.3E-05 -1.6E-06 -4.5E-06 1.0E-05
POT 2.1E-04 2.0E-05 -4.6E-04 8.8E-05 9.9E-05 1.6E-04 2.5E-04 -7.7E-06 -1.5E-05 -8.7E-06
FRT -9.7E-05 3.4E-05 8.8E-05 -9.8E-04 2.9E-04 2.8E-04 -3.1E-04 -1.0E-05 -3.0E-05 3.0E-05
VGL -2.9E-04 7.2E-05 9.9E-05 2.9E-04 -7.6E-04 -1.7E-04 2.9E-04 3.4E-05 3.8E-05 -2.4E-05
MLK -2.2E-04 -3.7E-05 1.6E-04 2.8E-04 -1.7E-04 -4.8E-04 -9.1E-05 -3.9E-06 6.5E-05 4.1E-05
EGG -9.9E-05 -6.3E-05 2.5E-04 -3.1E-04 2.9E-04 -9.1E-05 -8.5E-04 -7.4E-06 2.3E-05 3.7E-05
MEA -3.8E-06 -1.6E-06 -7.7E-06 -1.0E-05 3.4E-05 -3.9E-06 -7.4E-06 -8.9E-06 8.6E-06 6.5E-06
OTH 7.8E-05 -4.5E-06 -1.5E-05 -3.0E-05 3.8E-05 6.5E-05 2.3E-05 8.6E-06 -5.3E-05 1.9E-05
MFR 1.1E-04 1.0E-05 -8.7E-06 3.0E-05 -2.4E-05 4.1E-05 3.7E-05 6.5E-06 1.9E-05 -5.0E-05
YZRGLN WWT -1.4E-03 1.1E-04 2.1E-04 -9.5E-05 -2.9E-04 -2.3E-04 -9.8E-05 -4.2E-06 7.7E-05 1.0E-04
RCE 1.1E-04 -6.3E-05 2.0E-05 3.4E-05 7.3E-05 -3.8E-05 -6.5E-05 -1.8E-06 -4.5E-06 1.0E-05
POT 2.1E-04 2.0E-05 -4.5E-04 8.7E-05 9.8E-05 1.6E-04 2.5E-04 -7.7E-06 -1.5E-05 -8.3E-06
FRT -9.5E-05 3.4E-05 8.7E-05 -9.8E-04 3.0E-04 2.8E-04 -3.2E-04 -1.0E-05 -2.9E-05 3.0E-05
VGL -2.9E-04 7.3E-05 9.8E-05 3.0E-04 -7.6E-04 -1.7E-04 3.0E-04 3.5E-05 3.8E-05 -2.3E-05
MLK -2.3E-04 -3.8E-05 1.6E-04 2.8E-04 -1.7E-04 -4.9E-04 -9.4E-05 -4.5E-06 6.4E-05 4.1E-05
EGG -9.8E-05 -6.5E-05 2.5E-04 -3.2E-04 3.0E-04 -9.4E-05 -8.7E-04 -7.8E-06 2.2E-05 3.7E-05
MEA -4.2E-06 -1.8E-06 -7.7E-06 -1.0E-05 3.5E-05 -4.5E-06 -7.8E-06 -9.2E-06 8.6E-06 6.5E-06
OTH 7.7E-05 -4.5E-06 -1.5E-05 -2.9E-05 3.8E-05 6.4E-05 2.2E-05 8.6E-06 -5.1E-05 1.9E-05
MFR 1.0E-04 1.0E-05 -8.3E-06 3.0E-05 -2.3E-05 4.1E-05 3.7E-05 6.5E-06 1.9E-05 -4.9E-05
KVAYRK WWT -1.4E-03 1.0E-04 2.1E-04 -9.8E-05 -2.9E-04 -2.2E-04 -1.0E-04 -3.8E-06 7.8E-05 1.1E-04
RCE 1.0E-04 -6.1E-05 2.0E-05 3.4E-05 7.2E-05 -3.6E-05 -6.3E-05 -1.6E-06 -4.5E-06 1.0E-05
POT 2.1E-04 2.0E-05 -4.6E-04 8.8E-05 9.9E-05 1.6E-04 2.5E-04 -7.7E-06 -1.5E-05 -8.7E-06
FRT -9.8E-05 3.4E-05 8.8E-05 -9.9E-04 2.9E-04 2.8E-04 -3.1E-04 -1.0E-05 -3.0E-05 3.0E-05
VGL -2.9E-04 7.2E-05 9.9E-05 2.9E-04 -7.6E-04 -1.7E-04 2.9E-04 3.4E-05 3.8E-05 -2.4E-05
MLK -2.2E-04 -3.6E-05 1.6E-04 2.8E-04 -1.7E-04 -4.8E-04 -9.1E-05 -3.8E-06 6.5E-05 4.1E-05
EGG -1.0E-04 -6.3E-05 2.5E-04 -3.1E-04 2.9E-04 -9.1E-05 -8.5E-04 -7.4E-06 2.3E-05 3.8E-05
MEA -3.8E-06 -1.6E-06 -7.7E-06 -1.0E-05 3.4E-05 -3.8E-06 -7.4E-06 -8.9E-06 8.6E-06 6.5E-06
OTH 7.8E-05 -4.5E-06 -1.5E-05 -3.0E-05 3.8E-05 6.5E-05 2.3E-05 8.6E-06 -5.3E-05 1.9E-05
MFR 1.1E-04 1.0E-05 -8.7E-06 3.0E-05 -2.4E-05 4.1E-05 3.8E-05 6.5E-06 1.9E-05 -5.0E-05
KKRSVT WWT -1.4E-03 1.1E-04 2.1E-04 -9.6E-05 -2.9E-04 -2.2E-04 -9.8E-05 -4.1E-06 7.7E-05 1.0E-04
RCE 1.1E-04 -6.2E-05 2.0E-05 3.4E-05 7.2E-05 -3.8E-05 -6.4E-05 -1.7E-06 -4.5E-06 1.0E-05
POT 2.1E-04 2.0E-05 -4.5E-04 8.6E-05 9.8E-05 1.6E-04 2.5E-04 -7.7E-06 -1.5E-05 -8.4E-06
FRT -9.6E-05 3.4E-05 8.6E-05 -9.6E-04 2.9E-04 2.8E-04 -3.1E-04 -1.0E-05 -2.9E-05 3.0E-05
VGL -2.9E-04 7.2E-05 9.8E-05 2.9E-04 -7.6E-04 -1.7E-04 2.9E-04 3.4E-05 3.8E-05 -2.3E-05
MLK -2.2E-04 -3.8E-05 1.6E-04 2.8E-04 -1.7E-04 -4.9E-04 -9.3E-05 -4.4E-06 6.4E-05 4.1E-05
EGG -9.8E-05 -6.4E-05 2.5E-04 -3.1E-04 2.9E-04 -9.3E-05 -8.5E-04 -7.7E-06 2.2E-05 3.7E-05
MEA -4.1E-06 -1.7E-06 -7.7E-06 -1.0E-05 3.4E-05 -4.4E-06 -7.7E-06 -9.1E-06 8.6E-06 6.5E-06
OTH 7.7E-05 -4.5E-06 -1.5E-05 -2.9E-05 3.8E-05 6.4E-05 2.2E-05 8.6E-06 -5.2E-05 1.9E-05
MFR 1.0E-04 1.0E-05 -8.4E-06 3.0E-05 -2.3E-05 4.1E-05 3.7E-05 6.5E-06 1.9E-05 -5.0E-05  
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; KSPBGT – Aggregate of Khazarasp and 
Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate of Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate of 
Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate of Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – 
Aggregate of Kushkupir and Shavat districts 
Source: Demand module calibration results 
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Appendix 4: Simulation Results 
Table A16: Shadow prices of land, USD ha -1 
District Producer Season BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
KSPBGT SK Jan-Jun 71 132 98 - - - -
Jul-Sep 327 524 323 435 - 337 -
Oct 101 353 143 220 - 202 -
Nov - - - 57 - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
PF Jan-Jun 92 162 129 - 147 - 93
Jul-Sep 367 519 249 471 - 391 488
Oct 92 306 206 269 - 128 291
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
HH Oct-Jun 265 346 260 291 229 293 299
Jul-Sep 463 527 363 497 353 462 472
KKAURG SK Jan-Jun 66 146 55 - - - -
Jul-Sep 413 594 419 492 - 392 -
Oct 201 345 228 222 - 64 -
Nov - - - 66 - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
PF Jan-Jun 71 164 78 - 114 - 83
Jul-Sep 363 580 371 467 - 387 473
Oct 84 239 87 102 - 104 82
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
HH Oct-Jun 236 347 228 259 222 253 233
Jul-Sep 393 534 396 422 391 413 402
YZRGLN SK Jan-Jun - 96 62 - - - -
Jul-Sep 351 474 355 423 - 349 -
Oct 59 202 68 82 - 153 -
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
PF Jan-Jun 24 73 35 - - 35 39
Jul-Sep 256 496 261 434 - 228 442
Oct 38 182 75 91 - 84 92
Nov - - - 14 - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
HH Oct-Jun 177 308 214 189 175 217 229
Jul-Sep 336 580 336 357 306 353 337
KVAYRK SK Jan-Jun - 119 76 - - - -
Jul-Sep 282 478 303 - - 308 -
Oct - 112 76 116 - - -
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
PF Jan-Jun - 125 89 - - - 79
Jul-Sep 304 495 318 363 139 201 360
Oct - 138 106 87 - - 142
Nov - 41 12 - - - 5
Dec - - - - - - -
HH Oct-Jun 135 309 246 152 131 226 235
Jul-Sep - 452 378 - - - 402
KKRSVT SK Jan-Jun 15 76 54 - - - -
Jul-Sep - 480 324 - - 105 -
Oct - 129 114 - - 314 -
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
PF Jan-Jun 19 83 63 - - - 64
Jul-Sep - 493 351 - - 67 367
Oct 5 53 - 11 - - 7
Nov - - - - - - -
Dec - - - - - - -
HH Oct-Jun 120 313 288 127 118 231 239
Jul-Sep - 456 382 - - - 395  
Notes: KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and 
Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – 
Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat 
districts; SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; BASE – Base situation 
(observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of 
water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of 
farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
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Table A17: Commodity prices and consumption 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
WWT KSPBGT 104 108 106 108 105 99 106 53.3 52.4 52.9 52.2 53.0 55.0 52.8
ton KKAURG 106 110 108 110 107 101 109 72.5 71.4 71.8 71.4 72.0 74.6 71.7
YZRBGT 108 112 110 112 110 104 110 31.9 31.1 31.5 31.1 31.6 32.8 31.5
KVAYRK 105 110 108 109 107 102 108 45.3 44.1 44.4 44.1 44.8 46.3 44.5
KKRSVT 107 112 110 112 109 104 111 44.3 43.0 43.5 42.9 43.8 45.1 43.2
RCE KSPBGT 264 274 300 274 275 273 270 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.8
ton KKAURG 253 262 287 262 267 262 259 5.9 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.7
YZRBGT 254 263 288 263 270 263 260 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.4
KVAYRK 257 266 291 265 271 264 262 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.5
KKRSVT 254 263 288 263 269 262 261 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4
POT KSPBGT 86 90 91 91 91 90 89 13.9 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.3 13.4
ton KKAURG 88 92 93 92 94 92 91 18.4 17.8 17.7 17.8 17.6 17.8 18.0
YZRBGT 89 94 95 93 97 93 92 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.0 7.8 8.0 8.1
KVAYRK 88 92 92 92 94 91 90 11.7 11.3 11.2 11.3 11.2 11.3 11.4
KKRSVT 89 93 95 93 96 93 93 11.5 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.1 11.3 11.3
FRT KSPBGT 41 42 42 42 42 39 42 16.2 15.8 15.7 15.8 15.7 16.8 15.9
ton KKAURG 42 44 44 44 45 40 43 21.5 21.2 21.1 21.2 21.0 21.9 21.3
YZRBGT 43 45 46 45 47 42 45 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.8 9.6
KVAYRK 42 44 44 43 44 40 43 13.6 13.4 13.3 13.4 13.3 13.9 13.5
KKRSVT 43 45 45 45 46 42 45 13.5 13.2 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.8 13.2
VGL KSPBGT 104 107 108 107 108 108 105 28.6 27.6 27.1 27.6 27.3 27.2 28.2
ton KKAURG 98 101 103 101 102 102 104 38.6 38.0 37.5 38.0 37.6 37.7 37.0
YZRBGT 102 105 106 106 106 106 106 17.2 16.6 16.5 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
KVAYRK 101 104 105 105 105 105 105 24.2 23.9 23.5 23.6 23.6 23.7 23.5
KKRSVT 102 105 105 106 106 105 106 23.8 23.2 23.2 22.9 22.9 23.1 22.9
MLK KSPBGT 155 152 151 166 184 150 161 41.9 42.2 42.2 40.1 39.3 44.3 41.1
ton KKAURG 151 147 147 160 173 146 157 59.9 61.1 61.1 57.6 56.8 62.6 58.2
YZRBGT 149 146 145 157 190 144 156 25.4 25.8 25.9 24.3 22.1 26.6 24.3
KVAYRK 152 148 148 162 187 147 158 36.1 37.2 37.0 34.4 32.4 38.3 34.8
KKRSVT 149 145 146 159 190 144 155 35.2 36.1 36.0 33.2 31.6 36.9 33.6
EGG KSPBGT 56 57 57 58 64 60 57 17.5 17.3 17.3 16.7 14.6 16.0 17.3
103 pieces KKAURG 53 54 54 56 62 57 55 23.5 23.3 23.3 22.7 22.2 22.6 23.0
YZRBGT 53 54 54 55 61 56 54 10.4 9.9 10.0 9.5 8.7 9.2 9.7
KVAYRK 54 55 55 57 62 58 56 14.7 14.6 14.6 13.6 11.8 13.3 14.3
KKRSVT 54 55 55 57 63 58 55 14.4 14.1 14.0 13.2 12.4 13.1 14.0
MEA KSPBGT 1,877 1,839 1,840 2,021 2,210 1,732 1,967 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.8 7.6 7.0
ton KKAURG 1,777 1,737 1,739 1,972 2,145 1,662 1,857 10.6 10.8 10.8 10.3 10.1 11.1 10.4
YZRBGT 1,785 1,749 1,747 1,925 2,300 1,692 1,872 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.5 4.3
KVAYRK 1,814 1,778 1,774 1,973 2,252 1,726 1,898 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.1 5.9 6.5 6.2
KKRSVT 1,792 1,755 1,751 1,928 2,293 1,707 1,868 6.0 6.1 6.2 5.9 5.7 6.3 6.0
OTH KSPBGT 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 10.2 10.3 10.2 11.2 11.2 10.5 11.1
ton KKAURG 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 14.6 14.6 14.7 16.0 16.0 14.9 15.4
YZRBGT 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.8 7.1 6.2 6.8
KVAYRK 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 8.8 8.8 8.8 9.8 9.9 9.0 9.6
KKRSVT 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 8.5 8.5 8.5 9.3 10.1 8.4 9.2
MFFR KSPBGT 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 56.5 57.0 55.7 67.5 59.6 61.6 72.7
ton KKAURG 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 82.9 83.1 85.4 105.2 86.8 88.8 114.7
YZRBGT 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 34.8 34.5 33.7 46.6 37.9 34.0 42.0
KVAYRK 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 49.1 49.7 48.7 68.0 52.9 52.1 59.9
KKRSVT 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025 47.9 47.0 47.8 57.9 52.1 46.3 57.4
LSR KSPBGT 51 50 57 66 57 51 69 51.3 49.2 55.9 62.9 56.3 50.5 64.0
103 h KKAURG 49 46 56 61 54 53 70 45.1 42.1 47.6 55.8 46.5 45.3 67.1
YZRBGT 50 49 55 64 55 50 72 28.7 27.1 31.0 34.9 30.0 27.6 39.4
KVAYRK 51 48 56 61 52 54 71 39.0 37.1 41.1 43.7 39.7 40.7 49.6
KKRSVT 48 47 59 57 58 49 68 41.0 39.1 43.7 42.1 42.3 41.2 48.4
Commodity Prices, USD  unit-1 Consumption in Districts, 103  unitsCommodity District
 
Note: WWT – Wheat and other food grains; RCE – Rice; POT – Potato; FRT – Fruits and melons; VGL – 
Vegetables; MLK – Milk and milk products; EGG – Eggs; MEA – Meat and meat products; OTH – 
Other food commodities; MFR – Non-food commodities; LSR – Leisure; KSPBGT – Aggregate for 
Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN 
– Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik 
districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; BASE – Base situation 
(observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water 
pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm 
restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
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Table A18: Land and water use 
Districts Producer BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
Land Use (103 ha)
KSPBGT SK 26.2 26.5 26.2 26.2 - 26.2 -
PF 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.6 32.9 7.5 34.5
HH 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.5
KKAURG SK 28.3 29.1 27.3 27.6 - 29.3 -
PF 10.0 10.8 9.1 9.4 38.1 10.2 33.3
HH 6.4 6.7 6.3 5.9 6.7 6.7 6.3
YZRGLN SK 15.8 16.7 15.5 15.7 - 16.0 -
PF 23.2 25.1 22.7 22.6 38.8 23.4 31.3
HH 5.3 5.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.1
KVAYRK SK 16.5 17.5 15.7 15.4 - 17.3 -
PF 8.4 9.3 8.4 8.2 25.3 8.4 23.6
HH 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.0
KKRSVT SK 27.1 29.9 29.7 26.4 - 27.2 -
PF 12.6 13.9 13.8 12.1 39.5 12.8 44.1
HH 7.0 7.7 7.6 7.3 7.0 7.2 7.7
Water Use (106 m3)
KSPBGT SK 479.8 455.4 425.7 485.6 - 479.2 -
PF 141.0 129.6 124.3 145.3 615.3 139.4 586.0
HH 133.5 125.8 129.9 129.9 133.3 128.7 127.1
KKAURG SK 486.6 488.1 427.9 470.0 - 455.6 -
PF 194.3 195.2 188.9 215.4 645.6 214.5 626.5
HH 107.1 107.8 60.6 63.5 70.4 68.1 59.9
YZRGLN SK 287.0 298.8 269.2 299.0 - 295.6 -
PF 441.6 429.4 330.5 374.3 654.8 364.9 631.8
HH 87.4 88.6 81.9 85.1 87.6 87.5 80.1
KVAYRK SK 294.9 294.2 274.5 307.8 - 297.4 -
PF 158.7 159.6 186.7 201.8 501.7 195.2 498.4
HH 91.2 91.6 136.1 140.6 137.4 141.4 138.6
KKRSVT SK 473.7 473.7 471.4 474.2 - 473.6 -
PF 232.6 232.4 230.4 232.8 636.1 232.3 632.9
HH 121.0 121.0 121.0 121.1 121.1 120.8 120.6
Water Use (103 m3 ha-1)
KSPBGT SK 18.3 17.2 16.2 18.5 - 18.3 -
PF 19.0 17.5 16.8 19.2 18.7 18.6 17.0
HH 17.9 17.0 17.6 17.4 17.9 17.5 16.9
KKAURG SK 17.2 16.8 15.7 17.0 - 15.6 -
PF 19.5 18.1 20.8 23.0 17.0 21.1 18.8
HH 16.8 16.0 9.6 10.8 10.5 10.1 9.5
YZRGLN SK 18.2 17.9 17.4 19.1 - 18.5 -
PF 19.0 17.1 14.6 16.6 16.9 15.6 20.2
HH 16.6 16.1 16.0 16.3 16.7 16.7 15.6
KVAYRK SK 17.9 16.9 17.4 19.9 - 17.2 -
PF 18.8 17.1 22.3 24.5 19.8 23.1 21.1
HH 15.1 15.0 22.7 23.7 23.0 23.4 23.0
KKRSVT SK 17.5 15.8 15.9 18.0 - 17.4 -
PF 18.5 16.8 16.7 19.3 16.1 18.2 14.4
HH 17.3 15.7 15.8 16.6 17.3 16.8 15.6
change to base (in percent)
 
Notes: SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp 
and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate for Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – 
Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik 
districts; KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; Base – Base situation 
(observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water 
pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm 
restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
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Table A19: Gross margins of production activities 
Base EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 Base EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 Base EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 Base EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 Base EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
SK CTN USD ha-1 198 233 78 69 - 198 - 213 250 96 93 - 213 - 119 146 -4 -22 - 119 - 198 233 107 58 - 198 - 170 202 78 44 - 170 -
WWT USD ha-1 245 278 184 7 - 231 - 223 254 161 -13 - 223 - 221 253 162 -48 - 221 - 211 241 164 -28 - 211 - 241 274 199 -4 - 239 -
RCE USD ha-1 865 1,007 178 635 - 890 - 852 953 167 680 - 843 - 966 1,071 290 789 - 940 - 907 1,008 344 706 - 878 - 906 1,016 343 644 - 884 -
POT USD ha-1 604 715 418 453 - 612 - 576 682 386 406 - 576 - 389 473 183 215 - 389 - 643 749 508 474 - 643 - 878 1,025 788 697 - 883 -
FRT USD ha-1 431 506 328 314 - 427 - 327 389 211 177 - 327 - 275 331 156 125 - 275 - 526 607 460 377 - 526 - 278 332 188 182 - 308 -
VGL USD ha-1 1,297 1,514 1,211 1,122 - 1,302 - 1,108 1,315 1,016 1,088 - 1,105 - 810 976 682 696 - 824 - 1,172 1,397 1,155 1,091 - 1,151 - 978 1,149 911 877 - 994 -
MZE USD ha-1 507 571 357 276 - 507 - 244 281 68 23 - 244 - 357 405 197 136 - 357 - 235 271 97 13 - 235 - 379 429 259 157 - 379 -
FOD USD ha-1 12 19 12 -83 - 12 - 59 71 59 -59 - 59 - 60 72 60 -56 - 60 - 100 115 100 -19 - 100 - 35 45 35 -77 - 35 -
MLK USD head-1 106 104 103 112 - 126 - 136 135 136 143 - 163 - 126 126 126 132 - 148 - 212 212 212 225 - 261 - 136 135 136 143 - 160 -
EGG USD head-1 2 2 2 2 - 2 - 8 8 8 9 - 9 - 3 3 3 3 - 3 - 8 8 8 9 - 8 - 4 4 4 4 - 4 -
MEA USD head-1 121 120 121 130 - 141 - 115 115 115 128 - 136 - 217 217 217 233 - 262 - 210 210 210 228 - 254 - 147 147 147 158 - 175 -
PF CTN USD ha-1 333 380 225 198 333 333 103 188 220 157 85 188 188 -27 169 200 49 64 169 169 18 316 361 235 238 316 316 169 164 194 70 65 164 164 -21
WWT USD ha-1 252 286 192 71 259 257 11 330 371 278 174 330 330 122 256 290 198 65 256 256 8 238 270 193 54 238 238 10 223 254 179 76 225 220 32
RCE USD ha-1 1,004 1,114 332 845 1,192 1,068 168 1,031 1,148 363 905 1,056 1,021 226 1,059 1,173 393 864 1,364 1,031 202 996 1,106 442 781 1,246 965 227 841 945 272 652 861 821 107
POT USD ha-1 281 356 59 82 288 286 -141 395 495 199 188 395 395 -8 468 580 290 257 468 468 79 503 594 352 300 503 503 149 253 325 88 48 264 258 -117
FRT USD ha-1 72 97 -81 -53 74 70 -206 176 217 40 34 176 176 -102 168 211 36 25 168 168 11 464 532 386 324 464 464 245 59 83 -61 -79 62 54 -199
VGL USD ha-1 404 503 203 204 413 410 3 441 551 254 316 530 439 123 740 904 609 591 811 754 468 769 955 713 641 856 751 593 401 498 261 235 447 410 101
MZE USD ha-1 178 209 -5 -11 178 178 -195 147 174 -39 -41 147 147 -226 284 325 117 95 284 284 -72 382 434 261 185 382 382 64 146 174 4 -42 146 146 -184
FOD USD ha-1 79 93 79 -106 79 79 -92 147 169 147 23 147 147 44 81 95 81 -24 81 81 -9 137 158 137 -18 137 137 2 85 99 85 -42 85 85 -27
MLK USD head-1 179 177 176 191 207 218 244 168 168 168 177 196 203 207 181 180 181 189 239 215 243 166 166 166 176 211 203 217 148 148 148 157 196 196 187
EGG USD head-1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
MEA USD head-1 117 116 117 125 137 135 160 145 145 145 161 182 172 186 182 182 182 195 244 218 254 147 147 147 159 190 173 197 146 146 146 157 196 204 192
HH WWT USD ha-1 421 472 429 272 423 414 323 456 511 456 313 456 456 368 492 550 492 304 492 492 363 421 472 421 249 421 421 300 410 460 410 269 413 407 320
RCE USD ha-1 1,108 1,224 443 862 1,307 1,164 191 1,334 1,477 692 1,087 1,364 1,322 433 1,114 1,230 450 963 1,424 1,086 303 1,205 1,331 668 1,008 1,491 1,170 470 1,070 1,194 520 772 1,108 1,092 251
POT USD ha-1 812 958 820 443 820 819 589 667 784 667 286 667 667 403 630 759 630 278 630 630 407 689 809 689 596 689 689 715 536 651 536 177 546 540 293
FRT USD ha-1 191 249 192 19 193 189 -21 233 309 233 -136 233 233 -60 521 618 521 321 521 521 418 428 518 428 258 428 428 347 317 395 317 -52 319 310 25
VGL USD ha-1 574 724 575 294 588 568 440 833 1,047 830 737 1,006 830 935 786 983 786 649 872 804 848 1,200 1,444 1,200 1,031 1,314 1,177 1,285 780 969 777 605 869 798 805
MZE USD ha-1 404 456 404 104 404 404 156 366 414 366 79 366 366 128 389 440 389 107 389 389 157 441 497 441 171 441 441 226 401 453 401 112 401 401 164
FOD USD ha-1 155 176 155 -27 155 155 -6 65 77 65 -99 65 65 -87 223 251 223 98 223 223 126 137 156 137 -19 137 137 0 157 179 157 3 157 157 25
MLK USD head-1 328 326 325 349 392 402 445 298 297 298 314 343 363 369 284 283 284 297 367 340 379 336 336 336 357 417 414 440 326 325 326 345 419 393 384
EGG USD head-1 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 8 8 8 8 9 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
MEA USD head-1 245 243 245 262 292 287 331 235 235 235 259 286 281 299 199 199 199 213 261 236 271 222 222 222 240 279 265 295 217 218 217 232 283 298 286
YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVTKSPBGT KKAURGActivity
 
Notes: SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE –Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; MLN – Melons;
MZE – Maize; FOD – Fodder crops; MLK – Cows; EGG – Poultry; MEA – Bulls; KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate
for Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT –
Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; Base – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water
pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 –
Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
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Table A20: Production activities 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
SK CTN 103 ha 17.565 17.565 17.565 5.323 - 17.565 - 15.922 15.922 15.922 8.825 - 15.922 - 9.211 9.211 9.211 0.000 - 9.211 - 10.437 10.437 10.437 0.000 - 10.437 - 16.654 16.654 16.654 4.241 - 16.654 -
WWT 103 ha 5.186 5.680 3.452 0.000 - 4.734 - 6.199 6.566 4.337 0.000 - 5.508 - 1.969 2.506 1.208 0.000 - 1.873 - 3.801 3.067 2.739 0.000 - 3.801 - 6.065 6.821 5.234 0.000 - 5.434 -
RCE 103 ha 1.772 1.915 0.536 4.580 - 1.933 - 3.583 3.856 2.222 7.135 - 3.517 - 2.817 2.917 1.459 5.078 - 2.812 - 0.983 1.399 0.521 3.492 - 0.971 - 1.497 1.911 0.894 4.881 - 1.426 -
POT 103 ha 0.064 0.164 0.024 0.221 - 0.104 - 0.162 0.221 0.091 0.255 - 0.162 - 0.044 0.040 0.022 1.060 - 0.044 - 0.079 0.134 0.105 0.483 - 0.088 - 0.143 0.628 0.532 0.614 - 0.543 -
FRT 103 ha 0.159 0.160 0.101 0.306 - 0.159 - 0.258 0.582 0.099 0.157 - 0.258 - 0.197 0.207 0.204 0.102 - 0.197 - 0.053 0.091 0.055 0.616 - 0.015 - 0.205 0.331 0.056 0.450 - 0.000 -
VGL 103 ha 0.346 1.506 2.144 12.394 - 0.862 - 0.777 1.334 2.489 10.076 - 1.180 - 0.335 0.582 2.140 9.263 - 0.475 - 0.307 1.120 0.477 10.592 - 0.681 - 0.680 0.906 1.022 15.717 - 0.911 -
MZE 103 ha 0.027 0.027 0.175 0.787 - 0.039 - 0.057 0.128 0.536 0.204 - 0.140 - 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.173 - 0.077 - 0.024 0.221 0.032 0.261 - 0.077 - 0.051 0.047 0.087 0.105 - 0.115 -
FOD 103 ha 1.104 0.523 1.142 0.000 - 1.384 - 1.333 0.522 1.631 0.972 - 2.599 - 1.163 1.157 1.170 0.000 - 1.264 - 0.794 0.983 1.369 0.000 - 1.248 - 1.845 0.836 1.943 0.000 - 2.426 -
MLK 103 head 0.73 0.21 0.31 1.05 - 1.45 - 1.66 1.15 2.15 1.60 - 2.84 - 0.66 0.00 0.22 0.86 - 1.00 - 0.77 1.00 1.45 0.78 - 1.66 - 0.57 0.19 0.91 0.11 - 1.20 -
EGG 103 head 2.54 3.75 3.04 3.41 - 1.92 - 58.91 60.72 72.05 77.14 - 60.11 - 2.29 2.06 2.20 3.44 - 3.26 - 132.88 129.11 135.39 180.24 - 136.42 - 5.85 5.45 7.18 8.29 - 4.26 -
MEA 103 head 1.65 0.61 2.46 2.46 - 2.15 - 6.60 6.20 8.00 7.34 - 9.90 - 2.07 2.43 2.48 2.48 - 2.36 - 1.72 1.33 1.88 1.02 - 2.58 - 1.49 1.30 1.86 2.03 - 2.57 -
PF CTN 103 ha 1.708 1.708 1.708 1.211 19.273 1.708 18.784 3.747 3.747 3.747 2.100 19.669 3.747 0.000 12.950 12.950 12.950 4.102 22.161 12.950 0.000 3.570 3.570 3.570 2.914 14.007 3.570 8.593 5.959 5.959 5.959 3.122 22.613 5.959 0.000
WWT 103 ha 1.134 1.365 1.137 1.141 6.320 1.133 2.833 2.354 2.870 2.354 2.041 8.553 2.352 15.553 4.466 4.512 4.466 4.466 5.966 4.466 6.435 1.847 1.847 1.847 1.503 4.875 1.847 0.388 3.346 3.195 3.346 4.546 7.719 3.346 18.551
RCE 103 ha 3.749 4.149 3.219 4.649 5.907 4.163 6.277 2.991 3.048 1.899 3.565 6.806 2.891 8.574 3.493 3.966 3.493 8.493 6.982 3.332 6.720 1.260 1.688 1.059 2.756 2.404 1.269 0.951 1.336 1.888 1.077 2.949 1.061 1.609 4.838
POT 103 ha 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.051 0.014 0.000 0.022 0.044 0.020 0.020 0.614 0.022 0.000 0.051 0.059 0.059 0.033 0.167 0.090 1.657 0.037 0.071 0.010 0.006 1.444 0.100 0.321 0.023 0.201 0.000 0.078 0.864 0.000 0.000
FRT 103 ha 0.098 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.087 0.000 0.083 0.111 0.054 0.420 0.303 0.083 0.000 0.190 0.201 0.080 0.000 0.288 0.066 0.000 0.077 0.180 0.079 0.022 0.021 0.370 1.502 0.150 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.000
VGL 103 ha 0.045 0.095 0.007 0.271 0.401 0.160 0.028 0.202 0.317 0.099 0.151 0.549 0.202 1.476 0.293 1.274 1.344 3.344 1.026 0.293 14.478 0.248 0.590 0.729 0.846 0.126 0.000 9.260 0.201 0.757 0.053 2.187 1.118 0.252 9.142
MZE 103 ha 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.010 0.034 0.007 0.000 0.057 0.024 0.000 0.006 0.241 0.057 0.000 0.202 0.306 0.306 0.335 0.675 0.202 0.000 0.078 0.070 0.177 0.181 0.092 0.070 0.094 0.091 0.081 0.291 0.000 0.342 0.091 0.000
FOD 103 ha 0.677 0.735 1.800 0.000 0.800 0.800 2.929 0.513 0.596 0.922 1.067 1.324 0.820 7.710 1.583 1.820 0.000 1.830 1.541 2.025 2.033 1.324 1.315 0.899 0.000 2.325 1.315 2.501 1.496 1.459 1.878 0.000 5.533 1.800 4.398
MLK 103 head 1.06 1.04 1.23 0.97 1.20 1.64 2.40 2.42 2.53 2.95 4.58 6.10 3.97 6.65 1.80 1.83 1.77 2.14 2.24 2.09 7.28 1.96 1.95 2.07 1.97 3.06 2.62 3.15 1.38 1.31 1.88 0.64 7.02 1.84 8.00
EGG 103 head 4.89 4.89 2.03 6.19 8.84 4.37 1.61 15.51 7.18 8.59 8.00 73.16 16.04 10.57 8.89 9.58 10.20 18.55 11.56 7.34 5.51 19.07 14.19 18.66 19.19 128.35 17.23 164.36 3.90 3.27 4.13 1.45 10.57 1.84 9.48
MEA 103 head 3.46 3.37 4.61 2.61 5.64 4.51 5.90 7.96 7.89 8.49 5.67 19.34 8.03 21.15 4.60 6.09 4.46 4.25 8.83 5.53 8.01 5.73 5.72 5.84 5.78 7.21 6.76 7.98 4.56 4.54 4.82 2.15 5.40 5.56 6.80
HH WWT 103 ha 3.965 3.964 3.964 3.965 3.965 3.965 3.965 3.385 3.384 3.366 3.366 3.385 3.385 3.385 1.450 1.450 1.450 1.450 1.450 1.450 1.450 2.200 2.200 2.200 2.200 2.200 2.200 2.200 3.400 3.400 3.400 3.400 3.400 3.400 3.400
RCE 103 ha 1.336 1.441 0.802 1.301 1.340 1.145 0.200 0.226 0.230 0.189 0.304 0.321 0.313 0.222 1.047 1.327 0.723 1.047 1.049 1.048 0.847 1.000 1.195 0.812 1.168 0.984 1.252 0.995 0.141 0.849 0.083 0.241 0.600 0.463 0.000
POT 103 ha 0.126 0.264 0.201 0.223 0.157 0.128 0.654 0.511 0.566 0.511 0.602 0.511 0.511 0.402 0.482 0.492 0.558 0.120 0.503 0.503 0.202 0.609 0.526 0.609 0.491 0.010 0.285 0.000 0.567 0.265 0.107 0.582 0.240 0.000 0.058
FRT 103 ha 0.293 0.057 0.045 0.040 0.162 0.282 0.000 0.062 0.066 0.062 0.000 0.062 0.062 0.000 0.319 0.389 0.875 0.506 0.473 0.470 0.444 0.148 0.050 0.148 0.018 0.050 0.030 0.000 0.230 0.205 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.000
VGL 103 ha 0.838 1.038 1.012 0.431 0.938 0.841 0.607 1.080 1.085 1.080 1.250 1.591 1.080 1.351 0.675 0.597 0.043 0.785 0.501 0.504 0.933 1.700 1.783 1.700 1.748 2.309 1.222 2.279 0.746 1.073 1.253 0.961 1.303 1.015 1.255
MZE 103 ha 0.113 0.113 0.313 0.113 0.112 0.105 0.406 0.319 0.415 0.319 0.349 0.218 0.307 0.324 0.146 0.135 0.142 0.146 0.144 0.145 0.110 0.150 0.155 0.150 0.196 0.192 0.115 0.150 0.291 0.287 0.243 0.291 0.288 0.128 0.442
FOD 103 ha 0.768 0.768 0.964 1.268 0.810 1.059 1.604 0.777 0.993 0.777 0.000 0.610 1.068 0.644 1.138 1.107 1.338 1.161 1.136 1.137 1.150 0.248 0.205 0.371 0.111 0.224 0.948 0.404 1.607 1.203 1.655 1.507 1.348 1.925 1.948
MLK 103 head 37.07 38.11 39.00 41.22 37.06 39.51 38.75 50.44 51.43 50.44 58.71 50.44 41.52 50.84 31.09 30.91 33.93 31.58 30.83 25.87 32.42 33.60 33.61 33.92 34.03 33.63 36.14 36.57 36.88 36.54 37.07 37.02 36.93 39.76 40.05
EGG 103 head 225.53 225.53 255.62 225.53 241.92 237.00 232.00 321.71 309.11 331.70 329.88 321.71 301.12 323.70 164.61 133.41 162.48 161.61 119.44 141.17 121.59 196.51 198.85 196.51 196.01 214.98 186.50 188.50 274.52 270.02 227.87 274.52 236.06 224.42 277.13
MEA 103 head 83.74 84.37 87.76 98.73 86.10 125.42 82.00 125.26 128.75 125.26 130.26 125.26 164.21 124.24 70.33 69.87 73.22 70.57 71.07 58.71 72.96 79.83 79.80 81.12 78.56 79.61 89.84 89.95 93.31 92.22 93.73 92.12 93.67 97.61 94.11
KVAYRK KKRSVTActivity KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN
 
Notes: SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; CTN – Cotton; WWT – Winter wheat; RCE –Rice; POT – Potato; VGL – Vegetables; MLN – Melons;
MZE – Maize; FOD – Fodder crops; MLK – Cows; EGG – Poultry; MEA – Bulls; KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG – Aggregate
for Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts; KKRSVT –
Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; Base – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 – Introduction of water
pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock sector; EXP6 –
Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
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Table A21: Agricultural profits of producers 
BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6 BASE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 EXP4 EXP5 EXP6
SK CROP 103 USD 6,858 10,100 4,825 17,590 - 7,579 - 8,964 11,523 5,315 16,718 - 9,261 - 4,696 5,874 2,159 10,720 - 4,725 - 4,285 6,475 2,516 14,481 - 4,714 - 6,581 9,029 4,104 17,638 - 6,905 -
ANIMAL 103 USD 282 103 336 445 - 491 - 1,482 1,385 1,823 1,856 - 2,327 - 538 532 571 701 - 777 - 1,597 1,540 1,795 1,944 - 2,231 - 318 238 425 370 - 659 -
TOTAL 103 USD 7,140 10,203 5,161 18,035 - 8,070 - 10,447 12,907 7,138 18,575 - 11,588 - 5,235 6,406 2,731 11,421 - 5,502 - 5,882 8,015 4,311 16,425 - 6,945 - 6,899 9,267 4,529 18,008 - 7,564 -
CROPHA USD ha-1 262 367 192 745 - 283 - 317 396 194 605 - 316 - 297 352 139 684 - 296 - 260 371 160 938 - 272 - 242 321 155 678 - 251 -
TOTHA USD ha-1 272 370 205 764 - 301 - 369 443 261 672 - 396 - 331 384 176 729 - 345 - 357 459 274 1,064 - 401 - 254 329 171 692 - 275 -
PF CROP 103 USD 4,700 5,797 1,815 4,303 15,351 5,447 2,755 4,762 5,715 2,097 3,849 14,521 4,673 4,362 7,495 10,049 3,772 9,865 16,078 7,267 8,292 3,281 4,592 2,386 3,513 9,783 3,223 7,586 3,081 4,352 1,482 2,987 7,612 3,301 1,906
ANIMAL 103 USD 603 584 758 525 1,045 976 1,535 1,592 1,582 1,745 1,742 4,873 2,223 5,323 1,188 1,464 1,160 1,291 2,728 1,679 3,816 1,233 1,212 1,266 1,338 2,578 1,766 2,843 879 866 994 441 2,464 1,495 2,822
TOTAL 103 USD 5,302 6,381 2,573 4,827 16,395 6,423 4,289 6,354 7,297 3,841 5,591 19,394 6,896 9,685 8,682 11,513 4,931 11,156 18,806 8,946 12,108 4,514 5,804 3,652 4,851 12,361 4,990 10,429 3,960 5,218 2,476 3,427 10,076 4,796 4,728
CROPHA USD ha-1 633 702 230 591 467 675 89 478 531 231 411 382 459 131 323 401 166 436 414 310 265 389 492 285 427 387 377 321 245 321 118 232 193 253 52
TOTHA USD ha-1 714 772 327 663 499 796 139 637 678 422 597 510 678 291 374 459 217 494 485 382 387 535 622 436 590 489 584 442 314 385 196 266 255 367 128
HH CROP 103 USD 3,952 4,840 3,085 2,404 4,313 3,816 2,026 3,268 3,918 3,086 2,505 4,057 3,392 2,752 3,191 3,968 2,234 2,285 3,517 3,128 2,004 4,755 5,765 4,109 3,855 5,571 4,219 4,091 2,873 4,217 2,883 1,824 3,660 3,073 2,235
ANIMAL 103 USD 33,676 33,944 35,565 41,276 40,854 53,049 45,460 45,760 46,817 45,808 53,667 54,586 62,465 57,373 23,439 23,162 24,812 25,023 30,401 23,194 32,563 30,504 30,520 30,898 32,547 38,181 40,217 44,102 33,059 32,670 33,088 34,944 42,690 45,374 43,023
TOTAL 103 USD 37,628 38,784 38,650 43,680 45,167 56,865 47,487 49,029 50,735 48,894 56,172 58,643 65,857 60,125 26,630 27,131 27,047 27,307 33,918 26,322 34,567 35,260 36,284 35,008 36,403 43,752 44,436 48,192 35,931 36,887 35,971 36,768 46,350 48,447 45,258
CROPHA USD ha-1 531 633 423 327 576 507 273 514 581 490 427 606 504 435 607 722 436 438 669 595 390 785 943 686 650 933 697 679 411 579 416 261 510 439 315
TOTHA USD ha-1 5,058 5,073 5,294 5,950 6,035 7,557 6,386 7,709 7,529 7,756 9,567 8,755 9,791 9,502 5,066 4,936 5,273 5,236 6,452 5,007 6,732 5,823 5,934 5,844 6,136 7,330 7,343 7,996 5,146 5,065 5,195 5,266 6,456 6,924 6,372
DIST CROP 103 USD 15,510 20,737 9,725 24,296 19,663 16,842 4,781 16,994 21,155 10,497 23,072 18,579 17,326 7,115 15,382 19,891 8,165 22,870 19,595 15,120 10,296 12,321 16,832 9,011 21,849 15,354 12,156 11,676 12,535 17,597 8,470 22,448 11,272 13,279 4,141
ANIMAL 103 USD 34,561 34,631 36,659 42,246 41,899 54,516 46,995 48,835 49,784 49,375 57,265 59,459 67,015 62,696 25,165 25,158 26,544 27,014 33,129 25,650 36,380 33,334 33,272 33,960 35,829 40,759 44,214 46,945 34,256 33,774 34,506 35,755 45,154 47,529 45,845
TOTAL 103 USD 50,070 55,369 46,384 66,543 61,562 71,358 51,776 65,829 70,940 59,873 80,337 78,037 84,341 69,810 40,547 45,050 34,709 49,884 52,725 40,770 46,676 45,656 50,103 42,971 57,678 56,113 56,370 58,621 46,791 51,371 42,976 58,203 56,426 60,808 49,986
TOTHA USD ha-1 1,219 1,274 1,150 1,740 1,525 1,684 1,352 1,475 1,521 1,401 1,874 1,744 1,826 1,761 915 953 801 1,147 1,197 913 1,280 1,474 1,523 1,428 1,948 1,795 1,767 1,978 1,001 1,049 935 1,269 1,210 1,278 1,135
CROPHA USD ha-1 377 477 241 635 487 397 125 381 454 246 538 415 375 179 347 421 189 526 445 339 282 398 512 299 738 491 381 394 268 359 184 489 242 279 94
Producer KSPBGT KKAURG YZRGLN KVAYRK KKRSVTActivity
 
Notes: SK – Shirkats; PF – Private farms; HH – Rural households; CROP – total profits of producer from crop growing activities; ANIM – total profits of producer from
livestock and poultry keeping activities; TOTAL – total profits of producer from crop growing and livestock and poultry keeping activities; TOTHA – total profit per
hectare of sown area; CROPHA – profit from cropping activities per hectare of sown area; KSPBGT – Aggregate for Khazarasp and Bagat districts; KKAURG –
Aggregate for Khanka and Urgench districts; YZRGLN – Aggregate for Yangibazar and Gurlen districts; KVAYRK – Aggregate for Khiva and Yangiarik districts;
KKRSVT – Aggregate for Kushkupir and Shavat districts; Base – Base situation (observed), EXP1 – Investment into irrigation and drainage system; EXP2 –
Introduction of water pricing; EXP3 – Liberalization of cotton and input markets; EXP4 – Accomplishment of farm restructuring; EXP5 – Improvement in livestock
sector; EXP6 – Cumulative scenario 
Source: Model simulation results 
 
